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ABSTRACT 
The Filipino Way of War is the dominant irregular warfare strategy executed by the 
Filipino warrior throughout the centuries. Armed with severely limited resources, a 
strong fighting spirit, and deep traditions, the Filipino warrior has always had to look for 
another method of warfare other than direct and total war. This has led to the indirect 
path, the path of irregular warfare. This tradition, built upon a foundation of tribal 
warfare, shaped by resistance to Spanish and American colonization, and honed during 
the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese occupation, has emerged in the modern era as 
the predominant Filipino military strategy. Entering the 21st century, conflict in the 
Philippines has not been focused on external invaders, but on internal division. In this 
era, both government and anti-government forces have recalled their traditions and 
experiences and predominantly used irregular warfare strategies, often through 
unconventional warfare, insurgency, or special operations. As external military influences 
wane, it is important to understand and prepare the Armed Forces of the Philippines for 
the future by understanding their past history, so that the Filipino warrior will be better 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTROSPECTION 
It has become cliché, in the 21st century, that in order to achieve success in most 
endeavors it is of the utmost importance that one must have an intimate understanding of 
their own personal makeup. This idea, applied to military philosophy, is commonly 
credited to Sun Tzu and believed to have been written somewhere around 500 B.C., 
translated as “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be 
in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning 
and losing are equal.”1 Though the original impact of this statement may not resonate as 
tremendously now as it did then, this idiom of understanding still holds very true. To 
understand your personal makeup is to set yourself on a continuous path towards self-
improvement. Introspection is vitally important; it allows us to evaluate our successes 
and, more importantly, our failures. Then from the lessons we learn and grow, we adapt 
and proceed. Understanding where a person comes from – their background, heritage, 
and culture – helps to understand where they are going. This concept is just as important 
(if not more so) for the soldier as for any other. For war is life and death; and in this, if 
the soldier understands himself, then he can plan, prepare, and decide action more 
effectively. The action will be more appropriate to his ability, but still ultimately lead to 
the desired goal of success in war.   
If the axiom of the soldier understanding himself or herself holds true for personal 
success in war, then this same concept should be applied to military organizations at all 
levels  – from the individual, to the squad, battalion, division, army, and every level in 
between. Introspection of past organizational action will always benefit the organization 
as a whole. Through this analysis, the military organization can better understand its own 
traditions and manner of fighting – in other words, its way of war. The idea that a 
military organization may show consistency of habit in the manner that war is fought 
follows this analytical line of thought. A military organization must look to its past to see 
                                                 
 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), 84. 
 2 
how it will face the future. 2 The Filipino Way of War is the idea that a deep tradition of 
irregular warfare is present throughout the history of Filipino warfare, and that in the 
future the Filipino warrior can look to this tradition for solutions to the fights that present 
themselves. 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an exploratory study of the military 
strategy that has been employed by Filipinos in warfare. From the earliest days of 
barangay battles to the modern conflicts against the gambit of nebulous, ideological, 
trans-national, state, and non-state threats, understanding how Filipinos fought in the past 
will better prepare Filipinos to fight in the future. By identifying and understanding the 
building blocks, genetic DNA, and evolution of strategy for the Army of the Republic of 
the Philippines, we will generate recommendations for how to proceed with a continued 
positive evolution. This study will benefit both the Philippine as well as the American 
militaries, which have been so greatly interwoven throughout the last century, and will 
continue to be far into the next. 
 In 1973, Russell F. Weigley published his seminal work, The American Way of 
War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. The work is a detailed 
study of how Americans have defined, studied, and applied military strategy from the 
founding of the nation to his date of publication. Weigley’s conclusion is a well-respected 
account of how, generally, American military men have focused their thinking on 
military strategy at the tactical and operational levels, and rarely at the strategic level. 
This led to the default American strategic level strategy used until the Cold War, which 
was to apply military power not “to attain political ends, except as the nation used force 
in wartime openly and directly in pursuit of military victories as complete as was desired 
or possible.”3 In application, this amounted to Clausewitz’s “total war,” the 
overwhelming application of resources and military power to annihilate the enemies’ 
military power. When done, America could then impose its will with little resistance. 
Weigley concludes that even when faced with a Clausewitzian “limited war” scenario, 
                                                 
2 Dr. John Arquila, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, in 
discussion with the authors, August 2011. 
 3 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(New York: Macmillan, 1973), xix. 
 3 
America still defaulted to the goal of total annihilation of enemy military power, ignoring 
more political and less direct use of military power to achieve goals. These mismatches 
of objective and strategy can obviously have serious repercussions. It can be argued that 
even to this day, America has had more than its share of pain in the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, because when goals are not clear, the U.S. military will default to do what it is 
designed best to do, high intensity annihilation-style warfare.  
Understanding how the American military has evolved and fought in past wars 
was critical to Weigley, because he believed that “what we believe and do today is 
governed at least as much by the habits of mind we formed in the relatively remote past 
as by what we did and thought yesterday. The relatively remote past is apt to constrain 
our thoughts and actions more because we understand it less well than we do our recent 
past, or at least recall it less clearly, and it has cut deeper grooves of custom in our 
minds.”4 Therefore, by truly analyzing and understanding why America has chosen past 
strategies, the military to can more effectively choose strategy in the future.  
A similar theoretical idea will be applied in this thesis, not to dispute the 
American Way of War, but to identify the Filipino Way of War. When Weigley wrote his 
treatise on American strategy, he had little American strategic writing available to work 
with. He therefore states that he was forced to study “a history of ideas expressed in 
action.”5 Just as Weigley traced the American model from the very beginning of the 
formation of the American nation state, this thesis will begin at a time when the islands 
that now make up the Republic of the Philippines were not a single nation state, but a 
collection of separate and distinct nations without a state. This was a time when loyalties 
lay with the barangay (or village), the tribe, and the family.6 The study will trace the 
Filipino military idea of strategy by studying the military action of Filipinos from these 
early beginnings through the colonial period, to independence, and into the present day, 
all the while following the formation and evolution of the Philippine nation state. 
                                                 
4 Weigley, The American Way of War, xx. 
5 Ibid. 
 6 Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Quezon City Philippines: New 
Day Publishers, 2000), 2–4. 
 4 
B. IRREGULAR WARFARE STRATEGY    
The overarching theme to Russell Weigley’s study is that, in the broadest terms, 
there are generally two types of military strategy.7 These for the most part fall in line 
with Clausewitz’s own writings on war. First, that the object of war is “to compel the 
enemy to do our will,”8 and that because war is “a continuation of political intercourse, 
carried on by other means….the political objective is the goal, war is the means of 
reaching it.”9 Therefore, depending on the chosen political goal and the ability of a 
military to force its will, the war can either be a total war, where annihilation and 
occupation are the end-state, or a limited war, where the goal is something less than 
annihilation and occupation.10 Weigley concludes his introduction by summarizing the 
German military historian Hans Delbruck, whom he says draws upon Clausewitz’s 
distinction between the two kinds of war.11  
Delbruck suggests that there are two kinds of military strategy: the 
strategy of annihilation, which seeks to overthrow the enemy’s military 
power: and the strategy of attrition, exhaustion, or erosion, which is 
usually employed by a strategist whose means are not great enough to 
permit pursuit of the direct overthrow of the enemy and who therefore 
resorts to the indirect approach.12  
Weigley makes a solid case that, due to there always being a plethora of resources 
and means available to the United States military, the resulting American way of war is 
then a deep tradition of fighting an annihilation-style total war. The U.S. commonly uses 
a direct application of overwhelming force and resources against any military problem, 
even when, as stated previously, annihilation is not the proper solution. It can be 
generalized that this is exactly the situation the American military found itself in during 
the war in Vietnam. The United States military, faced with an insurgent war of political 
                                                 
7 Weigley, The American Way of War, xxii. 
8 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.  
9 Ibid., 87. 
10 Clausewitz, On War, 90–99. 
11 Weigley, The American Way of War, xxii. 
12 Ibid. 
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movement, chose the strategy that had served itself so well in World War I, World War 
II, and the Korean War: “big units, traditional tactics, and overwhelming firepower.”13 
The result is well documented, and generally serves as a modern day lesson on how not 
to counter insurgent political warfare. Delbruck’s first strategy is the essence of the 
modern military definition of conventional warfare, employment of large units, using 
traditional tactics and the nine principles of war against an enemy.14 The characteristics 
of conventional warfare will be fundamental to this study by providing the contrast used 
to identify irregular warfare. Large units, divisions, fleets, air wings, heavily resourced 
joint combined arms maneuver warfare, quick decisive victories, the pursuit of new 
technologies, and annihilation goals are the characteristics of conventional warfare. 
Specifically, the difference between attrition and annihilation will be important in 
differentiating between conventional and irregular warfare. Annihilation, being the 
complete destruction of an enemy’s ability to resist having their wills changed, versus 
attrition, which is the wearing down of an enemy until they then decide to change their 
own will. An irregular warrior, with limited means to annihilate their enemy, will always 
resort to a strategy of wearing down the enemy because there is no other option.  
The Filipino warrior has consistently either chosen or been forced, by lack of 
resources and military might, to resort to something that falls within the realm of 
Delbruck’s second strategy. The more commonly used modern military term for the 
strategy of the warrior who does not engage in conventional warfare is irregular warfare. 
 Recently Dr. John Arquilla, the chair of the U.S. Special Operations Command-
funded Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, published a 
book that studies irregular warfare leaders from history who have left a significant impact 
on warfare.15 In his study, Dr. Arquilla first presents the definition and the characteristics 
of irregular warfare. This definition then becomes the parameter he uses to identify and 
rate the irregular warfare masters.  
                                                 
13 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 6. 
14 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–0 Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Defense, Feb 2008), Appendix A:Principles of War and Operations, A-1. 
15 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, preface. 
 6 
The study of this field is markedly relevant, as the American wars in the first 
decade of the 21st century have created a palpable buzz and a business of trying to 
understand and compete in irregular warfare. That being said, there continues to be 
debate and confused descriptions of what irregular warfare is, who conducts it, what its 
purpose is, and where the lines between irregular and conventional are drawn, if any. 
This inability for irregular warfare to be consistently described arises from the fact that it, 
in itself, as Dr. Arquilla states, is one of greatest complexities of armed conflicts.16 
Irregular warfare arises from a situation where at least one of the combatants is at a 
disadvantage; where one or the other does not possess the means or the military might to 
challenge their rival directly.17 This environment often puts one of the belligerent’s back 
against the wall, where it seems that no other option is available. This is often where 
human creativity and innovation rise to the occasion. New tactics and strategies are 
developed. Technologies, which previously had been unconsidered, are given their 
chance, and abnormal risks are taken because there is no option for direct conventional 
war. Because of this concept, and because the “age old pattern of action reaction in 
military affairs persists,”18 the environment, means, and methods used in irregular 
warfare are constantly changing, often even before the steady state can be identified.  
Despite the complexity, Dr. Arquilla is able to firmly describe irregular warfare. 
His definition includes three fundamental characteristics. First, that irregular warfare is 
conducted by small units, whereas conventional warfare is characterized by large 
formations of armies, fleets, and wings. Secondly, that the tactics of irregular warfare are 
appropriate to small units in their many forms and names, whether they be guerrillas, 
commandos, insurgents, Green Berets, terrorist cells, etc. Lastly, Dr. Arquilla describes 
the third leg of his “irregular warfare triad” simply as terrorism.19  
Several additional facts add to the complexity. First, irregular warfare can be 
conducted by large standing militaries, as well as it can be by any other form of warring 
                                                 
16 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 3. 
17 Weigley, The American Way of War, xxii. 
18 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 13. 
19 Ibid., 4–5. 
 7 
party one can imagine. This fact is corroborated by the large amount of effort that the 
U.S. military has recently put into understanding, then adapting the standing force to 
conduct and master irregular warfare. In January of 2009, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (USDOD) released its Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. In the 
report are outlined the six core mission areas. These are considered to be “relatively 
enduring missions; they are necessary for achieving strategic end states derived from the 
2008 National Defense Strategy; they constitute a broad military activity; they describe a 
unique Department of Defense capability and capacity; or they identify a mission for 
which the Defense Department is the U.S. Government lead and/or provides the 
preponderance of U.S. Government capabilities.”20 The core mission areas are: 1) 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 2) Deterrence Operations, 3) Major Combat 
Operations, 4) Irregular Warfare, 5) Military Support to Stabilization Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 6) Military Contribution to Cooperative 
Security.21 The addition of irregular warfare by a military with a deep tradition of 
conventional, high intensity, annihilation warfare is a telling sign of its perceived 
importance. 
Furthermore, although seemingly a reactionary effort to friction in the GWOT, as 
well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USDOD has also published two versions of 
the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IWJOC) (version 1.0 in 2007, and version 
2.0 released in 2010). Both studies contain a detailed attempt to define the irregular 
warfare environment, problem, approach, activities, operations, methodologies, and 
requirements.22 The IWJOC even goes as far as laying out what irregular warfare 
operations the U.S. will conduct in order for the U.S. Special Operations Command, the 
lead agency for irregular warfare in USDOD, to plan and organize units against the tasks. 
These missions include: Counterterrorism, Unconventional Warfare (U.S. resistance and 
                                                 
 20 USDOD, “Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 2009” (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2009) 
21 Ibid., 5–6. 
 22 Joint Staff, “Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept 1.0” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2007) 
Joint Staff, “Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept 2.0” 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010) 
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insurgent activities designed to overthrow an enemy government or occupying power), 
Foreign Internal Defense (support to a friendly government to resist subversion, 
lawlessness, and insurgency), Counterinsurgency, and Stability Operations.23 These 
efforts are proof that irregular warfare can be conducted by a large, well-resourced, 
highly technical, standing military just as easily as they can by a farmer squatting in the 
jungle with an assault rifle and little motivation. Unsurprisingly, the recent U.S. IWJOC 
is very threat focused, often portraying irregular warfare as a defensive option only to be 
taken against those enemies who are conducting irregular warfare against the U.S. This is 
untrue; irregular warfare can be used by big militaries, in the offensive, preemptive, or as 
a first response, against irregular and conventional enemies. Though irregular warfare can 
be conducted by well-resourced groups, it is more commonly the strategy of the under 
resourced. Likewise, when there is some form of asymmetric advantage between two 
sides, either the strong or the weak side can choose to use irregular warfare based upon 
their goals. In an era of constrained budgets, irregular warfare will be a cost saving 
measure. If limited goals can be achieved with a properly executed 
political/unconventional warfare campaign, then why commit large expensive formations, 
fleets, and wings? 
A second complexity that Dr. Arquilla establishes is that the lines between 
irregular warfare and conventional warfare are often blurred. Not only do many of the 
conventional warfare principles apply to irregular warfare, but irregular warfare and 
conventional warfare can coexist, and even be conducted simultaneously by the same 
combatant. 24 
It is important to understand the distinctions and differences between 
conventional and irregular warfare strategy, in order to identify or discern a way of war 
that relies on one or the other. This study will extract six characteristics of warfare 
strategy from Dr. Arquilla’s definition of irregular warfare (Figure 1): 1) the size of units 
involved, 2) how well they are supported or resourced, 3) the type of doctrine or tactics 
employed, 4) the effect, 5) the objective, and 6) the force’s perspective on technology.  
                                                 
23 Joint Staff, “Irregular Warfare, Joint Operating Concept 1.0,” 7, 17–24. 
24 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 8–12. 
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Conventional warfare, because of its place in history, commonly seems to be an 
easier concept to grasp than irregular warfare, with its more nebulous nature. However, 
when placed in direct comparison, the stark contrast between the two offers a solid range 
of characteristics to identify irregular warfare. These ideas and definitions will be 
paramount to understanding how the Filipino warrior and the Philippine Army have 
evolved their use of strategy in warfare throughout the centuries.  
 
Figure 1.  Conventional and irregular warfare characteristics comparison 
 In order to flesh out these characteristics from Filipino military history, we will 
organize and detail the different eras of Filipino warfare, pre-colonial, colonial, Japanese 
occupation, post-independence and war on terror, into three categories. These categories, 
organization of forces, tactics / doctrine, and attitude towards technology will allow us to 
organize and identify the characteristics from Figure 1.  
 These characteristics and divisions are certainly not all encompassing, or a 
disqualifying factor, in the identification of either strategy of war. For example, 
conventional forces often will use characteristics this study has attributed to irregular 
warfare. Hypothetically, this could be seen in a scenario where two evenly matched 
conventional forces might fight for a goal of attrition because annihilation is not possible. 
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A conventional force may also leverage existing technology, but it may also seek new 
weapons for gaining advantage. Less likely is the reverse: irregular warfare forces 
exhibiting conventional warfare characteristics. It is unlikely that a true irregular force 
would conduct joint combined arms maneuver warfare, or use fleets, divisions, or air 
wings. These are characteristics reserved for conventional forces. However, this is not a 
black and white comparison; there will be mixes, hybrids, crossover, and blurring in all 
aspects. The key, and importance, of using these characteristics is to make a diagnosis of 
what has (and is happening) on battlefields. When a warrior has the knowledge and 
ability to identify irregular warfare strategy, they then can harness it for lethality and 
success, or defeat it with efficiency. 
C. THE FILIPINO WAY OF WAR 
Warfare conducted by the Filipino warrior has been consistently dominated by 
irregular warfare strategies. While there have been conventional warfare operations, the 
overwhelming characteristics of Filipino operations fall strongly into the category of 
irregular warfare. Generally, warfare in the Philippines can be separated into five specific 
periods of warfare: pre-colonial, colonial (which can be further broken down into the 
Spanish and American periods), Japanese occupation, post-independence, and the Global 
War on Terror. In each of these periods, small units using insurgent, guerrilla, or special 
operations tactics have conducted the majority of operations. 
In 1971, Philippine Army Major Robert T. Yap-Diangco published a study titled 
The Filipino Guerrilla Tradition. His study presents an idea that the prevalence of 
guerrilla warfare (a term that, he states, has “often been used indiscriminately to describe 
an irregular form of warfare”25) is the result of socio-political, religious, and economic 
milieu that are common throughout the history of the Philippines.26 These stated 
conditions create a situation where one or more entities are under resourced, or are under 
cared for socially. Because these populations have goals or aspirations, they are therefore 
in competition. In the Philippines, this competition has come in the form of warfare 
                                                 
25 Robert Yap-Diangco, The Filipino Guerrilla Tradition (Manila: MCS Enterprises, Inc., 1971), 129. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
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against each other, and more dominantly, against colonial occupiers. Because in warfare 
annihilation is the goal and survival the highest priority, under-resourced entities must 
always default to a strategy of survival, and attempt military victory by others means. The 
most dominant characteristic which leads to the development of guerrilla warfare is a 
level of economic subsistence. Those populations with lower levels have a higher 
inclination for guerrilla war. Yap-Diangco concludes that, up until the time of writing his 
study, Filipino guerrilla warfare had been conducted for national liberation. He warns that 
it is important to continue to analyze the “social-political and economic discontents 
which invariably create strain in the existing relationship between military and civilian 
entities.”27 
Major Yap-Diangco’s study is important because it concludes two key points: that 
guerrilla warfare is a result of one side having a significant lack of resources in 
competition with another, and that this disparity threatens the survival of the guerrilla. 
This resource asymmetry puts the guerrilla’s survival at stake, because if the guerrilla is 
identified, then the anti-guerrilla will be at a significant advantage. In open combat, the 
better resourced is generally at an advantage, making up for any organizational weakness 
with resources. Because Filipinos have consistently operated militarily with fewer 
resources than their enemies have, they often have resorted to an irregular warfare 
strategy.  
An important aspect of the Filipino irregular warfare thread is that each period 
reinforced what was learned in the previous. Filipinos began with a solid, irregular 
warfare, tribal base. Following this were two long and significant periods of irregular 
warfare against foreign occupiers, Spain and America. In each of these two periods, 
resources were limited, and Filipinos were forced onto the indirect path – the irregular 
warfare path. The Japanese occupation during World War II was almost industrial 
guerrilla warfare in its intensity, and few Filipinos were unaffected by the brutality of this 
war. The awfulness of guerrilla warfare became commonplace, and Filipinos became 
quite good at it. After the Japanese occupation, there was a significant change in 
conditions that should be addressed. Specifically that, other than during the pre-
                                                 
27 Yap-Diangco, The Filipino Guerrilla Tradition, 132. 
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colonial/tribal era, Filipinos had been fighting outsiders, and not resolving internal strife 
and divisions. These internal divisions were put on the backburner until independence 
was gained. Thus, after 1945, Filipinos found themselves trying to resolve the problems 
of their national identity. Resources were still very much lacking on both the pro-
government and anti-government sides. The government was supported by the United 
States, but because the U.S. was overwhelmingly resourced for the Cold War, they could 
not support the Philippine government to the necessary capacity. The anti-government 
forces returned to what they knew, and what they were good at, to their traditions of 
irregular warfare. The next 60 years would be marked by a series of irregular warfare 
conflicts fought throughout the islands. 
By going back into history and studying the actions which have taken place, we 
will identify and prove this deep tradition of Filipino irregular warfare. In order to 
actually constitute a way of war, an action must be observed over time. This thesis will 
begin in the pre-colonial era, roughly 1000 A.D. to 1500 A.D., and then travel through 
the colonial era and into the 20 and 21 centuries. During these periods, we will look at the 
military action undertaken by the people of the Philippines Islands, to see if they contain 
the characteristics of irregular warfare and fit Dr. Arquilla’s irregular warfare definition.  
As previously stated, this will be done through an analysis of the organizational 
structures used, the doctrines, and the attitudes towards technology. For example, was the 
organization large and conventional, or small and cellular? How were recruiting, 
communications, and intelligence conducted? Were the common organizational designs 
essentially more oriented for irregular warfare, or for traditional conventional battle? The 
study of tactics and doctrine will expose the irregular warfare characteristics of strategy, 
goals, and effects. The third area that this thesis will look at is the attitude towards 
technology over time. Did the Filipino warrior try to advance and develop new weapons 
of war to win the day, or did they adapt to their limited means and leverage an advantage 
using existing technologies.28 By using these three criteria and matching them to the 
characteristics of irregular warfare, including the three legs of irregular warfare (small 
                                                 
28 Dr. John Arquilla, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, in 
discussion with authors, August 2011. 
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units, guerrilla / insurgent tactics, and terrorism), a clear thread of irregular warfare will 
be seen throughout every period in Filipino history. 
Warfare on the islands of the Philippines in pre-colonial times (before 1500) was 
brutal and savage. Marked by the use of edged hand weapons, and conducted in close 
quarters face to face, the violence was emotional, personal, and ferocious. Loyalties lay 
with the barangay chieftain and his family. Common were barangay raids conducted by 
the males of a nearby barangay. Occasionally barangays would ally, but often the 
motivation was for reasons such as subsistence, revenge, glory, and pride.29 This period 
would form the base that the following three periods would be built on. Traditions of 
loyalty, honor, a savage style of fighting, and cellular structure would be carried by the 
people for centuries. This may be considered the “irregular warfare DNA” of the Filipino 
warrior. 
Throughout the Spanish and American colonial periods (1521–1941), the use of 
irregular and conventional tactics was common for both the colonials and the indigenous. 
These periods were times of learning irregular warfare. Lessons, such as the idea that 
going toe to toe against better-resourced forces would result in defeat, would be hard 
learned. The colonial periods were very much the adolescent years of Filipino irregular 
warfare culture. The Spanish and American forces had more success with conventional 
operations than their Filipino opponents, due to their ability to resource the armies and 
dominate the conventional battlefield with superior firepower. Conversely, the Filipinos 
had significant success with guerrilla/insurgent tactics, owing to their ability to move 
freely, gain intelligence, recruit, and operate in a true guerrilla environment.30 Filipino 
attempts at conventional warfare were often premature, costly, and bloody. This lack of 
success in conventional warfare further fused into the psyche of the Filipino warrior that 
irregular warfare was the one true way of success.31 In a common characteristic of 
irregular warfare, without the ability to claim success on the battlefield through 
                                                 
29 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 2–5. 
30 Ibid, 15–69. 
31 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine American War, 1899–1902 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2007) 
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conventional means, Filipino guerrillas dug in for protracted, small-scale conflicts.32 
However, the U.S.-directed development of the AFP was more along the lines of the 
American conventional model, due to the ultimate success of the era’s foreign 
conventional warfare tactics.  
By 1935, the Philippines was declared a commonwealth by the United States, but 
true independence would have to wait.33 For in December of 1941, following their 
declaration of war and surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began attacking 
American and Philippine military targets in the archipelago. By the spring of 1942, the 
Japanese had pushed most major American assets off the islands and captured the final 
American/ Filipino allied holdouts at Bataan and Corregidor. 34 However, the following 
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese would be no easy task. Filipinos, now on 
the run with their former colonial occupiers, fell back into the jungle and began to wage a 
successful guerrilla campaign. Many different and independent insurgent units fought to 
harass and expel the invaders from the islands. Filipino Scouts, Hukbalahap communist 
guerrillas, and un-captured Filipino and American units all participated in the irregular 
warfare waged until the Allies could amass enough military might and return to expel the 
Japanese main force units through conventional means.35 The guerrilla warfare campaign 
during the Japanese occupation is likened here to a finishing school for guerrillas. Taking 
their historical traditions and lessons learned, the Filipinos fought the Japanese harder 
than they fought any other foreign occupier. These were difficult years, marked by brutal 
violence against the Japanese and themselves. The guerrillas and guerrilla units, which 
survived these years, were hardened to the task and carried their skills into the next 
generation of conflict. 
After World War II, the Filipino people gained their long-sought independence, 
and with it, a completely new series of internal conflicts. While the Republic of the 
Philippines was now an independent nation state, the country continued to be culturally 
                                                 
32 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 9. 
33 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 195–203. 
34 John Costello, The Pacific War 1941–1945 (New York: Perennial, 1981), 171–213. 
35Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 308–351.  
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and politically disunited. With many well-armed guerrilla organizations still in existence 
on the islands, the violent struggle toward political goals continued. The government was 
seen as weak, and the irregular warfare traditions surged. These were the first adult years 
for Filipino guerrilla traditions. Built upon many centuries, the Filipino warrior now 
found himself using his irregular warfare skills against other Filipinos. Furthermore, the 
nation was still not free from American influence. While the U.S. had granted 
autonomous rule, American business and military influence was still strong throughout 
these transition years.36 The United States continued to maintain large naval and air bases 
on the Philippine islands. As World War II ended and the Cold War heated up, the Pacific 
theatre continued to be a front line. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the United 
States and the Philippines were committed to an alliance to defend each other from any 
external threat. In application, this meant that the United States would secure the 
Philippines and respond to any invasion, but in return would use the Philippines as a key 
lager and staging area. The U.S. and the Philippines maintained a robust cooperative 
alliance during this time, with the Philippine army even contributing to the U.S. wars in 
Korea and Vietnam.37 Out of this relationship was the largest period of conventional 
growth for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Resourced, trained, and mentored 
by the United States, the AFP developed their conventional capabilities for future Cold 
War combat. Simultaneously, though on the home front, the Philippine nation faced a 
more immediate threat. For the next fifty years after World War II, the Philippine Nation 
would be engaged with one internal insurgency after another. First, the Huk communist 
rebellion in 1946–1954,38 followed by the New People’s Army (NPA) from 1969 
onwards, challenged the internal ruling factions of the Philippines. Outside of the 
communist insurgency problem, there was also a growing Islamic revolution in the 
Southern Islands among the Moro population. This would produce guerrilla organizations 
                                                 
 36 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 99–100.  
37 Ibid., 100–101. 
38 Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Pub. Inc., 1977), xix-xxiv. 
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such as the Moro National Liberation Front, and the splinter Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front, each of which has been active in the 1970s through today. 39 
Homegrown insurgents, secessionists, and rebels would routinely use all facets of 
irregular warfare, including terrorism, in battle against the AFP. The AFP would learn 
many hard lessons on how to deal with insurgency. Throughout the campaigns, the AFP 
would occasionally use conventional tactics to counter the insurgent threats. Over time, 
the recognition that these were not working would become clear. The conventional tactics 
were ineffective against the guerrillas, and they isolated the population from the 
government, often forcing a neutral population firmly into the anti-government camp 
with the government’s use of heavy-handed tactics. The AFP slowly developed 
population-centric counterinsurgency tactics, combined with special operations, and these 
structured conventional operations would turn the tide for the government. Adding the 
Filipino understanding that counterinsurgency was a whole government problem, and not 
strictly a military one, created a holistic attitude to solve the population’s grievances 
combined with a smart security strategy. The AFP had adopted a conventional mindset 
from the U.S., but ultimately settled for a more balanced method of warfare that also 
included tradition and experience. Many of these holistic, hybrid, irregular/conventional 
strategy lessons continue to be used with success to this day.40 
Moving towards the end of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st 
century, the problems of the Islamic and communist rebellions have not gone away, 
though for the most part, they have been contained. These recent decades, unfortunately, 
have not seen peace come to the Philippines. The Nation has not only been plagued by 
insurgent irregular warfare, but also by a number of internal military coups. These 
irregular military operations, which include the Peoples Power Revolution EDSA, 
EDSAIII, the Oakwood Mutiny, and other coups, show panache for irregular warfare, 
even among the Philippine military elite.41 By 2001, one of the largest growing problems 
within the Philippines was the influence, harboring, and alliance of Moro Islamic 
                                                 
39 Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 1–27. 
40 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 485–646. 
41 Ibid., 604. 
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insurgents with trans-national terrorist organizations. These organizations have increased 
the capacity and the capabilities of Filipinos to conduct terrorism against their own 
Nation, so far as to gain the attention of the United States. At the time of this study, the 
U.S. military has maintained an almost constant special operations presence in the 
Southern Philippines since 2001.42 Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines, a lesser 
known front in the U.S. Global War on Terror, is aimed at assisting the AFP in 
combating these transnational threats, while simultaneously supporting the growth of the 
AFP’s capacity and capability to counter insurgency.43 All sides in this quiet war (the 
U.S., the AFP, trans-national terrorist organizations, and the national Moro Islamic 
insurgents) have readily accepted and used irregular warfare against each other. 44 All are 
in the business of using small units and guerrilla tactics, with special operations being the 
dominant form for government forces, and terrorism a first option for anti-government 
forces.45 
When we take these six eras of warfare and compare them with the characteristics 
of irregular warfare, it is clear that irregular warfare appears in all six periods. The key 
characteristics of irregular warfare are present in each period: small, under-resourced 
units using any tactics they can to survive, to attrite the enemy, and to continue the battle 
until they are able to win their political state. 
                                                 
42 1st Special Forces Group, “The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 
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Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 44 (1st Quarter 2007) 
45 Brian Petit, “OEF-Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” Special Warfare Magazine, vol. 
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Figure 2.  Irregular warfare characteristics through Filipino warfare eras 
In Figure 2, we have separated terrorism from the other tactics or doctrines. This 
is because we feel that the use of terrorism needs its own separate identification, due to 
the political sensitivity of its use, and because of the high degree of contemporary focus 
and study of the tactic. Furthermore, because terrorism is specifically broken out by Dr. 
Arquilla as one of the three legs of his irregular warfare triad from other tactics, we felt it 
was important to differentiate in this study. This is that terrorism is distinctly different 
from the other tactics of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, or special operations. For this 
study, terrorism will be defined according to the U.S. joint definition provided in the 
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 2.0. “Terrorism is the calculated use or threat 




governments or societies through fear.”46 Throughout the study we will keep terrorism 
separate from other tactics in order to keep track of when it becomes a prevalent aspect of 
the Filipino way of war.  
Figure 2 is a generalization of six distinct and detailed eras of conflict. However, 
the detailed narrative in each era better supports the ability to return to these fundamental 
characteristics of irregular warfare during the analysis of in the subsequent chapters of 
this study. 
When taken together, both will present a concrete conclusion that, in each of these 
conflicts, Filipinos have consistently competed for their interests to the best of their 
abilities. That the ends, ways, and means of the multitude of Filipino military 
organizations has resulted in generations of leaders, deciding to use irregular warfare 
strategies to achieve their political objectives.47  
With a deep and history of action to analyze, the idea that irregular warfare is the 
Filipino Way of War will be shown. Small units, guerrilla tactics, special operations, 
terrorism, hybrid irregular/conventional campaigns, and the simultaneous use by military 
and insurgent organizations, will make it clear that the Filipino is at home with irregular 
warfare. Important to this study is to understand why we should analyze this. The 
conclusion will present ideas and recommendations for how the AFP should proceed 
forward in the next fifty years. With all of their hard fought lessons learned and a 
ingrained flair for the irregular, the AFP has settled with a more holistic strategy using 
irregular, conventional, and complete government resources to meet national threats. As 
external military influence on and in the Philippines wanes in this century, it is important 
to understand and prepare the AFP for the future. By understanding past actions, as well 
as the strengths and weaknesses of their strategy, the Philippine military can be better 
prepared for tomorrow. 
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II.  PRE-COLONIAL FILIPINO WARFARE 
“And they followed us, hurling poisoned arrows four or six times; while, 
recognizing the captain, they turned toward him inasmuch as twice they hurled arrows 
very close to his head. But as a good captain and a knight he still stood fast with some 
others, fighting thus for more than an hour. And he refused to retire further, an Indian 
threw a bamboo lance in his face, and the captain immediately killed him with his lance, 
leaving it in his body. Then, trying to lay hand on his sword, he could draw it out but 
halfway, because of a wound from a bamboo lance that he had in his arm. Which seeing, 
all those people threw themselves on him, and one of them with a large terciado, which is 
like a large scimitar, thrust it into his left leg, whereby he fell face downward. On this all 
at once rushed upon him with lances of iron and of bamboo and with scimitars, so that 
they slew our mirror, our light, our comfort, and our true guide.” 
 
–Antonio Pigafetta, on his personal account of the death of 
Ferdinand Magellan at the hands of Mactan Datu Lapu Lapu48 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 The deep traditions of irregular warfare in the Philippines were set long before 
Western colonial powers began to arrive in the islands. The tribal society that dominated 
Philippine culture prior to the arrival of the colonials, also contributed directly to the 
dominance of irregular warfare. The Barangay (village) was the dominant form of 
sociopolitical organization, as well as the main organization in warfare. Males from allied 
families within the barangay conducted battle led by their chief, often against their 
neighbors. The battles were bloody, savage, brutal, and close. Goals were the 
accumulation of wealth, women, glory, or vengeance.49 This truly was an age of irregular 
warfare for the Filipino warrior. The most common fighting seen was by small units from 
the barangay conducting raids against other barangays, using the hand weapons that they 
had available. Occasionally larger battles would take place, but often the only factor to 
change was the amount of warriors participating. The genetic DNA of irregular warfare 
                                                 
48Antonio Pigafetta, Magellan’s Voyage: A Narrative Account of the First Circumnavigation, Volume 
I, translated and edited by R.A. Skelton from the manuscript in Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript 
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inside the Filipino warrior was being solidified at this very early age, setting the path that 
the Filipino warrior would follow for centuries. 
B.  ENVIRONMENT / SITUATION 
To this day, there continues to be much debate about the manner and method of 
the development of the Filipino people and Filipino society. Generally, the debate 
revolves around where the first Filipinos arrived from, the manner of their arrival, and the 
extent of their spreading throughout the islands. What is known is that evidence of human 
existence on the islands can be traced through archeology as far back as 22,000 years 
ago.50 This time covers four large periods of development for the Filipino people. Pieced 
together through archeology using rare and incomplete historical stories, the 
Anthropologist F. Landa Jocano breaks these periods into the Formative Phase, the 
Incipient Phase, the Emergent Phase, and the Baranganic Phase.51  
The Formative Phase is exactly as titled, the period where the formation of a 
Filipino people and societal structure began. This was a very basic stone tool era.52 The 
Incipient Phase was characterized by a “general leveling off of local and regional socio-
cultural differences and the breakdown of isolation.”53 This phase was distinctive as a 
period where isolated groups began to interact, as well as by the appearance of metals and 
metalworking.54 The Emergent Phase was the period where a definable social 
organization appeared. This included patterns of politics, economics, religion, and social 
cultural practices. Intensive trading, both internal and external, was important to this 
phase of Filipino prehistory.55 This trading was important because it brought with it ideas 
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and inventions from other peoples, as well as the inevitable cross populating of cultures 
and peoples. Notably, trading was most common with people from India, China, Malay, 
and Arabia.  
The Final phase was the Baranganic Phase. Defined as the phase of the barangay 
or village, this phase ran from circa 14 through 16 centuries AD.56 This phase is the most 
important to this study because it was the period where society reached a point that 
warfare began to emerge. The irregular warfare trends developed in these centuries had a 
lasting impact on how warfare was conducted in future centuries. 
C.  ORGANIZATION 
 The organizational structure of warfare in the Baranganic Phase was the barangay. 
The barangay (or village) was the smallest sociopolitical unit in Filipino culture. These 
barangays were usually small, consisting of from 10 to 100 households. The larger (and 
more rare) barangays could be from 2000 to up to 20,000 households. The barangay was 
an independent, self-sustaining, politically organized community, controlled by a ruling 
Datu (chieftain) and a council of elders.57  
The purpose of the barangay was socially oriented. By joining together, the 
families within the barangay were able to share and work towards common goals, 
including but not limited to, defense of the home and land, economic trading, farming, 
and rule of law. One of the main purposes for the organization of the barangay was 
defense of the home and family from attack by other barangays. Barangay battles were 
common, but “since resources were plentiful and populations small,”58 territory was not 
generally a cause for battles.  
The reasons for battle included: control over the population, to avenge 
wrongdoing,59 broken trade promises, theft, murder,60 abuse of friendship, or general 
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feuding.61 Because battle could come at any time, it was necessary for each barangay to 
keep a standing force. This force was comprised of all the able-bodied males within the 
barangay.62  
The barangay force was personally led by their Datus, to whom the men 
developed and owed fierce loyalty.63 This responsibility was one of the most important 
tasks for the Datu. His leadership was only bestowed through heredity, skill in battle, or 
the accumulation of wealth and marriages, the latter of which could both be achieved 
through battle. Jocano describes the most important aspect of datuship as personal 
charisma and the ability to lead a community through hard times and prosper, to lead by 
example, and to lead from the front.64  
In order to strengthen their organizations, barangays would ally themselves with 
others for mutual benefit. However, this barangay alliance could also be forced by larger 
barangays upon smaller units.65 In April 1521, Ferdinand Magellan lost a battle (and his 
head) fighting against a barangay force led by the Mactan Chieftain Lapulapu.66 This 
battle is a fine example of the rapid organization of barangays for battle; “overnight, 
Lapulapu was able to mobilize hundreds of warriors to engage and defeat the Spaniards at 
dawn.”67 Though this is an example of an alliance for a larger operation, the majority of 
battles throughout the barangay era consisted of small barangays versus other small 
barangays. 
D.  TACTICS / DOCTRINE 
 The majority of inter-barangay warfare consisted of raiding neighboring 
barangays. This was an era of raiding and defending. The villages would wait until 
surprise was on their side, then strike swiftly with purpose in order to achieve their goal – 
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for example, to steal women, food, or weapons. Any raid would cause a reactionary 
attack; otherwise, the implication was that the barangay was weak, which would only 
invite more attacks.68  
Raids were carried out on land and at sea. Raids on land would be directed against 
enemy barangays, raids at sea against enemy ships. Because of the geographic features of 
the Philippines—over 7000 islands and massive coastlines—raiding parties would often 
travel in boats, land to conduct their attack, and then retreat via boat back to their own 
barangay. Because of the frequent maritime aspect, raiding was often seasonal, depending 
on tides, winds, weather, and harvests.69  
Another common offensive tactic was the ambush—by setting themselves in an 
area where it was known that an enemy would be traveling through, and then 
bushwhacking them. The third (and most obvious) common aspect to the doctrine of the 
era was defense. Simple fortifications were built to help protect the physical barangay, 
accompanied by the strategic placement of structures to take advantage of terrain to help 
in the defense.70 Outside of method of attack, actual battles were hand-to-hand combat; 
often taking place no farther than a spear could be thrown, but generally face to face 
since most warriors carried hand weapons. 
E.  WEAPONS / TECHNOLOGY 
 Filipino weapons of the Baranganic Phase were mostly handheld edged 
weapons—daggers, swords, knives, and spears being the most common. Other 
weapons—such as blowguns, bow and arrow, crossbows, and the stone and sling—were 
still used, but less frequently.71 As a comparison, both before and during the Baranganic 
Phase (14 through 16 centuries AD), outside of the Philippines, weapons which used  
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gunpowder (such as cannon, muskets, and pistols) were already in use around the world. 
Large sailing ships and conventional land armies were routinely outfitted with such 
weapons. 
 Handheld edged weapons were so common to the culture that for a male to appear 
in public without one was considered a sign of disgrace, and would imply that he was a 
slave.72 The most common blade weapons were the kris, a short sword used to slash. 
Often, the Filipino warrior would begin his attack by slashing at his enemy’s arm, hoping 
to disarm them by wounding the same hand they would wield their weapon.73 Also 
popular was the kampilan, a larger sword, that when delivered with a two handed stroke 
could cleave skull and bone. Finally, the Filipino would often be armed with a barong, a 
short leaf-shaped heavy blade, which could be concealed, yet could easily deliver a 
decapitating blow.74 
 Apart from weapons, Filipino warriors of the pre-colonial age would commonly 
be equipped with some personal protective equipment. Items such as heavy shields made 
of hard woods, and lighter shields made of lighter wood (using materials available 
locally), were used to protect from sword and spear blows. The warriors were sometimes 
also equipped with breastplates and helmets made from whatever was available. Quilted 
body armor similar to chain mail was created by weaving bamboo and carabao hide and 
horn. 
The most important aspect of the weapons of the era was that the Filipinos 
generally made good use of what they had available to them. Massive resources where 
not put into the development of better and better weapons. Instead, the Filipino warriors 
accepted their limited means and tried to leverage an advantage from the already existing 
technology. 
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F.  ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION 
 
Figure 3.  Pre-colonial Filipino irregular warfare characteristics 
 Present in the pre-colonial era were key aspects of irregular warfare. The 
barangay tribal forces generally fought in small units, raiding and ambushing each other. 
Occasionally they would create alliances in order to mass strength, but these would be 
fleeting and rare. These warriors used what technology was on hand and available at the 
time: handheld edged weapons and primitive projectile weapons. Compared to western 
militaries of the age, these were severely under-resourced fighting forces. However, when 
compared internally to each other, they were relatively evenly matched. The objectives of 
conflicts were far ranging, but due to the limited resources, battles were often quick. The 
types of military objectives were different, maintaining a more primitive purpose. 
Certainly, attrition and annihilation were both seen in the era, as well as long protracted 
battles and quick decisive engagements between barangays and families. The most 
important aspect of this analysis, and relevance to this thesis, is that the tribal pre-colonial 
era set the tone for future conflict in the Philippines. 
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 Based upon the organization (small units formed from families, which are not a 
regular paid force but an irregular force formed from within the community), the pre-
colonial Filipino warrior fits well within Dr. Arquilla’s definition of irregular warfare: 
under-resourced forces, using small units and guerrilla tactics. Coupling this organization 
with the common tactics of the day, raiding and ambushing, we see that the Filipino was 
conducting his warfare using guerrilla tactics. Modern terrorism of civilian populations 
was not specifically mentioned in Filipino pre-history writings, but it can be assumed that 
the nature of tribal conflict, which would include the entire family, would spread fear 
amongst the communities. The Pre-colonial Filipino was not a pre-trained, professional 
fighting force, but an irregular unit, using tactics, which came naturally and with little 
training. Sneaking up to gain relative superiority,75 and then striking quickly and 
violently, so as not to allow their enemy the ability to mount a defense. The weapons 
used were not overly developed or resourced. The Filipino warrior used what was 
available to him, trying to gain advantage by leveraging existing technology. The 
barangays and Datus did not have massive amounts of resources or wealth to dedicate to 
weapons development or manufacturing, so they made do with what was available, or 
with what could be gained through raids and battles. There can be no doubt, when 
looking at Filipino history as a whole, that the great tradition of irregular warfare began 
simultaneously with the formation and development of the people, society, and nation 
state. 
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III. SPANISH COLONIAL ERA WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Ferdinand Magellan discovered the Philippines on 17 March 1521, when he saw a 
group of islands off the coast of Samar.76 Magellan’s discovery brought to Spain’s 
awareness the existence of the archipelago later named the Philippines, in honor of King 
Philip II of Spain. However, it was not until 27 April 1565 that the Spanish colonization 
period began under the expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi.77 What followed was a 
very long period of Spanish rule for most of the islands and their inhabitants. Spanning 
more than three centuries, Spanish rule over the islands brought profound influences—
political, economic, social, cultural, and religious—in the lives of the people. The most 
notable of these influences was the introduction of Christianity.78 Further, the 
establishment of Spanish rule opened the Philippines to the western world.79 But while 
these influences may have brought some positive effects, the Filipinos were likewise 
subjected to the more negative and lamentable aspects of Spanish rule.80 The Filipino 
response to these negative aspects of Spanish rule finally found its expression with the 
Filipino revolt in the latter part of the 19 century. The Philippine revolution of 1896 
marked the beginning of Filipino solidarity, and of fighting foreign invaders under the 
concept of nationalism. Along with the revolution came the emergence of the Philippine 
military, certainly in its infancy stage. 
 Fighting during the pre-colonial period was between tribes. Loyalty was mainly to 
family and tribes, and the motivations were limited to tribal interests. The succeeding 
period, however, saw a shift from being tribal to more nationalistic in character. The 
period saw the coming together of the locals to fight against the colonizers. Ultimately, 
                                                 
76 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, 79–80. 
77 Ibid., 83–84. 
78 Ibid., 113–114. 
79 Ibid., 96, 123. 
80 Ibid., 123. 
 30 
the Spanish colonial period gave birth to the Philippine military, a fruition of national 
aspirations to achieve the quest for independence. 
This chapter presents the evolution of the Philippine military. It tells the story of 
how a revolutionary group, grossly lacking in resources, rose to fight a powerful enemy, 
armed only with their warrior tradition and their nationalistic fervor. The ensuing 
revolution, likewise, saw how the weak could overcome their inferiority to progressively 
turn the table against the strong. Starting from scratch, the revolutionaries kept their 
organizing activities underground in order to grow. As they achieved a certain level of 
growth, the revolutionaries tried to tow the conventional path, by fighting the Spanish 
forces toe-to-toe with large formations. While it was inevitable to organize in a more 
conventional fashion, so as to achieve direction and centralization of their efforts, the 
revolutionaries found out that such an option was a disadvantage against a much more 
organized, trained, and equipped adversary. To offset their inherent disadvantage, the 
revolutionary forces had to adapt to an indirect method of fighting their enemy—that of 
guerrilla warfare.  
The first part of this chapter provides the general situation of the Philippines 
during the period—what characterized the Spanish rule, what were the prevailing 
sentiments of the people, and what finally led the people to revolt. The second part deals 
with the historical aspects, touching on the significant events of the Philippine revolution. 
It discusses the growth of the Philippine military in terms of organization, the 
tactics/doctrine employed, and the technology used to wage revolution. The last part of 
this chapter provides an analysis of what constituted the Filipino way of war during the 
period—determining that it was essentially irregular in nature. Throughout the period of 
the revolution, the Filipino way of fighting would be characterized by a dominance of 
guerrilla tactics to offset the inherent disadvantages in organization, weapons, and 
military training. Small units would take the place of large unit formations. The Spanish 
colonial period exemplified two of Arquilla’s fundamental characteristics of irregular 
warfare—the preference of small units, and inherently, the use of guerrilla tactics. 
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B. ENVIRONMENT / SITUATION 
 Right from the beginning, and throughout it period of rule, Spain encountered 
resistance from the Filipinos. The first of these series of resistances against the Spaniards 
were when Lapu-Lapu refused to pledge his allegiance to the King of Spain.81 The 
defiant Lapu-Lapu, despite having inferior weapons compared to the Spaniards, fiercely 
fought Magellan on Mactan Island on 27 March 1521. This resulted in the death of 
Magellan and the retreat of his companions. This was followed by other revolts: the 
revolt of Lakandula and Sulayman (1574); Tamblot’s revolt in Bohol (1622); Bankaw’s 
revolt in Leyte (1622); the Caraga revolt (1630); the Cagayan insurrection (1639); 
Sumuroy’s revolt in the Visayan (1649–1650); Malong’s rebellion in Pangasinan (1660); 
Diego Silang’s revolt in Ilocos (1762–1763); and Dagohoy’s rebellion in Bohol (1774).82 
These revolts were caused by one, or a combination of, the following: personal 
grievances, opposition to some practices or aspects of Spanish rule, religious motives, 
and agrarian complaints.83 But none of these revolts sought the independence of the 
Philippines from Spain.   
Developments at the turn of the 19 century combined to slowly bring about a 
sense of nationalism among the Filipinos. One such development was the opening of the 
Philippines to the Western world. Along with the exchange of commerce and trade came 
the exposure of the Filipinos to the political developments in Europe and to liberal 
ideas.84 As trade flourished, this brought prosperity to some Filipinos which, in turn, 
brought about the emergence of a new social class—the middle class.85 The wealth 
allowed the middle class families to send their children to good schools, not only in 
Manila but also to Spain and other European countries, thus further exposing these 
educated individuals to liberal ideas and current events in Europe. Then, there was the 
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racial prejudice that Filipinos experienced under the Spanish rule, where Filipinos were 
looked down upon and discriminated against as a people.86 Another issue that came 
about was the secularization question.87 As Filipino priests (who belonged to the 
seculars) increased in numbers, the Spaniards (the regulars) limited their chances to 
become parish priests. The Spaniards even despoiled them of parishes already in the 
possession of Filipino priests. It was regarded by the Filipino priests as an expression of 
racial prejudice when the Spaniards refused to give them opportunities for the simple 
reason that they were Filipinos and not Spaniards. Another factor that contributed to the 
emergence of Filipino nationalism was the enlightened tenure of Carlos Maria de la Torre 
as governor-general from 1869–1871,88 who exercised liberalism during his tenure. He 
encouraged the freedom of speech, abolished the censorship of the press, and most 
importantly, dealt with the Filipinos as a people who had the same rights to dignity and 
self-respect and recognition as the Spaniards. It was during his administration that 
Filipinos experienced how it was to be treated equally. Finally, there was the event of 
1872, the unjust execution of three Filipino priests—Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos and 
Jacinto Zamora—which was a turning point in Philippine history, for it ushered in the era 
of the reform movement.89  
All these factors, combined with the common grievances against the Spaniards, 
aroused the Filipinos’ sense of nationalism. Initially, the Filipinos, particularly the middle 
class, campaigned for reforms in the Spanish administration of the Philippines. It was in 
the best interest of the middle class, composed of the rich and the intellectuals, to 
campaign for reforms through peaceful means, for an armed struggle would surely affect 
their material possessions and their social status.90 However, their war of propaganda 
against the Spanish authorities and friars failed to achieve its purpose for reforms.91 This 
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failure of the reform movement, highlighted by the arrest and banishment of Jose Rizal to 
Dapitan in 1892, opened the way for the Filipinos’ quest to be liberated from the tyranny 
of the Spaniards through armed struggle. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
 In terms of organization, the revolutionaries started off from scratch and slowly 
grew and evolved into a more organized, formalized group. From a conglomeration of 
small groups emanating from various towns and provinces in the archipelago, the 
Filipinos saw the need to organize to provide direction and unity for the armed struggle. 
This need to formally organize tended to tow the conventional path, and reflected later as 
well on how the revolutionaries fought from an organizational standpoint. Initially, 
revolutionary forces would fight from large formations and face-to-face with the enemy. 
However, this would prove ineffective against better-trained and well-equipped Spanish 
forces. The period of revolution would see the shift from large to small formations to be 
able to fight guerrilla-type of warfare. As the fight progressed towards the end of the 
revolution, the revolutionary forces would shift back to the conventional form, dictated 
by the need to be recognized as a sovereign nation with a professional standing army. 
However, this proclivity to go conventional would not last long with the advent of the 
second revolution against the American colonial forces.    
In order to pursue its quest for freedom and independence from Spanish rule, the 
Filipinos needed to organize themselves for action. Andres Bonifacio, with a few others, 
founded the secret organization Kataas-taasan Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga 
Anak ng Bayan (KKK or Katipunan) on 7 July 1892.92 It was founded on a radical 
platform—to secure the independence and freedom of the Philippines by force of arms.93 
The secret society served as the nucleus in organizing the manpower and in mobilizing 
the resources necessary for the armed struggle. The Katipunan initially used the triangle 
method to recruit its members, for obvious security reasons.94 However, failing to 
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generate the much needed number of members, this method of recruitment was changed 
to a more open system—where any member could take in as many recruits as he could 
get.95 The ability to remain in secrecy, a critical consideration for an organization still in 
its very infant stage, was put at risk in favor of increasing the organization’s numbers. 
This proved to be of a disadvantage later when the Katipunan’s existence was discovered 
by the Spanish authorities on 19 August 1896, and forced Bonifacio and his men to 
untimely declare the revolution against the Spaniards in the “Cry of Pugadlawin” on 26 
August 1896.96 
 During its organization phase, from 1892 to just before the outbreak of the 
revolution in 1896, Bonifacio structured the Katipunan into a Supreme Council, the 
Provincial Council, and the Popular Council.97 It showed a government-like structure, 
with the Supreme Council as the highest governing body, providing the overall direction, 
and the Provincial and Popular Councils taking charge of the different provinces and 
towns. Bonifacio also enlisted the support of the women—wives, sisters, or daughters of 
Katipuneros—by organizing a women’s chapter of the Katipunan. The Katipunan, though 
exhibiting a conventional structure necessary for organizational purposes, remained 
clandestine. 
When the revolution broke out, there was much to be desired in the Katipunan in 
terms of its military organization. Troops that formed were basically volunteers from the 
local areas brought in by the local chiefs, while others were tenants that were brought 
along by landlords.98 Commissioned and non-commissioned officers were determined by 
virtue of their status in the society.99 In other words, the officers and men were plain 
civilians who had chosen to participate in the revolution, but with no military training at 
all. Compounding the plight of the revolutionaries was the absence of a command and 
control that would coordinate the operations and other activities and bring them to bear 
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upon the Spaniards and achieve favorable results.100 With no chain of command to speak 
off, loyalties bore down to personalities and factions emerged, to the detriment of the 
cause. There emerged the Magdalo faction, which was of the view that another 
organization should supersede the Katipunan since it had ceased to be a secret 
organization, and because they felt it needed to be more responsive to the demands of the 
period. Then there was the Magdiwang faction—contending that the Katipunan, already 
with a constitution and by-laws recognized by all, should remain as the government of 
the revolution.101  
To solve the organizational issues, Emilio Aguinaldo proposed the establishment 
of a republican government and a regular army. The regular army was to be composed of 
three corps of 10,000 men each, commanded by three generals and a general-in-chief.102 
Thus, on 22 March, 1897, Bonifacio and members of the Magdalo and Magdiwang 
factions met at the so-called Tejeros Convention.103 This resulted in the dissolution of the 
Katipunan and the establishment of a government called “Republica Filipina.” Also 
established was the Filipino Army, composed of the various loose units of 
revolutionaries, and with Artemio Ricarte elected as the captain general.104 Unfortunate 
as it was, the Tejeros Convention marked the irreconcilable differences between 
Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, eventually leading to the execution of the former. Nonetheless, 
the revolutionaries now became more unified under one command, and the struggle 
continued with Aguinaldo assuming the leadership of the revolution. 
As the revolutionaries became more organized, fighting against the Spaniards 
resumed on all fronts. The Spanish authorities, who still had the advantage in terms of 
weapons and organization, began to feel the impact of the Filipinos’ struggle.105 It wore 
down the Spanish government, drained its resources and weakened the morale of its 
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troops. Thus, the Spaniards offered a truce with the Filipinos.106 The truce stipulated that 
Aguinaldo and his ranking officers would go into exile, and the Filipino Army would be 
disbanded and weapons turned in.107 In exchange, the Spaniards would pay Php 800,000, 
plus an additional Php 1,700,000 for the victims of the war, make a declaration of 
amnesty, and support an end to the hostilities and a promise for reforms to improve the 
conditions of the Filipinos.108 Before the end of 1897, Aguinaldo eventually agreed to a 
truce and went in exile to Hongkong.109 The truce, however, did not hold its ground as 
the Spaniards did not keep their part of the bargain. The revolutionaries that were left 
behind, and had remained skeptical about the truce, opted not to surrender their firearms 
and used the time to reorganize. For Aguinaldo and his companions in exile, they 
continued to reorganize and purchase weapons and ammunition. Despite the truce, the 
revolution did not actually stop and still continued in some parts of the archipelago.  
In April 1898, the Spanish-American War broke out, which later resulted in the 
defeat of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey’s fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay.110 The 
turn of events brought new hope to Aguinaldo and his forces. Aguinaldo, with help from 
the Americans, returned to the Philippines from exile.111 Aguinaldo saw this as an 
opportunity to continue and finally finish the revolution against the Spaniards. Upon 
return from exile, Aguinaldo rallied the Filipino revolutionary forces to fight for 
independence from Spanish rule. As fighting broke out in almost all parts of the 
archipelago, the Filipinos scored victory after victory. Manila was soon surrounded by 
the revolutionary forces and most of Luzon was freed from Spanish control. As the 
historian Pobre would describe it, the battles between the Filipinos and the Spaniards 
would finally be over, for all practical purposes, by mid-1898.112 Hence, on 12 June, of 
the same year, Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence. 
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After the declaration of independence, Aguinaldo immediately took steps to 
transform the revolutionary forces into a more systematically organized army. A decree 
was issued setting down organizational rules for the Army, considered to be the first law 
specifically organizing a standing army for the Philippines.113 Modeled after armies of 
the time, the Philippine Army was to have the standard military arms and branches: 
infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and a general staff. These were to be supported by a 
Quartermaster Division, a Medical Corps, and a Judge Advocate Division. The basic 
organization of forces was to be regional, headed by the provincial military 
commander.114 Units were of battalion size, composed of six companies each, with each 
company having three officers and 100 enlisted men.115 In support of the standing army 
were two irregular forces, the territorial militia and the sandatahans (bolo-armed forces); 
the only difference between the two was that the former was more organized.116 
Aguinaldo placed Gen. Antonio Luna, the best qualified military officer at that time, in 
charge of bringing the Philippine Army to a standard. Luna, making use of his military 
knowledge obtained from Europe, implemented organizational systems addressing, 
among other things, the Army’s appointment and promotion of officers, pay and 
allowances, and rules and regulations to discipline the troops.117 At about the same time, 
the Philippine Navy was organized, with a steamboat becoming the first vessel of the 
Navy, followed by merchant marine vessels owned by Filipinos who joined the Filipino 
land forces in the fight against the Spaniards.118 Most of these vessels operated in the 
Visayas for the inter-island transport of weapons and supplies for the revolutionaries. 
Meantime, Luna recognized the importance of further developing and 
professionalizing the Army and recommended the creation of a military academy. Thus, 
Aguinaldo decreed the establishment of the Academia Militar on 25 October 1898, in 
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Malolos, Bulacan.119 The academy aimed to address the professional education and 
training of the officer corps that would lead the Army in the future. However, the 
Academia Militar was deactivated in the early part of 1899 because of the impending 
hostilities with the Americans. 
Toward the end of the 19th century, it was evident that the Filipinos were already 
beginning to transform their revolutionary forces from loosely-knit, decentralized and 
rag-tag guerrilla units to a more conventional, standardized army. This was a necessary 
transformation for the Aguinaldo forces to move from being insurgents to being in power. 
But the Filipinos’ independence and the development of their forces into a conventional 
standing army would be put on hold. Unbeknownst to the Filipinos, the Americans had a 
different plan for the Philippines. The Americans, secretly negotiating with Spain, 
assumed sovereignty over the Philippine territory, concluded with the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris in 10 December 1898.120 This ushered in a new era for the Filipinos and 
their forces with the eventual outbreak of the Philippine-American War on 5 February 
1899, immediately following the revolution against the Spanish colonial forces. 
D.  TACTICS / DOCTRINE 
 In was in terms of tactics/doctrine that the Filipino revolutionaries capitalized on, 
and tried to make up, for their weaknesses in organization, weapons, and training. Raids 
and “ambuscades” would become the staple tactics for the Filipinos. This particular 
period in the revolution against the Spanish forces would provide the earliest accounts of 
guerrilla tactics employed against a more organized, much more powerful foreign enemy. 
Building on their familiarity with the terrain and their ability to easily blend with the 
population, the Filipino revolutionaries were able to exploit these advantages to inflict 
harm on the enemy.    
The discovery of the Katipunan by the Spanish authorities happened at a time 
when the underground organization was not yet fully prepared to readily engage the 
Spanish forces. Faced with mass arrests, the Filipinos were forced to launch their 
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revolution. As expected, the initial clashes with the Spaniards resulted in defeat for the 
Katipuneros. The Filipinos were very much at a disadvantage against the trained and 
well-equipped Spanish forces. The Filipinos had no other option but to fight a guerrilla 
type of warfare—engaging the enemy only when they had the battlefield advantage, 
while retreating into the shadows or evading a fight when the odds were against them. 
The Filipinos made use of raids and ambuscades, choosing when and where to fight the 
Spaniards, making good use of their knowledge of the terrain. Raids brought success to 
the revolutionaries on a number of occasions; the most notable was the one led by 
Gregorio del Pilar in Paombong on 31 August 1897.121 Other successful raids were those 
conducted against Spanish garrisons in: San Rafael, Bulacan; Atimonan, Tayabas (now 
Quezon); Aliaga, Nueva Ecija; and in various points in Laguna, Batangas, Pangasinan, 
Tarlac, and Zambales.122 Moreover, the revolutionaries had the support of the Filipino 
population who aided them in terms of logistics, provided the necessary intelligence, or 
simply provided refuge. Aptly described by Pobre, the revolutionaries were the “fish” 
that greatly depended on the population, the “sea,” for their strength and survival.123 
 To address the shortage of weapons, the employment of Filipino forces would 
have those without arms, the volunteers, closely following those with arms, the active.124 
When somebody from the active forces got hit or downed, those without arms would 
readily pick up the weapon and continue the fight. Further, the volunteers were also 
assigned the task of collecting any reusable weapons or materials found in the battle 
scenes that could still be of use for the next battle.  
 As the revolutionary fervor spread in other areas of the archipelago, fighting 
likewise erupted in those areas. Filipino guerrilla forces were present, not only within 
Manila and its surrounding provinces, but also in Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, the 
Bicol provinces and the Visayan provinces.125 This served the revolutionary forces well, 
as the Spaniards found themselves threatened from various fronts. Fighting from all 
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fronts wore down the colonial forces, drained their resources, and sapped the morale of 
their troops. The nature of warfare used by the Filipinos forced the Spanish authorities to 
offer a truce, for fear of losing more lives and property. 
E. WEAPONS / TECHNOLOGY 
 Weapons were one area where the Filipinos were very much at a disadvantage. 
Bereft of the resources or the technology needed to produce modern-day weapons, the 
Filipinos had to make do with what was available in their meager arsenal. They had to 
resort to raiding Spanish arsenals to get rifles and pistols—or acquire the weapons during 
successful engagements against Spanish forces and garrisons. The revolutionaries also 
resorted to improvisation, particularly for needed ammunition.  
Initially, weapons of the Katipunan were mostly bolos, spears, and other bladed 
weapons.126 These were complemented with bows and arrows, clubs, some pistols and 
old rifles, and paltik (home-made gun).127 These were of no match to the weapons of the 
Spaniards, who were armed with Remingtons and Mausers.128 Thus, Bonifacio eyed 
Japan as a source for weapons, particularly the Murata rifles used in the recently 
concluded Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.129 Talks were initiated with the admiral on 
board the Japanese ship Kongo, who dropped anchor at Manila Bay at that time. 
However, the revolutionaries failed to enlist the support of the Japanese. It dawned on the 
revolutionaries that the best hope to obtain rifles (and ammunition) were those captured 
from successful engagement and raids against Spanish troops and garrisons. To this end, 
Bonifacio enlisted the help of two government employees at the Maestranza (arsenal), to 
steal rifles and pistols for the Katipunan.130 This expediency, however, was not enough to 
arm the revolutionary forces. It was only later in the revolution that the Filipinos were 
able to substantially increase their arsenal, after Aguinaldo came back from exile in 
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Hongkong—along with purchased weapons and ammunition from abroad.131 Any 
semblance of artillery was generally crude, consisting of lantakas and bamboo “cannons” 
reinforced with wire and timber shoring.132 
While the Filipinos could easily manufacture bolos and other bladed weapons, 
there was not much technology available to support their needs for weaponry. If there 
was any ammunition manufactured, it was done by revolutionaries who used to work in 
the Spanish arsenals. However, such ammunition was not always reliable. 
F. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION  
 After more than three centuries of Spanish domination, the Filipinos had finally 
come together to express their grievances and a sense of nationalism through revolution. 
The revolution saw the birth of the Philippine military. It was a classic case of an 
insurgent group trying to overthrow a government in power. First, the Filipinos had to 
organize themselves in order to mobilize the manpower and resources needed to fight the 
Spaniards. They had to make sure that this whole process of organizing was kept secret, 
in order to allow the organization to grow to a level where it was capable enough to 
challenge the authority. Otherwise, their early discovery would essentially nip the 
revolution in its bud. Second, as the revolution broke out, the Katipuneros had to 
continuously adapt themselves to the demands of the situation. Tactics had to be 
adjusted—from being “position soldiers” to “hit and run soldiers”—in order to 
compensate for the lack of weapons and technology. This was also the case with the shift 
to smaller units in lieu of large formations. Their revolutionary experience likewise 
emphasized the merits of having the population on their side, as well as the insurgents’ 
knowledge of the terrain. Further, it saw the insurgents’ determined objective to gain 
independence from colonial rule. Hence, there was no doubt that the insurgents’ would 
fight no matter what and how long it took. On the other hand, the colonial forces were 
faced with concerns about time, resources, morale of troops, and other external factors 
that certainly had an effect on the Philippine revolution. Finally, as the revolution wore 
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on, the Katipuneros had to slowly transform their forces from a rag-tag guerrilla force to 
a more professional, standing army. Troop discipline, professionalism, systems-thinking, 
training and education, organizational structure, and other concerns became the order of 
the day. It was an inevitable transition necessary for the Filipinos if they were to stand as 
a sovereign nation. They needed to create a capable military organization. Yet, in 
hindsight, fighting guerrilla-type warfare was something the Filipinos would resort back 
to during the American colonial period, and beyond. 
 While much has been described of the Filipino revolutionaries, how the colonial 
forces dealt with the revolution is worthy of mention. The Spaniards conducted mass 
arrests of individuals suspected of being, or of collaborating with, the revolutionaries. 
Areas where revolutions were taking place were placed under martial law. Terror and 
intimidation became the automatic response of the Spanish authorities. They resorted to 
the torture of individuals and public executions became a common scene.133 In Cavite, 
thirteen men were executed on 12 September 1896—they have since been known as “Los 
Trece Martires de Cavite.”134 On 4 January 1897, twelve Bicolano rebels were executed, 
making them the “Twelve Bicol Martyrs.”135 The most infamous of these executions was 
that of Jose Rizal, executed by firing squad at the old Bagumbayan Field in Luneta on 30 
December 1896.136 However, the reign of terror conducted by the Spanish authorities did 
not curb the revolution. It only served to inflame the feelings of the Filipinos against the 
Spaniards and made them fight with more determination. The negative aspects of the 
Spanish colonial period had reached a boiling point, and there was no stopping the 
Filipino revolution. 
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Figure 4.  Spanish Colonial Era Filipino irregular warfare characteristics 
 The Spanish colonial era essentially saw the first accounts of the use of irregular 
warfare by the Filipinos against an invading force. Figure 4 highlights the irregular 
warfare characteristics. Initially inclined to battle the Spanish colonial forces using large 
formations, the Filipinos were forced to shift to small units to counter the overwhelming 
advantage of the enemy. Accordingly, this led to the use of guerrilla tactics—of raids and 
ambuscades—to hurt and wear down the enemy. As the Filipinos did not have the 
resources and the technology to their advantage, guerrilla tactics was the means to 
acquire the needed weapons and further use it against their enemy. The Filipinos had to 
make do with what was available and supplement it with whatever could be captured 
from the enemy. Likewise, it was to the advantage of the Filipinos to prolong the conflict, 
to choose when and where to fight, given the right opportunity, in order to drain the 
enemy of their resources and wear down the morale of enemy forces. The Filipino 
revolutionaries were, for the most part, applying Arquilla’s fundamentals of irregular 
warfare. These fundamentals would, time and again, also serve the Filipinos well with the 
advent of the Philippine-American hostilities. 
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IV. AMERICAN COLONIAL ERA WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Philippine-American War was an excellent example of a Filipino conflict that 
highlighted the Filipino propensity for irregular warfare. The Filipinos were always under 
resourced compared to the Americans. This asymmetry forced the Filipinos to innovate 
their organizations and strategy using irregular methods in order to attain their goals. The 
Philippine-American hostility was a reaffirmation of Arquilla’s irregular warfare 
characteristics displayed by the weak when fighting the strong. It was a continuation of 
the way Filipino revolutionaries fought a colonial force. While they were ultimately 
defeated, the irregular methodology was internalized, and would be repeatedly used 
throughout the next century. 
B. ENVIRONMENT / SITUATION 
How the U.S. got involved with the Philippines, and eventually, the war in the 
Philippine Islands, can be traced to a series of events that happened half-way across the 
globe before the turn of the 20th century. Around 1897, Spain was already dealing with 
Cuban insurgents who wanted independence from Spanish rule. Meantime, the U.S., 
initially contented with just passively supporting the cause of Cuban independence, 
became more interested in a resolution to the Cuban conflict. When riots erupted in 
Havana on January 1898, the U.S. made it known to Spain that it was greatly concerned 
with the safety of American citizens.137 Thus, the USS Maine was sent to Havana to 
provide some means to secure the safety of American citizens, arriving on 25 January 
1898. On 15 February 1898, an explosion destroyed the USS Maine, docked at Havana 
harbor, and killed 266 American sailors.138 A U.S. board of inquiry conducted an 
investigation that later concluded that a mine was detonated under the USS Maine, but 
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did not come to a conclusion about who was responsible for the disaster.139 Nevertheless, 
the incident created outrage from the American public and a call for intervention in Cuba. 
The sinking of the USS Maine, however, did not lead the Americans to declare war on 
Spain, but it served as a catalyst towards a diplomatic impasse between the two 
countries.140 Following a U.S. naval blockade of Cuba on 21 April, Spain declared war 
against the U.S. on 25 April.141 Thereafter, the U.S. declared war, paving the way for the 
outbreak of the war. 
Across the Pacific, around the time of the declaration of war, Commodore 
Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron was already in Hong Kong making preparations for war. At 
12:15 on 25 April, Dewey received a cable from the U.S. Secretary of Navy Long, that 
war had commenced between the U.S. and Spain, and to proceed at once to the Philippine 
Islands, and to commence operations against the Spanish Fleet.142 Immediately, Dewey’s 
squadron sailed for the Philippines to hunt and destroy the Spanish fleet under Admiral 
Montojo. On 1 May, Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron overwhelmingly destroyed the Spanish 
fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay.143 However, even with the Spanish fleet destroyed, 
Manila was still under the control of the Spaniards. Dewey simply did not have the forces 
needed to venture inland. Moreover, the U.S. did not have a clear cut policy on what to 
do with the Philippines.144 Dewey had to wait for the arrival of U.S. expeditionary forces 
before Manila could be taken, and the U.S. could obtain the total surrender of Spanish 
forces garrisoned in Manila. Whatever the reasons, be it the need to complete the 
reduction of the Spanish power or the establishment of a colonial government, the U.S. 
eventually found itself occupying, not only the capital Manila, but most of the 
archipelago. The eventual American occupation of the Philippines was crucial to the 
outbreak of the Philippine-American War. 
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The outbreak of the Spanish-American War was seen as a blessing for Aguinaldo 
and his revolutionary forces. Aguinaldo, who was in exile at that time, saw it as an 
opportunity to continue the struggle for independence and oust the Spaniards.145 
Aguinaldo met with American Consuls Pratt and Wildman prior to his return to the 
Philippines.  
The series of events that transpired from the time Aguinaldo spoke with the 
American consuls up to his return to Manila is critical—because it explains the tensions 
and animosity that later developed between the Filipinos and the Americans. Aguinaldo’s 
account claimed that the tenor of his meetings with Pratt, Wildman, and particularly 
Dewey was that the U.S. did not desire to colonize the Philippines. The analogy made 
was that since the U.S. already declared that it would not possess Cuba, it was logical that 
the U.S. would not be interested in possessing the Philippines—which was thousands of 
miles away from the U.S. mainland. Aguinaldo’s understanding of the context of the 
meetings would point to the assumption that the U.S. would then respect the quest for 
independence of the Filipinos as a nation.146 However, the American consuls did not 
agree with this contention about what took place in their meetings. Similarly, citing his 
own account, Dewey described his dealings with Aguinaldo as being on a more personal 
note. Although Dewey welcomed the Filipino revolutionaries’ actions against the 
Spaniards in relation to his purpose of weakening the Spanish position, it was Dewey’s 
policy to avoid any entangling alliance with Aguinaldo and the revolutionary forces.147 
It must be pointed out that at the time, Filipino forces had already captured (except for 
Cavite and Manila) most of the areas previously under Spanish control. Regardless of 
what really transpired in those meetings, this misunderstanding became the source of 
tensions and animosity between the Filipinos and the Americans. This was further fueled 
by the exclusion of the Filipino forces in the “mock” Battle of Manila that resulted in the 
surrender of the Spanish forces and the transfer of Manila to American control.148 In the 
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minds of the Filipinos, the events surrounding the surrender of the Spanish forces and 
assuming control of Manila were done with treachery on the part of the Americans. The 
stage was now set for the imminent outbreak of the Philippine-American War, finally 
ensuing with the San Juan Bridge incident on the night of 4 February 1898, yet another 
contentious event from the perspective of both the Filipinos and the Americans.149  
This chapter will now focus on the military actions during the Philippine-
American War. Although the American colonial period spanned from 1899 to 1946, 
albeit briefly interrupted by the Japanese invasion, this chapter is more focused on the 
early years—for it was during these years that the significant fighting occurred, for both 
the Filipinos and the Americans. Using Dr. Arquilla’s characteristics of irregular warfare, 
as pointed out earlier, the nature of how the Philippine military fought and evolved 
during this war will be examined by looking at its organization, tactics/doctrine, and 
weapons/technology. Equally deserving of attention in this chapter are the counter-
actions of the American forces throughout the conflict. The conflict was illustrative of a 
weaker force fighting a superior force, and thus, of a need for a change in the 
employment of forces and tactics to counter the marked imbalance. The conflict also 
highlighted, among other things, these other facets: the brutality used by the opposing 
forces, the local population becoming an integral part of the conflict, and the use of 
indigenous forces by the Americans in neutralizing the Filipino forces. By all accounts, 
the Philippine-American War, on both the Filipino and the American side, was reflective 
of the nature of irregular warfare. 
Just prior to the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, the Filipinos, under the 
leadership of Aguinaldo, rallied together to fight the Spanish forces. Buoyed by the 
defeat of the Spaniards at the Battle of Manila Bay, and with Aguinaldo having brought 
in additional weapons and ammunition, achieving independence was very much within 
reach for the Filipino revolutionaries. As fighting resumed on all fronts, the Filipinos 
forces had captured almost all of the areas under Spanish control, leaving Manila as the 
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only remaining Spanish stronghold.150 In other words, Aguinaldo’s forces had already 
surrounded Manila, and brought it under siege. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
How the Filipino forces were organized at the outbreak of the Philippine-
American War becomes a point of reference in examining their organization. As pointed 
out in the earlier chapter, the Filipino forces—from being a conglomeration of groups of 
volunteers brought in by their local chiefs or landlords to fight the Spaniards—slowly 
evolved into a more organized force. Aguinaldo’s intention to re-organize his 
revolutionary forces can be gleaned from two considerations. First, the Filipino forces 
needed to be more organized and have a command and control, in order to coordinate all 
their military operations and bring them to bear on the Spaniards. Second, a standing 
army was necessary if they were to become a sovereign nation, recognized by other 
nations. The second consideration was obviously in preparation for the impending 
Philippine independence from Spanish rule (which they expected). Aguinaldo’s advisers 
believed that a standing army would show a high level of civilization and hasten their 
recognition for independence.151 The re-organization taken by the Filipino revolutionary 
forces was slowly taking the form of the conventional type. To this effect, Aguinaldo 
issued a decree on 30 July 1898, setting down the organization, composition, and basic 
regulations for a standing army of the Philippines.152 The army was modeled after 
existing armies at that time, with all the standard military arms and branches.153 With this 
in mind, the Filipino revolutionary forces were now organized by regions and provinces. 
Troops were organized into battalions, composed of four to six companies depending on 
the size and importance of the province.154 Each company was to have 100 enlisted men, 
with four sergeants, eight corporals and 88 privates, commanded by a captain and 
                                                 
150 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 32. 
151 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 12. 
152 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 32. 
153 Ricardo Trota Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935–1942 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 
1992), 10. 
154 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 32–33. 
 50 
assisted by a first lieutenant and a second lieutenant.155 For the battalions, it was to be 
commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with two majors, a color lieutenant (flag bearer), a 
commissary officer, and a gunsmith.156 A navy, however small, was likewise established, 
composed of small vessels armed with small guns, with the mission to protect the 
Philippine waters.157 Professionalism and systems thinking were likewise made a 
concern for the army. To this end, Aguinaldo tapped General Antonio Luna, deemed to 
be the most qualified officer at that time, and who had also undergone military schooling 
in Europe.158 In line with the need to professionalize the army, a military academy—
Academia Militar—was established in on 25 October 1898, to cater to the officer needs 
of the army.159 The existence, however, of the military academy was short-lived due to 
the outbreak of the Philippine-American War. The Filipino revolutionary forces were in 
the process of transforming themselves with all of the trappings of a conventional army. 
From being a rag-tag band of revolutionary forces, it was now called the Army of 
Liberation of the Philippines, though still in its fledgling state.160 
In terms of strength, the Filipino forces, by January 1898, were estimated at 
50,000 in Luzon, with about 20,000 of them armed with a variety of rifles—Mausers, 
Remingtons, Muratas, and Ambers.161 An estimated 20,000 additional men were in the 
Visayas and Mindanao area, 8,000 of whom had firearms.162 Those who had no firearms 
were armed with bolos, bows and arrows, clubs, and bamboo spears. 
When war broke out with the Americans, the Philippine Army was initially 
organized in a conventional fashion. True to their conventional form, Filipino forces 
fought the Americans by massing their troops. Companies would establish defensive 
positions along the American’s axis of advance. From prepared defensive positions, the 
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Filipinos would fight the Americans toe-to-toe. However, against a trained and well-
armed force, the Filipinos did not stand much of a chance against American military 
superiority. By massing their forces to fight the enemy, the Filipinos became easy prey 
for the Americans’ superior firepower. This was manifested in numerous battles, a good 
example being the battle for Caloocan. Filipino forces under General Antonio Luna, 
numbering about 4,000 troops, tried to put up a defense, but American forces under 
General Arthur MacArthur,163 backed by naval gunfire and artillery, crushed the Filipino 
forces and evicted them from their defensive positions.164 The next defensive lines 
established by Filipino forces would be in defense of Malolos, Aguinaldo’s seat of 
government. The Americans again won. Despite putting up stiff resistance, Luna’s forces 
succumbed to the pressure of the American attack.165  
Faced with defeats, Aguinaldo shifted to guerrilla warfare by mid-November 
1899.166 By electing a strategy of guerrilla warfare, the Filipino forces reconstituted to 
smaller units in order not to present themselves as a large target to the Americans. An 
example of how Filipino forces were organized into smaller units can be gleaned from the 
guerrillas of Panay. The smallest unit was the guerrilla fraction composed of seven 
riflemen and two bolomen, led by a sergeant. Two or three fractions made up a guerrilla 
band under an officer, and two or three bands made up a guerrilla group led by a chief.167 
The organizational set-up allowed the Filipino forces to easily avoid American forces and 
then re-group into larger numbers when the opportunity presented itself for an attack 
against American forces. By choosing to re-organize into small units, and employing the 
small unit tactics, the Filipino forces staved off annihilation by the American forces. 
Although the Filipino guerrillas were eventually defeated, it came at a greater cost for the 
Americans by dragging the war to its limits.  
Without a doubt, the Philippine-American War exemplifies one of Arquilla’s 
defining characteristics of irregular warfare, the use of small units.   
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D.  TACTICS / DOCTRINE 
 How an army chooses to fight very much defines how it is organized. This maxim 
closely describes how the Filipino forces fought the Philippine-American War. In the 
early stages of the war, Filipino forces chose to fight in a conventional manner. Hence, 
they organized their forces along conventional lines. However, with hard-learned lessons, 
Aguinaldo’s forces had no other option but to fight guerrilla warfare. This decision was 
based on their experience and tradition, as well as the external circumstances and threat 
that they were now facing. Small unit tactics became the convention against much larger, 
superior American forces. Raids, ambushes, and hit-and-run operations became the 
common tactics for the Filipinos.168 Attacks against American forces were of the 
Filipinos’ own choosing, deciding when and where to fight. This enabled the Filipino 
guerrillas to evade a fight when faced by an overwhelming force, while engaging in a 
fight only when they had the advantage. In order to do this, the Filipino guerrillas 
blended with the population. It was an advantage used to the maximum by the guerrillas. 
If they were not engaging enemy forces, Filipino guerrillas would simply hide their 
firearms and mix with the population. After an attack, they would again hide their 
firearms and melt back into the population. Filipino guerrillas were lost in the shadows of 
the population, making it hard for the American forces to pursue them. This was also a 
clear indication that the guerrillas had the popular support of their fellow Filipinos, and 
this partly explained the reason why heavier hostilities between the Filipino guerrillas and 
the Americans lasted up to mid-1902. The popular support of the population for the 
guerrillas made it difficult for the American forces to immediately contain the 
insurgency. 
 While there were still pockets of resistance in other areas after the surrender of 
General Malvar of Batangas to the Americans on 16 April 1902, but none that were 
serious enough to challenge American sovereignty on the islands.169 However, an 
exception was the American pacification of the Muslim areas in Southern Philippines 
which took longer, from 1902–1913. The reason why it took longer for the Americans to 
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pacify the Muslims can be attributed to several factors. First, the Muslims were united by 
their religion Islam. The Muslims were concerned about preserving their distinct Muslim 
community and their way of life, a fact that the Muslims had manifested way back during 
the arrival of the Spaniards.170 Second, was the Muslim’s indomitable warrior spirit. At 
an early age, the Muslim warrior was taught to skillfully use his edged weapons.171 The 
Americans, however, combining a pacification campaign and military superiority, 
eventually subdued the Muslim insurgents. 
The stubbornness of the guerrillas and the Filipino people against American 
occupation brought extreme ugliness to the Philippine-American War. Brutality became 
an instrument used by both Filipino and American forces. To weaken the enemy’s 
resistance, the American forces resorted to brutality to soften the Filipinos’ will to 
fight.172 On the other hand, extreme measures, including torture, were employed by the 
Americans, and were met with an angry and hateful response from the Filipinos.173 
American atrocities were answered with Filipino atrocities and vice-versa. The best 
known example of this brutality was the infamous “Balangiga Massacre” on the island of 
Samar on 28 September 1901.174 The guerrillas, together with the townspeople of 
Balangiga, had suffered enormously from the pacification campaign of the Americans. In 
response, the guerrillas and the locals attacked the garrison of C Company, 9th U.S. 
Infantry stationed at Balangiga. This resulted in the death of 48 American officers and 
men. In retaliation, the Americans forces, under Brigadier General Smith, swept Samar 
with orders to kill anybody who was ten years or older, and thus capable of carrying 
arms.175 The incident, along with others of similar brutality, was a testament to the 
attempt by both sides to influence the actions of the other. For the Filipinos, the brutality 
was meant to show the American forces that fights would be ugly and costly, so that the 
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brutality might make the Americans give up their occupation and leave the country. For 
the Americans, they were sending a message to the Filipino guerrillas, and more 
particularly to the population, through the use of brutal measures, that it was not worth 
fighting the American forces. The brutality was meant to weaken the resolve of the 
guerrillas to fight, and the population’s support for the guerrillas. In the end, it was the 
Filipino population who got tired of the sufferings caused by the conflict, and thus 
weakened their support for the guerrillas. 
E. WEAPONS / TECHNOLOGY 
 The Philippine-American War did not demonstrate any changes in terms of 
weapons and technologies used. The Filipino guerrillas practically had the same kind of 
weapons that they had during their revolution against Spain. As the Philippine-American 
War occurred immediately after the Spanish surrender to the American forces, the 
weapons used were a carry-over from the preceding conflict. It was still a mix of rifles—
Mausers, Remingtons, Muratas and Ambers.176 The only difference was that there were 
an increased number of rifles as a result of the weapons and ammunition Aguinaldo had 
purchased while in exile.177 This was further increased with the defection of Filipino 
militias with arms, organized under Spanish Governor-General Agustin, to the side of the 
Filipino revolutionaries.178 Meanwhile, bladed instruments remained a staple weapon for 
the Filipino guerrillas—bolos, bows and arrows, clubs, and bamboo spears. 
For support weapons, the Filipino guerrillas had artillery pieces captured from the 
Spaniards, or Spanish guns that were turned over to the Filipinos by the Americans 
before the Philippine-American hostilities erupted.179 Likewise, a number of arsenals 
were built for the refill of cartridges and the manufacture of bullets, but quality was 
always a problem.180 The Filipinos certainly did not yet have the technological capacity 
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to produce quality ammunition—compared to those produced by more developed 
countries at that time. 
It was also during the period that Aguinaldo organized the Philippine Navy. Ships 
were comprised of vessels captured from the Spanish, while others were donated by 
vessel owners sympathetic to the Filipino revolution.181 These vessels were armed with 
small guns, and were utilized for inter-island transport of weapons and supplies of the 
revolution.182  
Overall, the Filipino revolutionaries had barely enough weapons to challenge the 
American forces. In addition, not only did they have an inadequate supply of 
ammunition, but it was of poor quality as well. The predicament of the Filipino forces 
looked even worse in comparison to the American forces, which had better weapons and 
an adequate supply of ammunition. The heavier American artillery was likewise superior 
to the few, light artillery pieces the Filipino forces had.183  
F. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION  
 If the Philippine Revolution of 1896 gave birth to the Philippine Army, it can be 
said that the Philippine-American War was its infancy. The period saw the formative 
years of the Philippine Army, which developed at the same time it waged a revolution 
against a far superior armed force. The Filipino forces adopted a conventional 
organization, only to find that they could not fight another conventional armed force on 
equal terms. They had to shift to guerrilla warfare in order to somehow negate the 
advantages of their enemy, and prolong the war with the hope that a protracted war would 
force the enemy to abandon the occupation. A shift to guerrilla warfare called for a 
change in organization, from deployment of a centralized, large force to decentralized, 
small, and very mobile forces. Raids, ambushes, and hit-and-run attacks became the 
prevalent tactics—if only to sting the enemy. Combined with inferior (and a lack of) 
weapons, guerrilla warfare was the only remaining option to fight the strong colonial 
                                                 
181 Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935–1942, 11–12. 
182 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 37. 
183 Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902, 73. 
 56 
forces. The only advantage the Filipino forces had, although only for a limited period, 
was their knowledge of the terrain, acclimatization to the local weather, and the support 
of the population. Overall, the American colonial era was again reminiscent of Arquilla’s 
fundamentals of irregular warfare: the Filipinos, greatly under-resourced, had to fight by 
way of guerrilla tactics, employing small units, and with the objective of wearing down 
the enemy and draining its resources, in the hope that the enemy would give up its 
occupation over time.   
 
Figure 5.  American Colonial Era Filipino irregular warfare characteristics 
 While the revolutionaries were able to prolong the conflict and produce a costly 
effect on the colonial forces, it is worthy to note the counter-actions of the American 
forces in bringing down the revolution. Apart from their armed superiority, two factors 
can be attributed to the success of the American forces in defeating the revolution: first, 
the use of indigenous forces; and second, the policy of “benevolent assimilation.” The 
Americans used indigenous forces to serve as guides and interpreters in their military 
operations against the Filipino revolutionaries. This step was very similar to the use of 
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Indian scouts in the American West while fighting the Indian.184 The Americans deftly 
used indigenous forces to fight against their own countrymen, pitting one tribe against 
other tribes. The capture of Aguinaldo in Palanan, Isabela with the use of the Macabebe 
scouts of Pampanga provided an example of its effectiveness.185 These indigenous forces 
later became the Philippine Scouts, initially as civilians under contract, and later as a unit 
under the U.S. Army.186  
 At a more strategic standpoint, the American policy of “benevolent assimilation,” 
somehow, had softened the resistance of the Filipinos to American colonial rule. In 
McKinley’s proclamation in December 1899, he avowed that the U.S. had come to the 
Philippines to bring the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Filipinos; and 
further, that it was the aim of the U.S. to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the 
people of the Philippines.187 What followed was called “Filipinization”—the giving of 
opportunity to the Filipinos for self-government.188 By allowing them to slowly 
participate in governance, the Filipinos, particularly the elites, were encouraged to work 
out a peaceful campaign for independence. Not only did it provide a peaceful 
environment, but more so, it ensured that their social status and material possessions 
would be maintained and protected. As more Filipinos become more encouraged with the 
Filipinization process, the population’s support of the guerrilla movement somehow 
waned over time. The American policy was a welcome change in contrast to the Spanish 
policy during the Spanish colonial period—where Filipinos were treated with racial 
prejudice, calls for reform were unheeded, and the colony was not represented in the 
Spanish Cortes.189 
 The Philippine-American War exemplifies a conflict between the weak 
and the strong. Beset by a great lack of resources, the Filipino forces were forced to 
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innovate, particularly in terms of organization and tactics, in order to pursue their goals. 
Resorting to irregular warfare provided the Filipino forces with the means to counter the 
colonial forces, though they were ultimately defeated. Towards the end of American 
colonial rule, Filipinos demonstrated the capability to govern themselves. Thus, they had 
to prepare to take charge of their own state affairs, including the defense of the country. 
Towards this end, the Filipino armed forces, in preparation for Philippine independence, 
would revert back to the development of a conventional, standing army under the 
auspices of their now American friends. However, the events of World War II found the 
Filipinos, this time fighting side-by-side with the Americans, going back to what they do 
best, their forte—waging guerrilla warfare against the might of the Japanese invasion. 
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V. WORLD WAR II, RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE 
OCCUPATION 
“I do not say this jokingly. Most Americans have merely assumed that guerrilla activity 
in wartime Philippines must have been initiated by U.S. escapees like me and that we 
then coaxed or bullied Filipinos into supporting us. This was not the case at all. Most 
Americans who managed to evade the Japanese in 1942 wanted to get back to their units 
some time, some way, or just escape from the Philippines and get to Australia, or China, 
or somewhere safe. Overwhelmingly, Filipinos came to us and begged us to lead them 
and help fight their oppressors.” 
 
  -Robert Lapham, Lt. U.S.A., Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF)190 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Imperial Japanese occupation of the Philippines was, if not the golden age of 
irregular warfare, then at least the most widely celebrated era of irregular warfare in 
Filipino history.191 All of the characteristics associated with irregular warfare were 
present, minus terrorism (as defined in this thesis). Fundamentally, it will be made clear 
that the Filipino American guerrilla forces fighting during the occupation were not using 
conventional means in any way.  
The characteristics of this era also support the main idea of this thesis. That 
irregular warfare is born from a lack of means, resources, and military might to directly 
challenge and attempt to overthrow the enemy, therefore forcing the irregular warrior into 
an indirect strategy of attrition, exhaustion, and erosion, was overwhelmingly seen 
throughout the Filipino guerrilla campaigns of World War II.  
The Filipino and American forces, which remained in operation after U.S. 
General Wainwright’s, 7 May 1942, surrender order, operated for almost four years with 
astonishingly limited means and support. Despite an often-overwhelming lack of 
weapons, food, medicine, transportation, reinforcements, communications and 
information, Filipino guerrillas managed to conduct extensive operations and be a serious 
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presence on the battlefield throughout the war. Guerrilla operations included, but where 
not limited to: offensive operations against the Japanese, intelligence collection and 
dissemination operations for allied and indigenous forces, information operations, 
psychological operations against the Japanese and the Filipino population, and direct 
support to the allied invasion and allied liberation operations.  
The organization of the many units differed greatly—from the larger, more 
organized U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines- North Luzon (USAFIP-NL),192 led by 
U.S. Army officer Russell Volckmann, to smaller rogue guerrilla groups more focused on 
banditry193. However, the fundamentals were the same: the majority of the groups were 
entirely made up of Filipinos, who had to recruit and operate secretly, and who had an 
absolute reliance on the civilian population for protection and information, all the while 
operating against the Japanese Imperial Army who was at the apogee of their strength 
from 1941 through to 1943 and beyond.  
The tactics and doctrine used were all surprising similar, yet greatly varied—with 
raids and ambushes being the most popular offensive actions. Information operations 
used radio, paper, and word of mouth through the bamboo telegraph. Intelligence 
collection focused on strategic and tactical targets and was one of the most critical 
aspects of the campaign. The different guerrilla groups all seemed to innately understand 
that there was a significant need for psychological operations. These were conducted 
against all parties: the Japanese, themselves, and most importantly, the population. 
Filipinos who collaborated with the Japanese, spied, or became traitors were dealt with 
according to a sometimes sickeningly ruthless and brutal guerrilla law. Undoubtedly, this 
guerrilla campaign had a strategic impact on the Pacific theatre, forcing the Japanese to 
keep a larger force than it would have liked in the Philippine Islands, just to maintain 
control.194 In such a massive and resource-intense theater as the Pacific, this forced the 
Japanese to spread thin, and ultimately led to a situation where they could not defend 
everything that they had taken. This contributed to Allied success throughout the ocean. 
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Born from the cultural DNA of the Filipino prehistory/pre-colonial warrior, and building 
on techniques learned through the hard lessons of the Spanish and American Colonial 
periods, the Filipino irregular warrior honed his skills in the crucible of World War II 
occupation. He emerged extremely savvy, confident, armed, and organized for guerrilla 
warfare.  
B. ENVIRONMENT / SITUATION 
 The history leading up to the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines is long and 
detailed. Much of it is focused on strategic decisions made by the major players, both 
globally and specifically in Pacific Theatre. These decisions had direct ramifications for 
the disposition of the Philippines. A detailed review of this history, while interesting, is 
not necessary to understanding the irregular warfare campaign being examined for this 
study. That being said, there are a few key points which should be discussed, and are 
tantamount to the developing guerrilla campaign.  
 As previously discussed in the colonial chapters, the people and government of 
the Philippines had been moving steadily, if not slowly, towards independence. 
Culturally, the country continued to consist of many separate cultural nations, held 
together by the glue of the United States. Geography, economics, religion, language, and 
other factors continued to reinforce long-standing divisions. However, the Filipinos had 
worked hard to make significant steps to come together as one nation. One of the largest 
steps was in November 1935, when the Philippines gained Commonwealth status from 
the United States and inaugurated Manuel Quezon as the President. This same year would 
see the Japanese invading China.195 Quezon would still be in power when the war would 
come to the Philippines. Despite this significant step towards independence, the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines was still very much reliant and dependent on the 
United States for many aspects of national sovereignty, to include but not limited to, the 
national defense. It is significant to note that the United States continued to believe that 
the Philippines was strategically important to U.S. national power in the Pacific. 
Furthermore, with the ratification of Philippine Commonwealth Act No.1, the National 
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Defense Act, the U.S. exhibited their belief that the Philippines would be more of an asset 
than a liability.196 The National Defense Act placed General Douglas MacArthur as the 
Field Marshall of the Philippine Army (PA), and detailed a ten-year plan to organize a 
citizen army including a 10,000 man regular force, a Constabulary, a 400,000 man 
reserve force, a modest literal navy, and a small air corp.197  
As war with Japan in the Pacific seemed inevitable, the effort to increase the size 
of the Philippine Army (PA) was accelerated, although, unfortunately, even by the start 
of the war the number of units was still inadequate to defend the whole of the nation. 
Trained soldiers were considered good, but above the battalion level the PA lacked 
trained officers and would be reliant on U.S. officers to lead them.198 In July 1941, 
Roosevelt ordered the forces of the Commonwealth into service. All PA units were 
incorporated into the U.S. Army and placed under the command of Gen MacArthur. The 
command was titled the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).199 As war came to 
MacArthur, the people of the Philippines, and the USAFFE, the allied decision of 
“Europe first” would have lasting ramifications on the outcome in the Philippines. 
Europe first would severely limit any aid to MacArthur’s command, forcing him to make 
do with what was already on hand, and forcing the Filipinos to look to irregular means 
after the defeat of the USAFFE in the Philippines.200 
In order to understand the environment around the guerrilla campaign, it is also 
necessary to look briefly at the conventional defense of the Philippines. MacArthur began 
the war with a small air force, an even smaller coastal navy, and about 10 divisions of 
8,500 men each, roughly 15,000 U.S. and 65,000 Filipino, with seven of these divisions 
on Luzon. Luzon being the largest island of the Philippines and at the time also contained 
the capital of Manila, including Manila harbor, the island redoubt of Corregidor, Clark 
Air Base, and the naval bases in Subic Bay and Cavite. On the first day of the war 
MacArthur’s air force was almost completely destroyed by what should not have been a 
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surprise attack. This defeat, along with his limited naval assets, and the upcoming 
decision of Europe first left him with only a land-based army, and limited means to 
defend against any attack from the air.201  
From 8 December, through 12 December, the Japanese Army made unopposed 
landings throughout the Philippines, to include large forces on Luzon.202 This turn of 
events, coupled with the lack of either a naval or an air defense, the strategic 
understanding that no reinforcements were coming, and his personal observation of the 
inability of Filipino units to stop the battle-hardened Japanese veterans,203 led MacArthur 
to make the decision, with regret, to execute War plan Orange (WPO). Under WPO, 
MacArthur was to abandon Manila and declare the city open, then retreat all forces to the 
Bataan peninsula and the island redoubt of Corregidor. 204 From these positions, it was 
planned that he might be able to hold out up to six months (theoretically) until 
reinforcements could be made available. 
 Unfortunately for the men of USAFFE and the civilians on Bataan, when the 
forces retreated, they brought enough ammunition with them, but only enough food for 
less than a month. Little food, compounded by the fact that few medical supplies were 
brought along on the retreat, meant that the defense of Bataan and Corregidor rapidly 
devolved into a battle for survival against the jungle, starvation, disease, and the 
Japanese.205 On 3 January 1942, when the decision was finally made by Eisenhower’s 
War Plans Division that no relief convoy would be fought through to Bataan, Stimson 
Secretary of War remarked, “there are times when men have to die.”206 Die they did, and 
in great numbers.  
By 9 April, Bataan had fallen, and of the initial 85,000 defenders, approximately 
72, 000 became prisoners, of which it is estimated that 20,000 died within the next few 
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weeks during the death march from Bataan.207On 21 February, President Quezon 
evacuated Corregidor via submarine, followed by the retreat of MacArthur via PT boat on 
11 March 1942.208 With these retreats, General Wainwright was left in charge of the 
command, which was re-designated, U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP).209 What 
followed on Corregidor after MacArthur’s retreat can only be described as hell on Earth. 
With Bataan now under their control, and with freedom to move at will in the skies and 
seas, the Japanese where able to attack Corregidor non-stop with artillery day and night. 
The deluge created an atmosphere of hot stinking death and steel, the only relief from 
which was inside massive reinforced tunnels, which seemed like death traps. One 
Corregidor defender, U.S. Navy Engineer Bruce E. Johns, who would be held as a 
Japanese prisoner from 1942 to 1945, nonchalantly described his time in the tunnels as 
“one of the hardest months of the war… to go outside was to invite death.”210 By 6 May, 
the Japanese had invaded Corregidor and captured the island, forcing Wainwright to issue 
a surrender order to all forces in the Philippines to cease operations and surrender to 
Japanese forces.211 
Counter to Wainwright’s surrender order, MacArthur, from Australia, issued his 
own order to any U.S. and Filipino forces, throughout the islands, still intact, and not 
under Japanese control, to initiate guerrilla operations. Though it was a difficult and 
confusing time for American soldiers on the island,212 though many had received 
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group and begin a guerrilla war.213 For the Filipino, the decision was much easier, for “as 
the Japanese themselves suspected… almost all Filipinos were guerrillas.”214 The 
guerrilla campaign had begun. 
The guerrilla campaign began almost immediately after the landing of Japanese 
forces on Luzon in December of 1941. It would last until the Japanese surrender on 15 
August 1945, a total of forty-four months, or three and three quarter years. By the end of 
December 1941, at the start of the war, many Filipino units had already been cut off from 
the main force, which was retreating into the Bataan Peninsula. There were also a 
significant number of individuals left behind, for various reasons, by units that made it to 
Bataan. Other individuals and small groups would also escape Bataan, as the Japanese 
victory became inevitable. Many of these men made it through Japanese lines and moved 
north to link up with other U.S. and Filipino soldiers still on the loose.  
By the time Corregidor fell in May of 1942, MacArthur was ordering any 
remaining forces not already captured to initiate guerrilla operations.215 The organization 
of guerrilla groups happened in many different ways, however the two most common 
methods were: for still-intact units to transition into guerrilla units, and for individual 
Filipino and American leaders—who sought out like-minded others—to form guerrilla 
units. Many Filipinos and Americans continued to want to fight the Japanese badly; they 
actively searched for guerrilla bands to join in order to carry on. The organizational 
period was very fluid, and many organizations changed significantly throughout the 
entire campaign.  
Due to the significant effort required by the Japanese to take Bataan and 
Corregidor, most of the main force units were occupied until the summer of 1942. This 
gave the guerrillas significant time to organize and begin operations without significant 
counterinsurgency operations from the Japanese. These 1942 guerrilla operations were 
often violent and proved positive results for the guerrillas as they molested the Japanese 
rear areas. As summer turned to fall, the Japanese began an aggressive campaign to root 
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out those guerrilla units that had made themselves known on the battlefield. The Japanese 
took severe retributions against the Filipino civilian population, which was supporting the 
guerrillas, as well as against the actual guerrillas, when they could be found.216 The 
Japanese reprisals wreaked havoc on the guerrilla units and the population; many units 
were forced to disperse, and many leaders were captured or killed. By the summer of 
1943, MacArthur had issued a “lie low” order to the guerrillas that he was in contact 
with. They were to stop directly engaging the Japanese and instead focus on gathering 
and transmitting strategic intelligence, which would be critical to retaking the island.217 
From this time on through 1943 and 1944, the guerrillas focused on intelligence, 
organization, training, information, and psychological operations. Offensive operations 
with Japanese units still happened but with less frequency than in 1941 through 
early1943. Both sides fell into a cycle of guerrilla operations, and Japanese counter-
guerrilla operations, with the results varying. Sometimes entire guerrilla forces would be 
decimated, other times they would escape unscathed. The most successful were the units 
that focused on survival, intelligence gathering, and counterintelligence operations. 
In October of 1944, General Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines, 
when he landed on Leyte Island. From this point on, the majority of guerrilla units began 
to focus on providing intelligence and support to allied units for the upcoming invasions 
of their specific areas. By January of 1945, the invasion of Luzon had begun. Once they 
had regained physical contact with allied forces, guerrilla units began to be well supplied. 
Operations were focused on direct support to liberation operations. Guerrillas often 
served as guides, scouts, and security. One of the most famous examples of this was the 
significant support provided to the Ranger rescue of POWs at Cabanatuan.218   
When General Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philippines 
(nicknamed the “Tiger of Malaya”) surrendered in August of 1945, he did so to a 
guerrilla leader: Russell Volckmann.219 For the guerrillas, the war against the Japanese 
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had ended; however, it would be years before many would find peace. Guerrillas and the 
Filipino population struggled with demobilization and reintegration. Many crimes were 
committed in the name of guerrilla survival; individuals and entire families were killed or 
murdered as collaborators and spies. In some cases, these actions were justified in the 
minds of the perpetrators and the community—in other cases, not so. Identifying who 
actually was and was not a guerrilla was another issue. Record keeping was dangerous 
inside Japanese occupied territory; therefore, many guerrilla leaders did not keep any.220 
All of these issues, and more, stuck around for many years as the Filipino people entered 
a new era of independence.  
Volumes have been written about the Philippine guerrilla warfare campaign 
during World War II. The overwhelming majority, though, have focused on American-
led guerrilla units on Luzon. However, from these primary and secondary accounts we 
can gain a good sense of how World War II cemented the Filipino irregular warfare 
tradition. By examining the organizations, tactics, and use of technology, we can see that 
Filipinos were unquestionably under-resourced, and forced to fight in an indirect and 
irregular manner. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
 Guerrilla units operating in the Philippines from 1942 until 1945 ran a gambit of 
different organizational designs. Because of the overwhelming motivations to join 
guerrilla units, there was rarely a shortage of volunteers. There were many different 
reasons for joining—to include, but not limited to: vengeance for Japanese cruelty, 
loyalty to the United States, Filipino nationalistic desires, and pragmatic reasons. Many 
Filipinos realized that life under the Japanese would continue to be difficult; therefore, 
with food hard to come by, being a guerrilla was a type of insurance from hunger.221 The 
Filipino auxiliary was extensive, with most Filipinos understanding that it was their duty 
to insure that the guerrillas were fed in order to continue operations. Many Filipino 
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guerrillas also believed that they would be reimbursed by the U.S. when they inevitably 
retook control of the islands from the Japanese.222 
 With so many reasons to become a guerrilla, there of course was no shortage of 
units. U.S. military historians put the number of guerrilla units operating around 75.223 
Filipino historians write that in almost every province of the country, of which there are 
80, there existed at least one guerrilla unit.224 Furthermore, smaller units, units that were 
destroyed, or units which later merged, may not have been identified or recognized by 
postwar investigators.225 As already previously stated, much of the writing, and therefore 
historical recognition, has gone to units led by Americans. This overlooks the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of units were manned and led by Filipinos. In North Luzon alone, 
it was estimated that there were less than 200 Americans present in the early days of the 
guerrilla campaign. Only 10 were alive when the U.S. Army returned in 1945, and of the 
CAF, only one had survived.226 It is estimated that there were 240,000 active guerrillas 
during the campaign—and of those 33,000 were on Mindanao, where conditions were 
much quieter. Luzon was home to roughly 80,000 guerrillas, of which around 20,000 
ended up being associated with Volckmann’s USFIP-NL. The next largest was 
Lampham’s LGAF 13,000, followed by Ramsey’s guerrillas and Markings guerrillas, 
12,000 each, and Anderson’s forces, 7,000.227 These numbers leave approximately 
another 35,000 to be distributed between the Huks and other various smaller 
organizations. What is not represented are the overwhelming numbers of Filipino leaders 
who often stood side-by-side with their American counterparts—who, though in the 
minority, managed to take the lion’s share of historical glory. These Filipinos include 
such legendary names as Ramon Magsaysay, Ferdinand Marcos, Marking (Marcos 
Augustin), Captains Guillermo Nakar, Manuel Enriquez, Manzano, Mondonedo, Manuel 
                                                 
222 Ibid., 312. 
223 Cherilyn A. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines,” 
Special Warfare (September 2004), 7. 
224 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, 314. 
225 Norling, The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon, 18. 
226 Ibid., 137. 
227 Ibid., 178. 
 69 
Roxas, and Juan Pajota, just to name a few.228 It is important to note that as the 
Americans died, or rotated home after the war, few remained in the Philippines to carry 
on. This was not the case for the Filipinos who returned to their homes, rebuilt their lives, 
and carried their guerrilla traditions and experiences with them. For example, one of the 
most noted of these was Roxas, who became the Philippine President in 1946; his 
guerrilla experience stayed with him—and with many others—and shaped the Philippines 
for decades to come.229 
 The actual formation of these units was not what they might seem on paper, from 
the statement that many contained “tens of thousands” of guerrillas—their actual 
operational makeup was much different. Just as modern day U.S. Special Forces contain 
thousands of green berets, when actually operating, the teams are deployed in small units 
of 12 in order maximize effect and purpose while simultaneously decreasing signature 
and increasing survivability. The guerrillas of the Philippines operated in small cellular 
group, dispersed by areas, villages, safe camps, barangays, and islands. Volckman’s own 
organization was dispersed over much of Northern Luzon. Most raids, ambushes, and 
intelligence operations only took as many Filipinos as was necessary to surprise and 
overwhelm their target without creating a large signature.230 This is an important fact as 
it relates directly to Dr. Arquilla’s thesis that irregular warfare is defined by small units 
conducting guerrilla activities. The larger guerrilla units learned quickly that a large 
signature was not beneficial to survival. Take the example of Walter Cushing, who had 
spectacular success ambushing and killing Japanese in 1942. However, his entire force 
was annihilated, including Cushing himself, by the Japanese in less than 9 months.231 As 
Cushing’s military victories became larger, he gained more attention—many civilian 
Filipinos knew his location, he became much easier to target by the Japanese, and he was 
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slaughtered after being betrayed by Filipinos who had been turned by the Japanese. After 
incidents like this, many units began to understand the need to keep things small and 
quiet; a dead guerrilla could not harass the Japanese. 
 As stated previously, there were general developmental trends for the guerrilla 
forces—pre-existing units that had transitioned, and units that were found and formed. 
An example was the Cagayan Apayo Forces (CAF), organized By CPT Ralph Praeger. 
Before the Japanese invasion, the CAF was Troop C, 26th Cavalry of the Filipino Scouts. 
During the retreat to the Bataan peninsula, Troop C was cut off, and did not make it. The 
squadron leadership disintegrated and the scout formation dissolved. Praeger and around 
80 scouts chose instead to take the fight back to the Japanese, operating successfully until 
the Japanese decimated them in the fall of 1943. The surviving CAF members were then 
rolled up into Volckmann’s USAIP-NL.232 Volckmann is an interesting story of an 
individual whose unit surrendered on Bataan. Volckmann himself escaped north on 
Luzon, trying to find a guerrilla unit to work with; he had limited success until he was 
able to link up with Filipino Ifugao Tribal leaders. Only after he was able to ally with the 
local strongmen Kamayong of the Halip Tribe and Tamicpao of the Antipolo tribe was he 
able to gain protection, Filipino knowledge, and warriors to begin organizing and fighting 
with. Volckmann proved an exceptional leader and organizer, and as previously stated, 
his force would end the war as the largest and best organized of all the guerrilla 
formations.233 
 Another—more strictly Filipino—guerrilla organization was the Hukbalahap, or 
Huks. The Huks would gain worldwide attention as a large communist insurgency, which 
seriously threatened the Philippine Republic government control in the 1950s. However, 
during the Japanese occupation the Huks formed to fight their aggression. Hukbalahap is 
an abbreviation of Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon, or People’s Anti-Japanese Army. 
The Huks emerged from already existing peasant social movements to fight the adversity 
of the Japanese. These communists understood the need for collective action; they 
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organized well and fought ferociously.234 Some Huks were nationalistic and had grand 
designs but the near target was to expel the Japanese. The Huks policed the countryside, 
held and controlled their territory, and aggressively attacked the Japanese. Their ability to 
survive and thrive can be attributed to their in depth and complete solidarity against the 
Japanese. Because they could not be infiltrated, the Huks succeeded in keeping their 
locations and operations secret.235 The Huks developed a deep and aggressive network of 
civilians who also tried to “undercut” the Japanese government. By 1944, the Huks had 
around 12,000 active armed guerrillas, organized into roughly 76 squadrons based in 
central Luzon. It is important to note that the Huks were well outside of MacArthur’s or 
any other U.S. Forces Far East’s control.236 The Huks looked down on these other units 
as cowards who were hiding for their own survival. The Huks prided themselves on their 
aggressiveness and their cohesion. There were clashes between the Huks and U.S./Fil 
units, but this was an inevitable aspect of lack of communication, ulterior motives, 
massive stress, and few resources. However, the Huks contributed greatly to the war, 
engaging in some large battles between their squadrons, the Japanese, and Filipino Police 
Constabulary units. Their own leaders estimated that they killed around 20,000 Japanese 
troops, spies, collaborators, and puppet police constabulary troops.237 
 There was significant friction between the guerrilla organizations. Because of the 
many different leaders, organizations, backgrounds and resources, very often the 
guerrillas felt as if they were in competition with each other instead of working together. 
Communication was difficult between the organizations—terrain, geography, Japanese 
garrisons, and travel difficulties hindered attempts at unity.238 The different leaders of the 
groups harbored great jealousies against each other; they bickered and fought for 
resources, sometimes even clashing in battle. The problems were described as endemic, 
as they squabbled over rank, tactics, jurisdiction, objectives, and many other issues.239 
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There was little intelligence and material sharing, little communication and no protection 
from each other or each other’s infiltrators or informants.240 The Japanese preyed on 
these divisions and tried to exacerbate them, often turning groups on each other in order 
to draw them out and destroy them. These disunity problems would continue to plague 
the Philippines for another fifty years, long after the guerrilla war against the Japanese 
had ended. 
 The final point necessary for discussion on organization is the double-edged 
sword of the civilian population. Every account of the guerrilla campaign discusses how 
necessary it was to have the civilian population on the side of the guerrillas. The auxiliary 
provided communication, intelligence updates on the Japanese, transport, early warning, 
supplies, safe houses, and ratlines (underground railroads). The auxiliary were involved 
in every aspect of guerrilla life and operations. The guerrillas separated the civilian 
support into mainly combat support roles. Combat supporters provided food, water, 
technical, and intelligence support. Volckmann felt these civilians were “critical and 
provided the only lifeline” the guerrillas had. 241 Intelligence gathering was likely the 
most critical role the civilians played—the civilians provided Volckman’s guerrillas with 
their greatest and only advantage over the Japanese: knowledge of terrain, enemy, 
weather, and situation.242 Without the civilian auxiliary combat support, the guerrillas 
would have had no chance.  
Unfortunately, the Japanese also knew this, so any and every opportunity was 
taken to sow discord, distrust, and to create infiltrators. If a civilian population were 
suspected of helping guerrillas, the Japanese would take vicious and brutal retribution 
against the population, until they got what they needed to target the guerrillas. The 
problem for the Japanese was that, even though this would provide tactical victories, it 
turned the population as a whole against the Japanese and the civilians would take any 
opportunity they could to help the guerrillas. The Japanese may have been winning the 
battles, but they were losing the war. The guerrillas had their own problems with the 
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civilians, because of the threat of infiltrators, collaborators, and spies, the guerrillas had 
to be very careful. They needed the civilians for everything, but opening the organization 
up to outsiders was the quickest way of being found out by the Japanese. Therefore, the 
guerrillas had to walk a tight rope on how much they let the civilians know, versus, how 
much support they received. These issues often led to guerrillas being betrayed, and 
guerrillas using extrajudicial punishment against suspected infiltrators. Guerrilla warfare 
was a messy business, with civilians and troops often paying the price. These issues, like 
the others, would linger for many years. 
D.  TACTICS / DOCTRINE 
 The tactics and doctrine used by guerrilla forces during the Japanese occupation 
fit nicely into Dr. Aquilla’s definition that irregular warfare has a focused on small-unit 
guerrilla and special operations tactics. What is important for this study is that the tactics 
used during the campaign were mixed, robust, imaginative, and aggressive. These 
operations also showed that the Filipino guerrilla during this conflict had reached a very 
serious and competent level. The Filipinos, built on their tribal DNA, used the lessons 
from the Spanish and American colonial conflicts and executed a very aggressive, 
detailed, and adaptive campaign against the Japanese occupiers. Filipino guerrilla 
operations of this period could be generally categorized into five groups: offensive, 
intelligence, counter intelligence, information, and direct support to allied invasion and 
liberation operations. 
 Offensive operations against the Japanese were the most common types of 
operations conducted by the guerrillas against the Japanese. They offered immediate 
results for the Filipino guerrillas and the civilian population. Japanese operations had 
bred significant animosity in the Filipinos—any opportunity for vengeance and to spill 
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Japanese troops did to troops and civilians alike; because of this, many harbored hatred. 
Summed up by one U.S. guerrilla, “I thought less of a Japanese life than of that of an 
animal.” 244 
Their attacks generally fell into two types: ambushes and raids. Because the 
guerrillas could rarely overwhelm the Japanese forces, they had to try to dictate when and 
how their engagements took place. Raids, or hit and run missions, maximized the theory 
of relative superiority, when a small force can gain a short but effective advantage over a 
larger force, then withdraw as the advantage wanes.245 Ambushes also worked well due 
to similar principles. The guerrillas had the advantage in the timing of the engagement; 
specifically they could pick the location, time, and decide to initiate or not. The Japanese 
often would try to lure the guerrillas onto their turf, in order to gain a decisive 
engagement more suited to their style of conventional combat. The Japanese would set 
ambushes and try to lure or entice the guerrillas. “The irregulars would pretend to take 
the bait, and would pepper the enemy for a bit with rifle fire from concealed positions 
just to pin him down long enough for Filipino civilians to flee out of harm’s way. Then 
the guerrillas would withdraw into the bush and try to induce the Japanese to follow them 
to places where they had set ambushes of their own.”246 Operations like this played to the 
guerrillas’ advantages of intelligence, terrain, and speed. 
Most operations could be describes as “hit and run”; the guerrillas would hit their 
target, “after which my men would scatter, hide weapons, go back to their homes, and 
appear to the world as ordinary rice farmers.”247 An example of the speed and simplicity 
of a guerrilla operation comes from Lt. Camp, an American who led a band of guerrillas 
from the CAF. He had been entreated to battle by the local Japanese garrison commander, 
who had barricaded himself inside a Filipino provincial penitentiary. The guerrillas knew 
that they could not hope to win in a battle against the garrison on the garrison’s terms, but 
simultaneously, knew that they needed to show to the population that they had no fear of 
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the garrison. “Lt. Camp was pondering the conundrum when he learned that some twenty 
Japanese soldiers were swimming in the Cagayan River. He promptly loaded several men 
in a sedan, drove up to the river’s edge in broad daylight, slammed on the brakes, and had 
his men open fire, Chicago-style. Nine Japanese were killed at a cost of one attacker 
suffering a leg wound.”248 These types of operations, while not decisive, undoubtedly 
were a major harassment to the Japanese, occupying their time and causing them to lose 
focus on other operations. These are extremely characteristic of guerrilla style irregular 
warfare strategy. 
Raids were another commonly used tactic. A raid is a deliberate attack on an 
enemy position with a planned withdrawal. The objectives of these operations were many 
and varied; sometimes either to simply hit the Japanese, and sometimes to gain 
intelligence, or to recover combat supplies. An example is when a Philippine Army 
officer, Captain Rufino Baldwin, conducted a raid on the Japanese garrison at the Igoten 
mines. The Objective of the raid was to capture the mines manager, a man named Agota, 
who the guerrillas believed would then furnish them with names of collaborators and 
intelligence on Japanese activities.249  
Offensive operations were successful from the point of view that they fell directly 
in line with the strategy. Harass the enemy, cause him to waste resources, frustrate him, 
and not allow him to gain a pitched and decisive battle. On the contrary, however, these 
operations would bring visibility to the guerrillas, and increase the pressure on them from 
the Japanese. The result was commonly that the guerrillas were destroyed or dispersed. 
Walter Cushing executed some of the most well-known and successful guerrilla 
ambushes of the war. In January of 1942, Cushing annihilated a ten-truck convoy killing 
all 69 of the Japanese soldiers; those who escaped the initial ambush fled into a field, and 
were chased down and killed by Filipinos with bolos knives. Only one Filipino was 
killed. Cushing was seen by Japanese aircraft during the attack and reported on. The 
Japanese, alerted to his operation, sent a large force from the garrison 25 miles north. 
When they arrived, they burned the village to the ground, and then relentlessly chased 
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Cushing for 9 months until he was killed and his force dispersed.250 Cushing was 
successful tactically and operationally, but his heavy balance towards risky operations 
cost him his life and his force. 
As stated previously, early losses of guerrilla forces, and retributions against 
civilians, caused MacArthur to issue his “lie low” order, which directed organized 
guerrilla units to desist from directly engaging Japanese forces, and instead focus on 
collecting and transmitting intelligence.251 Intelligence collection was focused, according 
to “USAFIP-NL G2 files, on five priorities; evaluation of the enemy forces and 
capabilities, interrogation of prisoners, proliferation of special agencies, psychological 
warfare, and infiltration.”252 These priorities show that intelligence was focused tactically 
and rolled up so that a strategic understanding of the situation could be developed. The 
issue strategically was that there was only ever one operational radio in the theater from 
the forces on Luzon (the island with the largest Japanese force and most USAFFE 
strategic objectives) to MacArthur’s USAFFE headquarters in Australia. From the 
invasion until March of 1943, this radio was with Praeger’s CAF in northern Luzon. 
After Praeger was captured, his radio was destroyed. Not until Volckmann’s force 
scrounged a radio and got it operational in August of 1944, did routine communication 
happen between the guerrillas and MacArthur. After Volckmann got up and running, the 
intelligence apparatus was ramped up to support the upcoming invasion, and liberation. 
For example, in November 1944, Volckmann’s forces found a crashed Japanese airplane. 
It had been carrying officials and papers relating to General Yamashita, the commander 
of all Japanese forces in the Philippines, and his defense plan for Luzon. Yamashita 
understood he could not repel a U.S. invasion on the beaches or defeat U.S. armor, 
instead he planned to move all six of his divisions into the mountains and make Luzon his 
last stand, and he would not defend the beaches. Volckmann’s guerrillas observed and  
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confirmed these troop movements by tracking his forces on the beaches and in the 
mountains. This information was then transmitted to MacArthur and was instrumental to 
the invasion plan. 
 The majority of intelligence collection for the guerrilla units, however, was 
focused at the tactical and operational levels on Japanese units. Civilians transmitted all 
types of data through the “bamboo telegraph”—a nickname for the passing of 
information from one Filipino to another until it reached its destination. This intelligence 
was important to moral, operations, and survival. 
 Because of the risks associated with being found out, the guerrillas focused a 
large percentage of their operations on counterintelligence—moving, hiding locations, 
and liquidating people who were threats. Collaborators, spies, traitors, and informants 
were dealt with ruthlessly. Guerrilla units were hard, even cruel, but most historians have 
forgiven this in the name of survival.253 It is conceded though, that some Filipinos took 
advantage of this situation for personal goals—killing not in the name of guerrilla 
survival, but actually killing out of vengeance.254 Not even the most ardent defenders of 
guerrilla justice could find reasons why whole families should be destroyed in the name 
of resistance.255 
 Information operations were also a large part of guerrilla life. Knowledge of what 
was going on was hard to find, yet very much in demand. Rumors flew in the early days, 
after the Japanese victories at Bataan and Corregidor. Any information was huge for 
moral. A number of guerrilla organizations were formed with the intended purpose of 
producing information and propaganda. Guerrilla radio transmitters and newspapers were 
used to strike back at Japanese information operations. 256 Significant success can be 
attributed to these endeavors, particularly in relaying information from the outside. While 
there were transmitters on the islands, receivers were in limited supply, but those who 
could receive could get Radio San Francisco, which transmitted allied information and 
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propaganda.257 Important to this study is that guerrilla leaders generally understood that a 
significant portion of the population was sitting on the fence. The majority of the 
population hated the Japanese, but the Japanese had incredible leverage and offered them 
great incentives to turn against the resistance.258 Therefore, getting the word out about 
the population was extremely important. It was important for guerrilla leaders to have the 
general population know that the guerrillas were resisting, having success, and that the 
allies would soon return with an invasion force to liberate the island. Victors hold faith in 
the darkest of times, and the years 1942–1944 were extremely dark; sometimes the only 
hope was from a rumor sent through the bamboo telegraph. 
 The fifth type of operation the guerrillas were involved with was direct support to 
allied liberation operations. Prior to late 1944–1945, the purpose of the guerrilla 
operations was to attrite and harass the Japanese, gain intelligence, and keep the 
occupiers on their toes. As the invasion and liberation drew near, the purpose shifted to 
direct support to these allied conventional operations. After Volckmann made contact 
with MacArthur in October of 1944, he prepared his forces to support the Luzon 
invasion. Volckmann passed intelligence to the USAFFE HQ on beaches and enemy 
formations. After the invasion began on 9 January 1945, Volckmann linked up with 
MacArthur, got his forces supplied, and began to participate in the liberation. The 
USAFIP-NL participated in many attacks, and when they were finally able to go on the 
offensive. Units were engaged all over Luzon—for months the guerrillas participated in 
the most violent and aggressive battles of the Philippine Liberation campaign. In the end, 
Volckmann’s forces fought their way to within 5 miles of Gen Yamashita’s mountain 
holdout, before the Japanese Emperor signaled surrender.259 
 One of the most common tasks performed by the guerrillas during this campaign 
was as scouts and guides to U.S. invasion forces. The ranger raid on the U.S. POW camp 
at Cabanatuan was one of the more legendary examples of this task. The guerrillas, led by 
the courageous Captain Juan Pajota, were the instrumental factor in the success of the 
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raid. Not only did Pajota and his guerrillas keep Colonel Mucci, the Ranger leader, from 
executing while there was a Japanese Battalion on the objective, but they also led the 
rangers to the objective, conducted all of the reconnaissance, provided the rangers with 
all of their intelligence, and then provided security. The security element outside of the 
camp saw the most action as they kept Japanese reinforcements from reaching the prison 
camp. Pajota’s unit killed over 300 Japanese in the battle while only suffering nine minor 
casualties.260This action kept the camp relatively quiet while the U.S. Rangers quickly 
beat the small prison guard force. The majority of their time in the camp was spent 
evacuating the severely weak prisoners. 512 U.S. POWs were recovered alive, then 
evacuated by the Filipino guerrillas and the Rangers. The U.S. Rangers took most of the 
glory, but the true credit and honor goes to the Filipinos who were the key to success.261 
E. WEAPONS / TECHNOLOGY 
 The bottom line with the weapons, technology, and other supplies used during the 
Japanese occupation by the Filipino guerrillas is that there was no effort put into 
developing new systems to win the day. Instead, the Filipino took what already existed, 
and that he possessed, however severely limited, and tried to use it to leverage an 
advantage.262 The Filipinos were not trying to make new weapons, instead they used 
what they had and tried to win. 
 The majority of the weapons that the Filipino guerrilla used were small arms—
rifles, pistols, edged weapons, grenades, and simple explosives such as dynamite. Almost 
no mortars or artillery made it through the Japanese invasions. The weapons that the 
guerrillas used had to come from one of four places: they were already in their possession 
before the war, or they were found, or scavenged from the battlefield, or they were left 
behind after U.S./Fil units retreated to Bataan. Weapons were also taken from Japanese 
troops during raids, and ambushes, or later and in much more limited quantities, brought 
in via submarines, sent by HQ USAFFE.  The weapons that the Philippine Army had 
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been armed with prior to the start of the war were America’s World War I surplus, 
including obsolete Enfield rifles.263 Many other weapons came from the colonial wars, 
and still made it into the hands of Filipino guerrillas. Americans did bring some weapons 
with them into the guerrilla lines, but these again only included limited numbers of small 
arms, including M1 Garand rifles and .45 caliber Colt 1911 pistols.264 One of the first 
concerns and duties of the guerrilla was to try and find more weapons. One of the 
principle methods was battlefield recovery—scrounging weapons which had been lost or 
left behind.265 Weapons were also routinely taken from Japanese soldiers after raids or 
ambushes. Lack of resources required the guerrilla to be resourceful with what he had. 
One example of this was in the case of Lieutenant Camp of the CAF, who before one raid 
made sixty homemade grenades consisting of dynamite, scrap metal, and 
bamboo.266When Camp’s raid force hit the airfield, they managed to knock out two 
machine gun positions with the homemade grenades. This action got the assaulters 
through the perimeter, where they then inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese 
defenders.267 Some groups had no artillery, mortar, rifle grenades, mines, or explosives, 
so they had to improvise. Blowing up bridges meant having to wire 30-second fuses to 
75mm shells; this turned out to be only moderately successful, but ironically, can be seen 
as a precursor to modern day IEDs.268 By 1944, the guerrillas had a new method of 
resupply: a few USAFFE submarines began to make it through to the coast and linkup 
with the guerrillas. This was a tricky maneuver, which required much secrecy, bamboo 
rafts, and coded light signals—but when they got through, the guerrillas received 
weapons, food, money, medicine, intelligence, information, cigarettes, radios, and 
technically trained men in communications, demolitions, medicine, and weather. These 
were the “boom times” for the guerrillas. The new weapons raised moral and were a sign 
that the tide had turned and that the liberation was on the horizon. One anecdote describes 
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the guerrillas getting their hands on new bazookas: “a bazooka was fired accidentally, the 
destructive force of the shell made an indelible impression on everyone nearby. At once, 
my men begged me to let them take it down into the lowlands, and try it out against a 
Kempeitai (Japanese military police) outpost. After an argument, I relented. They dashed 
off, jubilant as six-year-olds at a birthday party. The bazooka was a tremendous success: 
those in the Japanese outpost never knew what hit them. There were no known 
survivors.”269 
 One of the critical components that the submarines delivered was radios.270 
Radios were critical lifelines to the outside. Receiver sets and transmitter sets were 
common, but very few had receiver-transmitter combos that could be used to 
communicate. Generally, messages went in one direction. Major Praeger of the CAF had 
the only receiver transmitter on Luzon, which belonged to the guerrillas, from 1942 until 
he was captured in 1943.271 The CAF radio was considered the most important piece of 
their organization.272 Without it, there would be no contact with the HQ USAFFE at all. 
Everything was done to protect it and keep it running. In the end, nothing could stop the 
Japanese from hunting it down.273 Men in Volckmann’s unit scrounged the second most 
important radio in August of 1944; this was an instrumental success because it enabled 
coordination between the largest guerrilla unit on Luzon and Gen MacArthur in charge of 
the liberation.  
 Medicine was in extremely short supply from the beginning of the war and 
throughout. Hospital facilities also were in critically short supply. The guerrillas were not 
the only ones to suffer either—all civilians paid a heavy price for the lack of medicine. 
Jungle disease was rampant, malaria and dengue ravaged the population. Starvation 
diseases were also very prevalent, beriberi and scurvy took a massive toll on the entire 
population. Food was very limited, and without medicine to compensate, many people 
wasted away. Guerrillas and the population tried to improvise remedies, with jungle 
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plants, and local spiritual leaders—however, as expected these often only had moderate 
results.274 No western fighter was immune to the awfulness of disease. Every known 
American guerrilla leader was afflicted at one time or another with jungle disease that 
knocked them down so badly that they expected they would not survive. Often the only 
reason that they did survive was that a member of the Filipino population brought them in 
and nursed them back to health. 
 There was limited transportation available to be used by the guerrillas throughout 
the entire war. Local vehicles, horse, caribou, and feet were the primary method of 
transport. Trucks and vehicles were used, but these were all civilian vehicles, which had 
existed locally prior to the war. One interesting example of “making do with what you 
have” is the story of how 45 carabao carts were used to move the 512  POWs liberated 
from the prison camp at Cabanatuan. These prisoners were weak and had a great distance 
to travel from the camp to safety. The Rangers and guerrillas were able to walk the 
twenty miles to the camp, but there would be no way the prisoners could walk out back to 
U.S. lines. There were no vehicles available, so the guerrillas improvised. They 
coordinated with the local Filipinos who provided and drove the carts—without which, it 
would have been impossible to get the prisoners out.275   
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F. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION  
 
Figure 6.  WWII Japanese Occupation Filipino irregular warfare 
characteristics 
 The Japanese occupation was certainly the worst five years in the entire history of 
the Filipino people. The overwhelming amount of destruction and death is hard to 
imagine. No person was unaffected. Simultaneously, the period produced some of the 
greatest examples of Filipino ingenuity, imagination, and irregular fighting spirit. 
Certainly, the Filipino was under resourced, before and during the campaign. They could 
not directly challenge the Japanese occupiers and hope to overthrow or annihilate them. 
Therefore, their only choice was to turn to irregular warfare. The Filipino did just this. 
They looked to their roots, their tribal DNA. They remembered the hard lessons they had 
learned from fighting their Spanish and American occupiers and they took the next step. 
The Filipino guerrilla campaign against the Japanese is an unbelievable study in adaption 
and whole-of-population effort. It is no less tragic than it is great; however, the campaign 
clearly shows how brutally violent and destructive irregular warfare is. The campaign 
was successful; ultimately, the Japanese could not consolidate their gains, and eventually 
they were expelled, as they could not defend against the liberation invasion.  
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 This period is possibly the clearest example of irregular warfare in Filipino 
history. First, it is classic in its makeup: a hated foreign occupier, and a popular insurgent 
movement working towards legitimate freedom and independence. There were multiple 
bands, well-trained individuals, and external support from the Allied powers. We have 
seen how the guerrillas organized in small bands, used guerrilla and insurgent tactics, 
leveraged the technology and weapons available, and worked to prolong the conflict and 
attrite the Japanese until outside resources were built up for the liberation.  
 Terrorism is not considered present during this time period, even though some 
would argue that the guerrillas did terrorize. We have not considered it because the 
Japanese were foreign occupiers, and any attack on them by a Filipino would be 
considered a legitimate military attack. Attacks against Filipino collaborators would be 
considered legitimate for the same reason. It would be taken as a serious accusation to 
consider the World War II Filipino guerrillas as terrorists. Many of their tactics may have 
spread fear, but they can be considered lawful violence against military targets. 
 In conclusion, the Filipino organization, doctrine, and use of technology during 
the guerrilla campaign is the epitome of irregular warfare. We have seen how limited 
resources forced the Filipinos to band together for survival. They then went on the 
offensive against the Japanese—however, again because of their limited resources, they 
chose to fight a protracted campaign to attrite the Japanese. The Filipino warrior would 
take this experience and carry it with him for many years. Unfortunately, he would next 
use these skills and this strategy against his own family. 
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VI. POST INDEPENDENCE ERA WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The post-independence period covered the next fifty years, from the time the 
Philippines gained its independence in 1946 to just before the onset of the Philippine-
U.S. Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in 2000. Throughout this period, the Philippines 
would continue to face security challenges as it struggled to develop as a sovereign 
nation. The nation’s immediate concern was not from foreign invaders but from threats 
made by internal groups. Conflicts, which became lingering and more complex, were 
now between Filipinos. In contrast to the colonial period, the nation’s armed forces now 
possessed significant military strength and capability, and faced internal threats that were 
deemed weak and lacking the military capability and resources to directly overthrow the 
government. Many of these same internal threats continue to persist even to the present 
day, continuing to disturb peace and stability, and hindering the country’s potential for 
growth.    
Throughout this period, the continued economic and military support of the U.S. 
government was very apparent. This was made possible by the relationship the 
Philippines and the U.S. developed over time. More so, though it achieved independence, 
the Philippine government did not have the wherewithal to rebuild the country and had no 
recourse but to rely on American benevolence. The continued U.S. presence in the 
Philippines, through their military bases, was vital to their national interest.276 Both 
countries saw benefits in this continued relationship. Thus, particularly on matters of 
security, the Philippines continued to be supported by the U.S. This was manifest in a 
series of military agreements. In 1947, the Philippines and the U.S. signed two 
agreements: the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the 
Philippine-American Military Assistance Agreement (MAA). The MBA gave the U.S. 
access to military bases in the Philippines, notably the Clark Air Base and the Subic 
Naval Base. The MAA, meanwhile, provided for the transfer of U.S. military surplus 
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equipment to the Philippines and the establishment of a Joint U.S. Military Advisory 
Group (JUSMAG) to advise and train the AFP. The two agreements were followed by the 
Mutual Defense Treaty, signed by the two countries on 30 August 1951, defining the 
collective security for both countries. However, the termination of the MBA in 
September 1991, briefly led to a low point in Philippine-U.S. security relations. 
Eventually, this relationship was revitalized with the signing of the 1999 Visiting Forces 
Agreement (VFA) and the subsequent 2002 Mutual Logistic Support Agreement. In sum, 
a long history of security relations between the Philippines and the U.S. underscores a 
U.S. influence over the Philippine military. This U.S. influence is very evident in how the 
Philippine military was organized, trained, equipped—and arguably—how it fought its 
conflicts. 
From the time the Philippines gained its independence, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) was confronted, over time, with various threats made by internal 
groups: the HUKBALAHAP or the Huks, the Maoist-inspired Communist Party of the 
Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), and the Muslim secessionist Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). Certain characteristics are common among these threat groups. 
First, each of these groups started out small and managed to grow to a level where it 
effectively challenged the government. Second, these groups were able to grow by 
recognizing the role the population played in their struggles.  
This chapter will focus on how these threat groups challenged the government, 
and correspondingly, how the AFP dealt with the challenges. For each threat group, an 
analysis will be made on the nature and capability of each group in pursuing its goals. 
Particular attention will be given to how each group waged war against the AFP and how 
the AFP responded to the groups in terms of its organization, tactics/doctrine/strategy, 
and use of weapons/technology. Throughout the period, Arquilla’s definition of irregular 
warfare, both for the insurgents and the counter-insurgents, is evident—the employment 
of small units and the use of guerrilla tactics. The insurgents’ use of terrorism to 
influence the behavior of the Philippine government emerges during this period. 
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B. THE HUKBALAHAP CONFLICT 
1. Situation 
The liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese occupation and the subsequent 
end of World War II brought new hope for the Filipinos. It signaled that total 
independence as a nation would soon be granted by the Americans. True to the spirit of 
the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Philippine independence was proclaimed on 4 July 1946, 
with Roxas as President of the Republic.277 The proclamation of Philippine independence 
ushered in a new era. However, along with hope came the enormous challenges faced by 
the Filipinos—who were now responsible for managing their own affairs as a sovereign 
nation. Coming out of the ravages wrought by World War II, the country had to deal with 
a myriad of problems: a devastated economy, acute food shortage, poverty, the 
collaboration issue, the issue of guerrilla abuses during the war, and establishing peace 
and order all over the archipelago. Indeed, a daunting task lay ahead for the government 
to rehabilitate and reconstruct the country. 
 While undergoing rehabilitation and reconstruction, of equal concern was the 
problem of maintaining the nation’s internal security. Just out of World War II, there 
were a lot of firearms available as well as armed groups that threatened peace and order. 
This was the primordial concern of the Philippine armed forces. The most prominent of 
these armed groups was the HUKBALAHAP, an acronym for Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa 
Hapon (People’s Anti-Japanese Army).278 Commonly known as the Huks, the group’s 
roots go all the way back to the period before World War II. Briefly, the Huks were a 
peasant-based organization borne out of the growing agrarian unrest prevailing in Central 
Luzon. The unrest was a result of the exploitative landlord-tenant relationship. Property 
owners exacted 50–70 percent of the tenants’ crop as rent and interest payment.279 
Tenants were left with little produce to live on and therefore were incapable of improving 
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their already impoverished situation. As such, tenants continued to be indebted to their 
landlords with no better future in sight. From these tenants came the rise of peasant 
groups demanding fairness from the landlords and action from the government. The Huks 
were built upon these peasant groups during the period of the Japanese invasion of the 
Philippines. It was clear that the Huks, though they gained prominence as a guerrilla unit 
during the Japanese invasion, were borne out of the agrarian unrest in Central Luzon. Not 
even their association with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) or the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP) prior to World War II could discount the fact that the 
existence of the Huks was rooted in the country’s socio-economic problems.  
 The Huks came out of the World War II as the most organized and strongest of 
the guerrilla organizations—some 15,000 armed fighters in number, and capable of 
threatening the post-war Philippine government.280 After the war, there was a need to 
recognize the contribution of guerrilla units who fought against the Japanese.  However, 
despite their role as anti-Japanese guerrillas in World War II, the Philippine government 
and the U.S. did not duly recognize the Huks. They were viewed with suspicion due to 
their communist inclinations. From their many squadrons, only two from southern Luzon 
were offered official recognition and promised veteran benefits, back pay, and the 
opportunity for integration into the Philippine armed forces.281 The rest of the Huks were 
ordered disarmed. The treatment resulted in the Huks’ disaffection towards the Philippine 
government and the U.S. forces. The Huks, thereafter, vowed to continue to fight the 
Philippine government and the U.S., and to pursue their goals rooted in the abusive 
landlord-tenant relationship. 
 In the 1946 elections, a requisite for the granting of Philippine independence, Luis 
Taruc, the Huk Supremo, and six others, all running under the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
party, ran for seats in Congress in their respective provinces. Six DA candidates, 
including Taruc, won their Congressional seats representing the provinces of Bulacan, 
Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac. However, Roxas, who was elected as president, 
made true on his previous promise of eliminating the Huk resistance. Roxas used his 
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influence in Congress to deny the DA candidates their Congressional seats.282 Denied of 
his seat as a duly-elected Congressman of his province, Taruc decided to return to the 
mountains and reorganized the Huk resistance movement. 
 Meanwhile, the AFP had been reorganized at the end of World War II. From its 
strength of about 132,000, it was immediately reduced to about 25,000.283 At that time, 
the Philippine armed force was generally poorly trained and equipped, and lacking the 
leadership necessary to perform its mission.284 Other problems further compounded the 
situation of the Philippine military: poor discipline, graft and corruption, ineptitude, low 
morale, and lack of a clear direction characterized the military organization.285 Given the 
sad state of the Philippine military, it was not surprising that the military committed 
atrocities against the population as it addressed the Huk resistance. Thus, the population, 
particularly in areas influenced by the Huks, was alienated from the AFP as well as from 
the Philippine government. 
The existing conditions in the country from 1945–1946 made the Philippines ripe 
for a rebellion. The Philippine government, still reeling from the effects of World War II, 
was unresponsive to the needs of the people. The Philippine military was likewise 
incapable of addressing the problems of internal security. The people, most especially, 
bore the brunt of the sufferings caused by the inability of the government and the military 
to provide for and protect them. It was as a result of these conditions that the Huk 
rebellion managed to flourish—until its eventual demise in 1955. 
2. Organization 
a. Huks 
Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941, provided an 
opportunity for the Huks to expand their organization. As the Japanese forces and 
Filipino collaborators committed atrocities, they drove the population to join the Huks 
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and fight the invaders. From an early strength of less than 300 individuals in April 1942, 
the Huks exceeded 10,000 individuals near the end of the war.286 As pointed out earlier, 
the Huks were the most organized and strongest guerrilla organization after the war. 
The Huk organization was composed of fighters, supporters and a mass 
base.287 The fighters were full-time regulars who conducted the raids, “ambuscades,” 
kidnappings and extortion. The supporters were those who acted as couriers, collected 
taxes, or from time to time joined the regulars. The mass base was the largest group 
among the Huk organization, serving as the lifeline of the movement—providing food, 
information and sanctuary to the guerrillas. 
Looking at the organization, the following chart shows the Huk 
organizational structure: 
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Figure 7.  CPP/HUK Organization (ca. 1950) 288 
 The structure shows the integration of the military side of the Huks 
and the political side of the PKP/CPP. More so, the organizational structure reflects its 
hierarchical/centralized nature.  The Philippine military would take advantage of the 
inherent weakness of this type of organization in guerrilla warfare. In October 1950, 
reflecting great intelligence work, the Philippine military’s intelligence units raided 
twenty-two homes and apartments in Manila.289 This raid resulted in the capture of 
almost the entire leadership of the Huk/CPP. The raid likewise captured documents of 
high intelligence value that aided the Philippine military in further efforts of decimating 
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the Huk resistance movement. The capture of these important leaders was a big blow to 
the Huk/CPP organization from which it never recovered.290 
 The chart above also shows the structure of the military side of the 
Huk/CPP. A regional command was composed of a regiment made up of two battalions 
(of two squadrons each); the squadron (company) was composed of 100 men, and was 
nominally composed of two platoons, each platoon having four 12-man squads.291 The 
structure is evidence of the use of small units, the squad as its basic organization, to carry 
out the Huks’ operations. 
b.  AFP 
 The AFP, in order to effectively confront the Huk problem, also 
required some reorganization. The reorganization took a serious pace during the tenure of 
Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense. While the reorganization encompassed a lot 
of areas for improvement in the military, emphasis here is given to the frontline units 
tasked to address the Huk insurgents at the tactical level—the Battalion Combat Team 
(BCT). The following chart shows the structure of the BCT: 
 
Figure 8.  AFP Battalion Combat Team Organization (ca. 1952) 292 
The BCT was organized to address the operational requirements for 
combating the Huk insurgency. Primary considerations in the organization of the BCT 
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were mobility, firepower, and the emphasis given to small unit operations. To increase its 
mobility, the battalion was stripped of its artillery and heavy mortars, and was replaced 
with additional rifle companies. Likewise, light utility vehicles were provided down to 
the platoon level. In terms of firepower, 81mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles were 
issued to the weapons company. For heavier fire support, artillery was attached to the 
BCT for specific operations, as needed. At the heart of the BCT were the rifle companies. 
Each company was composed of approximately 200 men and divided into four rifle 
platoons; a service platoon with intelligence analysts, maintenance, civil affairs, and 
medical sections; and a company headquarters. Each rifle platoon was assigned with four 
light utility vehicles, one 2 ½ ton truck, two .50 caliber machine guns and one 60mm 
mortar. Platoons were made up of three squads, each squad composed of two patrols. 
Each patrol, typically, was composed of an enlisted patrol leader, a radioman, a 
Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) man, a scout, a rifleman/grenadier, and an 
aidman/cook. Provided with the necessary support to accomplish its mission, the BCT 
was considered a self-contained combat unit.293 
The emphasis given to small-unit operations also saw the birth of the 
Scout Ranger (SR) team. Combining the reconnaissance capabilities of the U.S. Army’s 
Alamo Scouts and the strike capabilities of the U.S. Army Rangers, the then-Captain 
Rafael Ileto, who had served with the U.S. Army’s Alamo Scouts in World War II, came 
up with the concept of the SR team. Thus, on 25 November 1950, the Scout Ranger 
Training Unit (SRTU) was created to train Scout Rangers. The basic SR unit was a 7-man 
team capable of infiltrating enemy territory, conducting long-range reconnaissance, 
and—when given the opportunity—strike the enemy and quickly withdraw. The SR team 
capitalized on stealth, mobility, and strike capabilities to attack enemy guerrilla units that 
were often larger in number than the SR teams. Initially, the SR teams were assigned to 
regular infantry battalions for reconnaissance and strike missions. By 1954, all SR teams 
were combined to form a single unit, the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR). At the 
end of major hostilities with the Huks in 1957, the FSRR was deactivated, and the SR 
training course was incorporated into the Philippine Army’s infantry school. The unit, 
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having displayed its utility in counter-insurgency operations, would again rise to the 
challenge to combat the threat posed by the communist insurgency in the 1970s. 
3. Tactics / Doctrine 
a. Huks 
The Huks employed raids and ambushes as their principal tactics. They 
normally operated in small units, but could come together to form a larger force, 
depending on the mission/target. Raids were conducted against poorly defended or 
isolated military camps or outposts. These raids would net for the Huks additional 
weapons and other war materials for the resistance movement. Raids would likewise be 
conducted in towns or villages to liquidate government officials, ransack for food and 
other supplies, or to intimidate the population in areas not supportive to the movement. It 
had become common practice for the Huks to conduct raids that were timed during the 
eve, or on the day, of town fiestas or holidays—when the general celebratory mood of the 
people would tend to relax the security measures of the military and the police.294 Raids 
would normally be timed at the break of dawn, or in some instances, just before twilight, 
especially on isolated military outposts where the arrival of reinforcements or outside 
help would be delayed by the onset of darkness. 
Ambush was also a common tactic of the Huks. Ambushes were set along 
roads or trails that were usual routes of government forces while taking advantage of the 
terrain that would provide the Huks cover and concealment. Ambushes were not limited 
to government forces but also to government officials or other civilians, landlords in 
particular, that were considered unsympathetic to the movement. The Huks became a 
master of the hit-and-run technique, which was used to avoid major clashes with the 
government forces, to wear out the government forces conducting pursuit operations, and 
for practical purposes of survival so they could fight another day. 
 The Huks were also noted for using terrorism as a tactic; they 
would “liquidate” civilians that opposed them. One particular incident outraged the 
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public and was denounced as excessive. In April 1949, the Huks killed Mrs. Quezon (the 
widow of the former President Manuel L. Quezon) and others in her car.295 Reasons were 
given in an attempt to explain the use of terrorism: that it was retaliation against 
government terrorism, which had forced them to do bad things, or that Huks who carried 
out terrorism were bad cadres with poor leadership control. Yet, the killing of the wife of 
a former president was considered inappropriate, and did not support the movement’s 
cause, even for those inside the movement.296 Whatever the explanations, the use of 
terrorism worked against the resistance movement. 
Throughout the resistance period, the Huks effectively used the population 
to their advantage. Having the support of the population, particularly in Central Luzon 
where Huk supporters and sympathizers were at their highest, enabled the resistance 
movement to flourish. Consistent with Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond Model,” the 
population was the source of food, money, members, and information for the Huks. 
b. AFP 
The reorganization of the AFP, and particularly the creation of the BCT 
and SR team units, showed evidence of a shift from the more conventional, large-
formation operations to an emphasis on the use of small unit operations. There were 
compelling reasons for these: the AFP had to keep up with the ability of the Huks to 
evade government forces and avoid major clashes; the AFP had to be able to conduct 
pursuit operations effectively; and the AFP had to be able to operate in Huklandia 
without compromising their presence. The use of small units capable of conducting small 
unit tactics was the key to combating the Huks. The government already had the 
advantage in terms of firepower, logistics, and mobility. What was needed was to be able 
to effectively engage the enemy and bring these advantages to bear upon them. 
Aside from the preponderance of small unit operations, the AFP also 
experimented with the conduct of pseudo-operations. The idea was to use specially-
trained soldiers to pose as Huks, infiltrate Huk areas, sow confusion, and obtain 
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intelligence.297 To this end, selected soldiers were trained to adapt to the Huks’ manner 
of dressing, speaking, and eating. The soldiers were exposed to the movement’s reading 
materials and other documents pertaining to the Huks. They were also exposed to, and 
equipped with, the type of weapons the Huks used. After the training, the soldiers were 
deployed at a time and area favorable to their cover-up, to make their presence as Huks 
plausible enough to the enemy. An example of the success of this deception operation 
was the “Force X” launched by the 16th PC Company, composed of three officers and 44 
men under Lieutenant Marana.298 Upon making contact with the enemy, the unit under 
Lieutenant Marana was able to disguise themselves as valid Huks in the eyes of the 
enemy for five days. However, on the sixth day, the Huks had already become suspicious 
of their true identity. With the initiative still on their side, Lieutenant Marana struck the 
enemy, leading to 82 Huks killed-in-action (KIA) in less than 30 minutes.299 This type of 
operation was also used to covertly distribute propaganda leaflets in areas thought to be 
secured by the Huks. The result was confusion and fear among the Huks. Another use for 
this type of operation was to plant altered ammunition in the Huks’ ammunition 
stockpile.300 Aside from destroying the rifle and injuring the person firing the weapon, 
this ploy caused confusion in the enemy ranks—a Huk could not be sure whether the 
ammunition he was using was tampered with, of if somebody in his ranks had become a 
government infiltrator. 
Other factors, throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, can 
be attributed to the success of the government’s operations against the Huks: leadership, 
better intelligence, improved troop discipline, and respect for human rights, to name a 
few. However, it cannot be denied that the emphasis on small unit operations enabled the 
AFP to bring the fight to the enemy. 
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4. Weapons / Technology 
a. Huks 
The lack of weapons and ammunition supply was always a concern of the 
Huk resistance movement. Lacking any external support as well, the Huks had to make 
do with firearms that were leftovers from World War II. The Huks augmented these with 
weapons captured from killed soldiers, or from successful raids of military outposts or 
government and private installations. The Huks fought mostly with rifles, a mix of old 
Enfield and Springfield rifles, carbines, and .45 caliber Thompson submachine guns. 
These were supplemented with a few .30 caliber machineguns and small mortars 
(60mm).301 
In terms of communications, the Huks did not have the equipment to come 
up with a communication network of their own. The Huks had to rely on the existing 
telephone and telegraph systems available at that time.302 They used it either to pass 
information to fellow Huks, or gather information from the government forces by way of 
supporters/sympathizers who were employed by communications services. To 
compensate for their lack of a mechanical means to communicate, the Huks resorted to an 
elaborate courier system.303 Utilizing their supporters, the Huks used couriers to pass 
messages to other units, making use of the transport systems available in the area. While 
this worked for the Huks for a certain period, the nature of the system certainly did cause 
delays in the delivery of messages, as well as in the coordination of Huk activities. 
Overall, the lack of resources, aside from other considerations, was an 
obvious factor for the Huk resistance movement. In addition, technological impacts, if 
any, were mostly absent for the Huks. The Huks had to make do with whatever resources 
were available, and they tried to compensate for this in other areas of the resistance 
movement.   
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b. AFP 
In stark contrast to the Huks, the AFP, while it also lacked the resources 
needed to fight the rebellion, enjoyed the backing of the U.S. government. In his 1950 
visit to the U.S., Magsaysay was able to secure military aid.304 The U.S. provided 
weapons, training, and funds to support the anti-Huk campaign.305 Hence, the AFP was 
able to have considerable advantage over its enemies in terms of resources. 
In terms of firepower, AFP units certainly had the advantage. Small units 
were armed with Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), Thompson submachine guns, and 
carbines. (Smith, pp. 120) AFP units also had direct fire support from heavy machineguns 
(.50 and .30 caliber), and 75mm recoilless rifles; indirect fire support was provided by 
mortars (60mm and 81mm), and artillery, and air support from Air Force planes.306 AFP 
units also had the mobility assets to cover wide areas and the radios to maintain 
communication with other units, and to allow coordination. 
In addition to the weapons and equipment already at hand, the Philippine 
Army Research and Development (R&D) Unit developed some items in contribution to 
the counter-insurgency effort. Some of these items were exploding radios, flashlights, and 
doctored Huk weapons that were planted in enemy supplies.307 The R&D Unit also made 
some innovations: one was the modified M1 carbine, for use of the SR teams, equipped 
with dual barrels, made fully automatic, and capable of firing 1,500 rounds per minute; 
another was the homemade napalm bomb, coconut shells filled with gasoline and 
dropped with incendiary grenades.308 
But then, while the AFP had an advantage over the Huks in terms of 
weapons, equipment, and technology, this particular advantage had to be combined with 
other efforts in various areas of the AFP military in order to produce the desired impact 
on the insurgency problem. 
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C. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES / NEW PEOPLES 
ARMY CONFLICT 
1. Situation 
 The years after the defeat of the Huk rebellion saw relative peace in the country. 
Yet, socio-economic problems continued to persist. Poverty was still rampant in the 
country while the elites and the landlords continue to amass their own wealth. While it 
can be said that the poor could vote, indicating that democracy was progressing, it was 
still the elites—the big landlords and businessmen—who dictated politics and power.309 
The gap between the rich and the poor in society had become wider. The issue of land for 
the landless remained a problem. Succeeding administrations after Magsaysay failed to 
carry on with the programs initiated by the late President, particularly the agrarian 
reform. Meantime, issues on nationalism started to gain momentum in the early 1960s 
with the students, workers, and peasants. Nationalist issues ranged from the unfair nature 
of the Philippine-U.S. free-trade agreement to the presence of U.S. bases in the 
Philippines. Two incidents at the U.S. military bases further fueled these anti-U.S. 
sentiments.310  On 25 November 1964, an off-duty U.S. soldier shot and killed a Filipino 
boy collecting scrap items inside Clark Air Base. This was followed by another incident 
where two U.S. naval sentries shot and killed a Filipino fisherman found paddling his 
boat inside the waters of Subic Naval Base. These incidents resulted in angry 
demonstrations outside of the U.S. Embassy in Manila. 
About the same time, a Cultural Revolution was occurring in China. This 
development was deemed to have influenced the nationalist movements. Mao’s writings 
provided a concrete plan for organizing an armed revolution. Further, it opened the 
possibility to the nationalists that there was something that a weak group could do against 
a more powerful group.311 
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Amidst these combined factors prevailing in Philippine society, along with the 
inspiration derived from China’s Cultural Revolution, Jose Maria Sison saw that the 
situation was ripe for revolution. Thus, Sison founded the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP). This was followed by the founding of the New People’s Army (NPA) 
under Bernabe Buscayno. The CPP, following Mao’s teachings, pursued a protracted 
people’s war. The CPP controlled and gave direction to the revolutionary movement, and 
the NPA served as the military arm. The birth of the CPP in 26 December 1968—and the 
subsequent founding of the NPA on 29 March 1969—marked the beginning of a renewed 
communist insurgency in the Philippines. While the CPP/NPA did have its ups and 
downs, this threat managed to persist over time and remains the primary internal security 
threat to the country even to this day.312 
The AFP, on the other hand, continued its development as a professional standing 
force. It gained much needed experience in security operations during its successful role 
of defeating the Huk rebellion. This was further enhanced with its experience in the 
international scene through its participation in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In 
Korea, it sent a Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) where its BCTs 
directly participated in combat under the United Nations. In Vietnam, a Philippine 
Contingent to Vietnam (PHILCONV), later named Philippine Civic Action Group to 
Vietnam (PHILCAGV), was sent primarily for civic action operations. Throughout the 
period, the AFP continued to be supported by the U.S. military. 
On the domestic scene, the AFP would have its hands full with emerging security 
challenges, the burgeoning communist insurgency, and for a period, Muslim separatism. 
On top of it all, disturbing trends were apparent in the AFP.313 The AFP would be 
hounded by politicization that affected its efforts towards professionalism. Also, 
factionalism characterized the organization, such as Academy graduates vs. ROTC 
graduates or “integrees.” Non-traditional roles would also be added to the AFP, such as 
the management and control of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), 
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most especially at the onset of Martial Law. This role, particularly for officers, digressed 
the AFP from performing its core competencies. 
In the public’s eye, especially the peasants and the poor, the AFP was always 
viewed as working for the privileged. The AFP was seen as instruments of the elite to 
repress any challenges—as pawns of the landlords.314 This would further intensify during 
the Martial Law period. 
Amidst all these challenges and negativism, the AFP would respond to the 
challenge, and would certainly learn its lessons as it tried to fulfill its mandate. 
2. Organization 
a. CPP/NPA 
Democratic centralism is the CPP/NPA’s basic organizational principle, 
reflecting centralized leadership and decentralized operations.315 At the top of the 
organization is the Central Committee (CC), providing control and guidance. Under the 
CC are: the National Democratic Front (NDF) which builds the front organizations; the 
Territorial Commissions (TC) which cover the six areas of northern, central ,and southern 
Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, and Negros Island; and four functional commissions (mass 
movement, propaganda, united front, and military).316 Under the TCs are the various 
levels of committees (regional, front, district, and section) with the corresponding armed 
units (the main regional guerrilla unit [MRGU], front regional guerrilla unit [FRGU], 
district local guerrilla unit, and section local guerrilla unit. The MRGU resembles a 
company-size unit, the FRGU a platoon-size unit, and the district guerrilla and section 
guerrilla units range from a squad-size to about 3–5 man teams.317 
 At the lowest level, the CPP/NPA operated with 3–5 man teams. 
These small units conducted a range of activities designed to gain the support of the local 
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populace.318 Operating in small units made the CPP/NPA very mobile and hard to detect 
by government forces, increasing their survivability. On the tactical side, when a target or 
mission required a larger force, these small units came together to form a larger unit. 
b. AFP 
Being a professional standing force, the AFP follows the conventional 
organizational structure. A chain of command enables the AFP to coordinate its efforts 
and resources to address the CPP/NPA threat. However, learning from the Huk rebellion 
experience, it had placed primacy in the conduct of small unit operations. In the Army 
organization, the service that bears the brunt of the counter-insurgency operations, 
emphasis has been placed upon the strengthening of the squad’s capability. The squad 
continues to be the basic fighting unit of the Army. 
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize the innovations adopted by 
the Army in its counter-insurgency campaign. One innovation is the organization of the 
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit or CAFGU. These are indigenous forces 
organized to augment the Army’s need for more personnel for a manpower-intensive 
counter-insurgency campaign.319 Given the scope of the CPP/NPA threat, the Army units 
become over-extended in the insurgency-affected areas. Hence, the concept of CAFGU is 
very helpful and cost-efficient in filling this manpower gap. CAFGU members are 
recruited from the local villages to put up a village defense. Since they are from the areas, 
these CAFGUs have knowledge of the local terrain and have access to local information. 
CAFGUs, as they hold the area, allow other Army units to maneuver and clear other 
affected areas. The CAFGU in a local village may number from a squad to a section in 
size, and is handled by a cadre (either an SF or Regular Infantry). 
 Another innovation made by the Army is the Special Operations 
Team (SOT). The SOT is basically a squad-size unit with the TRIAD capabilities of 
civil-military operations/intelligence/combat operations (CMO/INTEL/CBT OPN) within 
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the squad.320 What make the SOT different from the regular infantry squads is the equal 
importance and capability it gives to CMO and INTEL, and not purely CBT OPN. The 
Army infantry companies, at the start of this new approach, developed at least one SOT 
in their organization. Later, the Army developed more SOTs, given their success in the 
field.      
3. Tactics / Doctrine 
a. CPP/NPA 
At the strategic level, the CPP/NPA combines the armed and legal struggle 
to fight the Philippine government. The armed struggle adapts the strategy of protracted 
people’s war.321 The strategy calls for the creation of guerrilla bases in the countryside 
from where the revolution can move towards the urban centers and to the encircling of 
the cities. It covers three strategic stages: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, 
and the strategic offensive. On the legal struggle, the strategy is to build united fronts and 
mass movements to isolate the government forces both politically and psychologically.322 
This means operating within the legal framework to infiltrate legitimate organizations in 
the society. The legal struggle also includes participating in elections, peace negotiations 
and efforts for international recognition. 
At the operational/tactical level, it is where the CPP/NPA does its 
organizational work and military activities. At the organizational side, the process starts 
with the arrival of a few cadres in a barangay. These cadres would conduct a social 
investigation to assess the situation in the barangay. This was followed by mass works 
with the purpose of gaining the people’s support. The people would then be organized in 
various committees (e.g. women, youth, farmers, fishermen) until such time that the 
barangay already established their own shadow government. This process would be 
repeated in other barangays until it expands to a mass base. From these mass bases is 
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where the CPP/NPA gets its recruits, information and other resources to further its 
campaign. 
On military activities, the CPP/NPA is a master of guerrilla warfare. Raids 
and ambuscades are its bread-and-butter tactics in order to confront a much larger enemy 
force vis-à-vis its smaller force. It utilizes its knowledge of the terrain to offset any 
advantages that the enemy has. In as much as the insurgents are lacking in weapons, one 
tactic it employs is the agaw-armas (arms seizure).323 Insurgents pry on isolated, 
unsuspecting government forces or even pro-government individuals to kill them and 
grab their firearms. The agaw-armas, raids and ambuscades are the primary activities of 
the CPP/NPA in increasing its arsenal. 
On the other hand, the CPP/NPA generally has not taken sabotage as a 
tactic on a more extensive scale, the reason being that sabotage is a double-edged 
sword.324 Corpuz pointed out that if used indiscriminately, sabotage can possibly incur 
the ire of the people and consequently alienate them from the movement. An example to 
this was the blowing up of bridges in the Bicol Region in 1987 which greatly 
inconvenienced the people.325 At a more controversial level, the Plaza Miranda bombing 
on 21 August 1971 lent credence to Corpuz’s point.  A rally by the Liberal Party, staunch 
critics of Marcos, was held that night. During the rally, three grenades were tossed into 
the stage that killed nine people and injuring more than 100. In what may be considered 
the onset of modern terrorism, the incident sparked outrage in the country and the blame 
was easily placed on Marcos. Unknown to the public, it was the CPP/NPA who was 
responsible for the act of terrorism. The CPP/NPA intended that the incident would create 
the spark needed to sweep the revolution into high gear.326 The incident elicited further 
repression from the government side, as predicted by Sison. But while the incident may 
have boosted the communists’ cause, it would continue to haunt and create schism within 
the CPP leadership years after its occurrence. No incidents of similar nature occurred 
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after the Plaza Miranda bombing, underscoring the communists’ reluctance to use 
terrorism in the pursuit of its goals.327 
b. AFP 
The AFP, over time, has likewise adjusted to the operational /tactical 
requirements in the field—the emphasis for small unit operations. Only by enhancing its 
capability to employ small unit tactics can it effectively engage the very mobile guerrilla 
units. AFP units have departed from the large-formation sweeping operations to the more 
deliberate, intelligence-driven operations employing sufficient force. 
The SOT concept, likewise, gave the AFP much success in reducing the 
CPP/NPA’s mass base in the countryside. Combining CMO, INTEL, and CBT OPN 
capabilities, the SOT dismantled the political structure at the barangay level. It was an 
anti-thesis to the CPP/NPA’s ideological, political, and organizational (IPO) works. 
Simply, it was the AFP giving the CPP/NPA a dose of its own medicine. 
While the bulk of the counter-insurgency campaign was at the tactical 
level, the AFP has made adjustments at the operational and strategic level in order to 
support the efforts at the tactical level with various campaign plans. The first was the 
OPLAN KATATAGAN (OPLAN STABILITY) during the Marcos regime.328 It was a 
copycat of Magsaysay’s campaign during the Huk rebellion; this plan, however, failed to 
achieve success. It was followed by another failure, OPLAN MAMAMAYAN (OPLAN 
PEOPLE).  Then the LAMBAT-BITAG (DRAGNET) CAMPAIGN PLAN came into 
being. The plan was an integration of CMO, INTEL, and CBT OPN and the tactics of 
CLEAR, HOLD, CONSOLIDATE, and DEVELOP.329 This was where the SOT concept 
was introduced and widely implemented, along with the employment of CAFGUs. The 
other facet of the campaign plan was the involvement of civilian government agencies 
and non-government organizations (NGO). The LAMBAT BITAG was the campaign 
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plan that led to the decline of the CPP/NPA.330 It underscored the whole-of-government 
approach, that insurgency cannot be solved through military means alone. As conditions 
on the ground change, other campaign plans were developed, all built on the gains of 
LAMBAT BITAG’s success. 
4. Weapons / Technology 
a. CPP/NPA 
It may appear comical, but in reality, it can be said that whatever weapons 
the AFP has, the CPP/NPA also has—though limited only to small arms and some high-
caliber weapons. This is because the AFP is the primary source of weapons for the 
insurgents, weapons gained from successful engagements with government forces or 
from raids of government and private installations. 
Recognizing the lack of weapons needed to further their armed struggle, 
the CPP/NPA established ties with China for the supply of weapons. The CPP/NPA sent 
a delegation to China—called the ‘China project’—for the purpose of securing weapons 
aid.331 The China project was able to secure weapons for the movement twice, as 
evidenced by the M/V Karagatan and M/V Andrea incidents. However, both shipments of 
weapons became fiascos for the CPP/NPA. The M/V Karagatan was discovered by the 
AFP in a timely manner—during the unloading of weapons at Digoyo Point along the 
coast of Isabela. Of the 1,200 M-14 rifles shipped, the communists were only able to 
salvage about 200 rifles, a few thousand rounds of ammunition, and a few rocket 
launchers.332 On the other hand, the M/V Andrea failed to even reach the coast of the 
Philippines as it ran aground on coral reefs while enroute.333 After these botched 
shipments, there were no other known incidents of foreign entities supplying weapons to 
the CPP/NPA. 
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The CPP/NPA had to contend itself with self-reliance by continuing to 
source its weapons internally. What it lacked in weapons had to be off-set with guerrilla 
tactics and better knowledge of the terrain. 
b. AFP 
The AFP, meanwhile, continued to benefit from the aid provided by the 
Americans. Not only did it have the small arms and other high-caliber weapons, it also 
had the advantage of artillery support and air-to-ground support. Aside from the weapons, 
the AFP also had the advantage of technologically advanced products and gadgets. The 
AFP was able to obtain secured radios, global positioning systems (GPS), night vision 
goggles (NVG), and sniper rifles to enhance its combat effectiveness. 
In terms of combat and combat service support, the AFP was able to 
acquire better air-to-ground aircrafts (e.g., MG-520 attack helicopters) and mobility 
assets (e.g., SIMBA armored fighting vehicles, HMMWV or Humvees). With newer 
technology, the individual soldier was also supplied with better, more durable and more 
comfortable combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIEs). 
Yet, despite its marked advantages in weapons and technology, the AFP 
still failed to eradicate the insurgency, further underscoring the fact that defeating 
insurgencies requires more than weapons and material. 
 
D.  THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT CONFLICT 
1. Situation 
 The Muslim problem in the Southern Philippines can trace its roots from 
historical and contemporary causes.334 The Muslim inhabitants began to feel 
marginalized as Christians began migrating to Mindanao. As the Christians settled, they 
began to acquire more land. The Muslims on the other hand, oblivious to the processes of 
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land ownership, found themselves slowly stripped of their land.335 Over time, the 
Christians became owners of larger tracts of land compared to the Muslims. This turnout 
was viewed by the Muslims as Christian encroachment of their territory. The 1960s saw 
increasing tensions between the Muslim and Christians, marked by some violence. 
 Apart from the influx of Christians in their territory, the Muslims felt discontented 
as the government failed to provide adequate basic services to their community.336 This 
has long been a grievance of people settled far away from the seat of power; government 
resources were always focused in the capital Manila and surrounding areas. 
 However, it was the infamous Jabidah massacre which pushed the Muslims to 
fight against the government. In 1968, a secret plot was uncovered wherein the AFP was 
training recruits to infiltrate and sow destabilization in the Malaysian state of Sabah. The 
plot was in relation to the Philippines’ claim of Sabah, stemming from the ancestral claim 
of the Sultan of Sulu. The trainees, all Muslim youths, were summarily executed because 
of disciplinary problems.337 But one trainee survived to tell the story.338 The incident 
prompted Udtog Matalam, a Cotabato politician, to organize the Mindanao Independence 
Movement (MIM). Hundreds of MIM members underwent training in Malaysia.339 This 
group became the nucleus of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) under Nur 
Misuari that pursued the struggle for independence. By the latter part of 1972, the MNLF 
Cotabato Command, alone, had an estimated armed force of 5,000–6,000.340 
 The years 1973–1976 saw among the heaviest fighting between the AFP and the 
MNLF forces. On 23 December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed 
the Tripoli Agreement. The agreement provided for a ceasefire and the creation of an 
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autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, but one that was subject to the constitutional 
processes of the Republic of the Philippines. Though peace was far from being attained, 
the agreement provided the stepping stone for future agreements, as well as for relief 
from the hardships on both sides caused by the fighting. 
 Towards the end of 1977, there came a split in the MNLF leadership due to 
internal differences. Hashim Salamat broke away from the MNLF, and subsequently 
formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1978. This time the MILF 
demanded an independent Islamic state. On 2 September 1996, the Philippine 
government and the MNLF finally signed an historic peace agreement. The MILF was 
now left continuing the fight for Muslim secessionism. It has managed to grow itself into 
a formidable armed organization throughout the years, and certainly has enough leverage 
to keep the government’s attention.  Peace negotiations have been ongoing between the 
government and the MILF, yet it has only produced periods of cessation in the hostilities, 
broken by some intense clashes every now and then. 
 The AFP, in the meantime, was caught up in two conflicts that it had to address. 
Given the manpower and the resources available, the AFP could not afford to address 
both conflicts simultaneously. Throughout this period of multiple conflicts, prioritizing 
the threat has been the AFP’s prudent strategy. Except for an occasional surge in the 
fighting now and again, the AFP has been able to contain both threats. However, the fact 
remains that, though it may have contained the threats, the AFP has failed to reduce the 
insurgencies to a level where they cannot challenge the government effectively. This has 
been the situation with the AFP and the insurgent groups for more than three decades 
now. Moreover, continuous occupation with these internal threats has kept the AFP from 
pursuing its long-needed modernization program. Moreover, the AFP’s constitutional 
mandate remains one that is concerned with external defense, notwithstanding the fact 




The MILF, much like the CPP/NPA, follows a hierarchical structure. 
Leadership emanates from its Central Committee (CC). The CC provides overall control 
and guidance to the organization. The CC pursues the political struggle, ably supported 
by its military arm, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces. 341 Its organization is shown 
in the following chart:  
 
Figure 9.  BIAF Organization342 
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The BIAF structure reflects the conventional form, resembling the 
structure of the AFP. Worthy of emphasis here are the base commands comprising the 
BIAF that are located in various areas of Mindanao. While the structure shows numerous 
base commands, estimates on the size of units or the number of armed individuals under 
each varies wildly among the base commands.343 There is also no fixed account on how 
these base commands are organized. It can only be assumed that the BIAF are also 
formed according to brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. As of 1st 
Semester 2010 estimates, MILF strength was placed at 10,500 with about 7,500 high-
powered firearms, supported by a mass base of 1.2 Million in 1,766 Muslim-populated 
barangays—or 18% of the 9,962 total barangays in Mindanao.344 
The MILF base commands are distributed over 21major MILF camps in 
various Muslim-dominated parts of Mindanao.345 Seven of these camps were recognized 
by the AFP in the General Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 July 1997.346 MILF 
forces are able to semi-permanently stay in these camps, which allows the MILF to 
consolidate and further build up. On the other hand, staying in such camps allows for 
easy monitoring by the AFP. It works both ways for the contending parties.  
b. AFP 
Since the Muslim secessionist problem erupted at about the same time that 
the communist insurgency surged, the AFP’s organization reflected the same 
conventional set-up (as described in the section on the communist insurgency). The 
creation of CAFGUs has also similarly supported the AFP’s operations against the 
Muslim secessionists by holding and defending cleared areas. On the other hand, while 
the SOT teams were designed for the communist insurgency, the AFP came up with a 
parallel concept appropriate for the Muslim insurgency—the Salaam. Salaam units, 
composed of Muslim soldiers, reached out to the Muslim population through dialogue 
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and information.347 Modest programs, in cooperation with civilian government agencies 
as well as NGOs, were also conducted by the Salaam units. 
3. Tactics / Doctrine 
a. MILF 
Throughout its existence, MILF operations have been a mixture of the 
semi-conventional and the unconventional. There were two instances where the MILF 
has confronted the government forces in a semi-conventional manner: the height of the 
Muslim insurgency in 1973–1976 (when the MILF was still part of the MNLF), and 
during the ‘all-out-war’ of former President Estrada in 2000. In these instances, the MILF 
fought semi-positional warfare against the AFP. After suffering military defeat in these 
periods, the MILF shifted back to guerrilla warfare to allow itself to consolidate. 
As pointed out, the MILF’s ability to stay in AFP-recognized semi-
permanent camps allows it to control some areas. From these controlled areas, the MILF 
gets to build its forces. Likewise, it is from these controlled areas where it launches its 
operations—when it has needed to show to the government that it still remains a 
formidable force. Showing its strength provides the MILF leverage at the negotiating 
table. When attacked by government forces and odds are not in its favor, the MILF calls 
for a cessation of hostilities. This has become a pattern of the MILF in its confrontations 
with the AFP. 
The MILF have deftly used terrorism and sabotage to influence the actions 
of government forces. One typical example is the conducting of bombings in major cities 
in Mindanao to divert government forces engaged with MILF forces in other areas. The 
MILF recognizes the shortage of AFP manpower when it is engaged in multiple areas. 
AFP forces would shift to augment the Philippine National Police (PNP) elements 
securing the urban centers. Another MILF tactic is to flag down and burn transport 
vehicles, thus plying the main highways (e.g., Davao-Tacurong-Isulan-Cotabato, Davao-
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Kabacan-Cotabato). This forces the AFP troops to disperse in order to secure the main 
lines of communication. 
While it officially denies the use of terrorism, the MILF’s links to the Abu 
Sayyaf Group and, more recently, with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—would point to its use. 
The MILF’s links with both groups works to its advantage in many ways. The ASG 
provides the MILF a degree of plausible deniability for any terrorist attacks it initiates.348 
On the other hand, its JI links have provided MILF members bomb-making capabilities. 
Further, as pointed out by Abuza, the MILF’s links with JI may get the attention of the 
U.S. government. In turn, the U.S. could compel the Philippine government to make 
concessions to the MILF to resolve the conflict, thus also addressing the JI problem.349    
b. AFP 
How the AFP fights the MILF is quite different compared to the 
CPP/NPA. AFP tactics, given the nature of the MILF’s operations, are a mix of semi-
conventional and unconventional. When the MILF chooses to fight in a semi-
conventional manner, it provides the AFP an advantage. Fighting a positional warfare 
would allow the AFP to concentrate its forces towards MILF positions. Further, the AFP 
can maximize the advantage in firepower provided by its artillery, armor assets, and air 
assets. This firepower advantage was manifested during the 1973–1976 fighting in 
Central Mindanao. In this type of engagement, the AFP can employ the principle of mass. 
If the MILF chooses to fight a guerrilla type of warfare, small unit tactics remain a potent 
answer to counter the MILF forces. 
AFP efforts in combating the MILF problem were not limited to combat 
operations. Just as Muslim-dominated areas exhibit the conditions of poverty, the AFP 
complements its military operations with CMO. This is where Salaam units, in 
coordination with civilian government agencies and NGOS, make an impact. These 
efforts strive to gain the population’s confidence in the government with modest 
programs (e.g., relief operations, free medical/dental check-up). 
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With the ongoing peace negotiations between the Philippine government 
and the MILF, AFP operations are limited to areas outside of MILF-declared camps. This 
limitation presents a dilemma for AFP troops. If rogue MILF or ASG elements engage 
AFP troops, these elements can withdraw to MILF camps to escape pursuit operations. 
MILF camps serve as safe haven for these elements. Pursuing government troops are then 
prevented from going after these elements, as they may clash with MILF forces. Clashes 
may escalate the conflict, and accusations that the government troops are guilty of 
violating the ongoing cessation of hostilities, with the possibility of hurting the peace 
talks. On the other hand, if clashes between government troops and these elements occur 
near MILF camps, there is always the danger of government troops being overrun by 
MILF troops. A classic example of this is the recent October 2011, Basilan incident 
where 19 SF soldiers were killed. This type of incident poses questions about the 
sincerity of the MILF regarding the peace negotiations, as well as the issue of the MILF 
coddling rogue elements. This AFP dilemma is a card played very well by the MILF, to 
its favor.   
4. Weapons / Technology 
a. MILF 
In terms of weapons, the MILF forces are better armed compared to their 
compatriots in the CPP/NPA, with an arsenal was mostly of high-powered firearms (M-
16, M-14, M-203 Grenade Launchers, a few sniper rifles). These are complemented with 
machine guns (a mix of .50 and .30 calibers), mortars (60mm and 81mm), and anti-
tank/anti-personnel weapons (RPGs and B-40 rocket launchers). 
Similar to the case of the CPP/NPA, the AFP has become a source of 
weapons for the MILF, either through captured firearms and/or through pilferage by AFP 
scalawags. The support from known sympathetic countries (e.g., Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
and Malaysia) gained by the MILF in the earlier years of its existence explains the 
sudden increase of weapons in its arsenal. Further, its established ties with the JI have 
enhanced its capability to conduct terrorist activities in support of its operations. 
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The MILF, over the years, has shown how its self-reliance cushions the 
impact of the non-availability of external support. It was able to fabricate cloned RPGs 
and convert mortar ammunition into B-40-type rockets.350 Given its ties with JI, the 
MILF has further benefited from a better technology for bomb-making. 
Overall, the MILF are well-armed. However, a possible weakness that the 
AFP can utilize is the MILF’s inability to fight a sustained conflict. The experiences of 
the 2000 ‘all-out-war’ would suggest to this. The question that must be answered is how 
far can the MILF’s resources (e.g., ammunition, food, medicines, etc.) go to fight 
prolonged engagements. This would help the AFP well in planning the next major 
campaign if talks fail. 
b. AFP 
The AFP, on the other hand, has maintained its marked advantage in 
weapons and technology. Fortunately for the AFP, it has the artillery, armor, and air 
assets that are sorely absent from the MILF arsenal. While the MILF has types of 
weapons that are similar to those of the AFP, the AFP has the greater number of 
weapons.  
For sustained operations, the government arsenal in Bataan has provided 
the AFP with a steady source of small arms ammunition. In addition, the continuous, 
though varying, U.S. support for the Philippine military supports the expectation that the 
AFP would outlast the MILF in a prolonged conventional military engagement. 
Moreover, the 2000 ‘all-out-war’ has already provided the AFP concrete answers to that 
question. 
E. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION 
 The Post-Independence period has seen a change in the nature of threats to 
Philippine security—from external to internal. Yet, while the nature of the threat has 
changed significantly since the colonial period, warfare has remained irregular in 
character. A very slight exception, however, was noted with regard to the MILF threat, 
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which provided a  certain degree of semi-conventional character. Even then, the history 
throughout the period supports the idea that conflicts were predominantly irregular in 
character. Figure 6 below sums up the irregular warfare characteristics present in 
conflicts throughout the period, relative to the various internal threat groups. 
 
Figure 10. Post-Independence Era Filipino irregular warfare characteristics 
 For the past fifty or so years, the AFP has lived through an environment 
characterized by irregular warfare. The first half of the period can be considered its 
growing years, while the second half represents its maturing years. The period has shown 
how the AFP has followed a generally conventional form of growth, but at the same time, 
has fought an unconventional form of warfare. The conventional side was due to its being 
a standing army, exhibiting a large U.S. influence; while the unconventional side was in 
response to what the situation called for on the ground. Further, the AFP has exhibited a 
mixed use of conventional and unconventional fighting to suit the dictates of the threat. 
The AFP experience speaks of what Dr. Arquilla mentioned in his book, Insurgents, 
Raiders, and Bandits, about standing armies fighting an irregular warfare, and of hybrid 
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wars. Additionally, the AFP experience shows the propensity for small unit operations 
and the innovativeness required by irregular warfare.   
 The nature of the threat in the Philippines not only shows its irregular character 
but also points to the protracted nature of the conflict. Evidently, the internal threats of 
the country have managed to persist for almost four decades. The cost it has entailed the 
Philippine government to address the conflict, not to mention the collateral cost to 
society, runs to epic proportions. Other than costs, it presents the danger of apathy. The 
AFP—and more so, the individual soldier—might settle with the view that it has become 
the way of life. Such a view runs the risk of stealing that sense of urgency to end the 
conflict. Indeed, experience shows that insurgencies require more than a military 
solution. This brings us to the question of what is there to do. The answer is for the AFP 
to address the military side of it, and to address it well. This brings us back to irregular 
warfare; the AFP must become masters of irregular warfare. It must continue to 
effectively conduct small unit operations. 
 Peace negotiations are currently ongoing between the Philippine government and 
the various threat groups. Peace would be good for all quarters—the government, the 
insurgents, and more so, the population that has borne the brunt of the sufferings caused 
by the conflict. However, the Philippine government cannot talk peace while the AFP 
suffers setbacks at the tactical level. The government cannot afford to talk peace while 
incidents like the October 2011, Basilan fiasco happens. The AFP must avoid these kinds 
of setbacks. It erodes the morale of the soldier, while it allows the enemy to negotiate 
from a position of strength. The AFP must not settle with the flimsy excuse of “charged 
to experience.” Rather, it must dominate at the tactical level; and it requires effective 
small unit operations to dominate. 
 Peace talks are welcome. But the threat groups must realize that they cannot win, 
that the only resort left is peace. The AFP, on the other hand, must demonstrate that it 













VII. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR ERA 
 “We walked all afternoon and toward evening stopped at another coconut hut to 
sleep. But just before sundown, sundalo were spotted again. So we took refuge on top of a 
ridge. When gunfire erupted at the bottom of the hill, several Abu Sayyaf ran down to 
engage the enemy. They returned later, exulting in their achievement. We learned that 
they had beheaded three AFP soldiers and ransacked their belongings. One of the victims 
had been a medic. They brought back his medical bag for our future use.” 
   -Gracia Burnham, American hostage of the Abu Sayyaf Group351 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The final era of irregular warfare in the Philippines that this study will examine 
will be the most recent era, one that continues to this day. This is the era defined by the 
United States as the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but from the Filipino perspective is 
more accurately an era of national and ideological/religious terrorism. Despite the end of 
the Cold War, and the diminishment of regional communist movements, irregular warfare 
activities have continued to flourish in the Philippines. Organizations such as the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI), and the Moro Islamic liberation Front (MILF) have found an environment that is 
well suited to their organizations’ survival and strategy. Equally important, the 
government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has conducted irregular warfare 
over the same period, with special operations forces. The defining irregular warfare 
characteristics of this era are the use of terrorism and special operations. Both are firmly 
inside the parameters of the irregular warfare definition laid out by Dr. Arquilla. In fact, 
he believes that terrorism is so quintessentially irregular that he places it as one of the 
three primary legs of his irregular warfare triad.352  Dr. Arquilla is also clear that the 
missions of military elites, as well as the roles of other special operations forces, can be 
qualified as irregular by their small size, use of guerrilla tactics, and other employment 
methods.353 
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 This chapter will look at the most recent evolution of irregular warfare activity in 
the Philippines by first describing the environmental, and then continue with an analysis 
of organization, tactics, doctrine, and use of technology. Within each area, the study will 
be organized into the subgroups of anti-government (which will analyze the key threat 
groups to include ASG, RSIM, and MILF/JI), and government (which will include the 
AFP). This chapter will also include an analysis of the United States organization, 
doctrine, and use of technology within this most recent era inside the Philippines. The 
U.S. has been a primary player in the Philippines throughout the GWOT and has had 
significant influence on the strategy employed by the GRP; therefore, we would be 
remiss if we did not include them in the study. 
 In this chapter, we will see that all of the characteristics of irregular warfare are 
present in abundance, including terrorism. Small units, irregular tactics, leveraging 
available technology, and fighting that is protracted to cause attrition—all of these are 
dominant aspects in the strategies of both the anti-government and the government 
forces. In this era, there are some inconsistencies from the characteristics commonly seen 
in the earlier eras. First, the AFP is relatively better resourced than the anti-government 
forces. With the support of the United States, the AFP also employs new technology. 
Interestingly, these factors do not change the fundamental nature of the AFP. 
B. ENVIRONMENT / SITUATION 
 For centuries, the Muslim population of the Southern Islands of the Philippines 
has stood up against the various primary controlling powers governing the Philippine 
Islands. Conflicts against the Spanish, Americans, and Philippine governments have been 
numerous and vicious. These battles and campaigns have been fought for a variety of 
reasons, including land rights, autonomy, cessation, economic, and human rights. The 
various fractured organizations and multiple purposes have created a muddled and 
confusing situation. What is clear, however, is that the minority Muslim population is 
disenfranchised from the majority Catholic population, which controls the country. Many 
in the south live in abject poverty—which they see in stark contrast to what they perceive 
as the better living standards of the Northern Filipinos. Meanwhile, from the southern 
perspective, the northern population continues to move south—to take and use the 
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valuable and limited land for their own prosperity. This has left the Muslim population 
feeling infringed upon and used, while seeing none of the benefits of citezenship. To the 
Filipino Muslim, the illegitimate GRP has used its military might to control the South, 
while the underrepresented Muslims have been taken advantage of. This has created a 
situation ripe for anti-government or pro-Muslim organizations to flourish.   
Certainly, the GRP has its own side to the story, one that includes the idea that all 
islands and people of the country should respect and abide by the laws of the legitimate 
government. The GRP understands that solutions to poverty take time, require communal 
effort, and are secondary to security, which is of the highest concern. The Muslim 
population of the South is often perceived as not helping itself and working against those 
who would help them prosper. Who is right and who is wrong is not the subject of this 
thesis. What is important is that anti-government organizations have grown and 
flourished in this environment. These include the ASG, MILF, RSIM, and the external 
transnational terrorist organizations JI and Al Qaeda (AQ), which they have allied. 
 The 1980s, were a time of sweeping change for the Philippines. The Peoples 
Power Revolution in 1986, deposed the dictatorial leadership of Ferdinand Marcos, and 
promoted democracy.354 However, these sweeping changes also created significant 
political instability. From 1986–2001, there were no less than eight significant coup 
d’états within the country.355 As Maria Ressa points out in her book Seeds of Terror, “the 
ensuing chaos, reorganization of the political landscape, and shifts in power,”356 allowed 
external terrorist organizations to penetrate the environment and begin to organize for 
operations. The environment must have seemed perfect for transnational terrorist 
organizations such as JI and AQ. The Philippines already had a large Muslim population 
who was not happy, and they lived in an established safe haven in the Southern Islands. 
The Southern Islands include difficult terrain dominated by jungle and vast tidal systems. 
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357 The population is not welcoming to the government and therefore, the anti-
government Islamic organizations find the area quite secure to organize, train, and 
survive. Travel is relatively easy for someone who remains discreet and has money. 
Furthermore, as previously stated, the Muslim population has a history of armed uprising. 
Weapons and an irregular warfare tradition were resident within the population. The 
Southern Philippine Secessionist Groups (SPSG) have been associated with one of the 
longest running insurgencies in the world.358 Simply put, the population was ripe for 
exploitation by Islamic leaders who had an agenda and the raw materials to wage 
irregular warfare. 
 For the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), this period is the continuation of 
what must seem like a never-ending fight against internal security threats. After facing 
fifty years of continuous counterinsurgency operations against the Huks and various 
communist insurgencies, the AFP has been routinely employed against the SPSG and 
Islamic terrorist organizations. Due to this continuous involvement in domestic 
counterinsurgency, the AFP has continuously adjusted its strategy in response to the new 
policies of changing administrations and leadership. However, the AFP has always 
worked to find a solution to the conflict. This search for solution while managing 
resources and multiple threats has produced some remarkable irregular warfare efforts, 
particularly within the realm of special operations. 
 For the United States, this period in the Philippines has been seen both as the 
second front in the war on terrorism and as America’s forgotten frontline.359 For the U.S. 
military, conducting Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines has meant accepting 
certain restrictions and constraints which included “legal prohibitions, strict operational 
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directives, host-nation caveats, and reduced U.S. forces.”360 These restrictions have 
forced a change in operational thinking which has dictated that U.S. forces act not as the 
primary counterinsurgent, but strictly as a supporting agent to the authorized primary 
counterinsurgent, the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This change in thinking has 
precipitated success in operations, which may not have happened if U.S. forces had been 
allowed to operate, unilaterally and indiscriminately, as they had in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
While not preferred by the traditional U.S. military establishment, conditions similar to 
the ones present in the Philippines should be sought when prosecuting a global 
counterinsurgency campaign.361 
This change in role for U.S. forces is certain to have created some friction and 
frustration, for it runs counter to the American way of war, a storied tradition of fighting 
annihilation-style total war with the direct application of overwhelming force, firepower, 
and resources against the problem and the enemy.362 As part of the GWOT, operations in 
the Philippines have always been a sort of quiet sister, not frequently discussed or 
covered by the mainstream media or the U.S. military—while simultaneously, being 
billed internally and externally as an example of successful operations.363 In OEF-P, the 
U.S. presence is small, American casualties have been relatively rare, the financial cost of 
operations is comparatively low, and of the highest importance is the fact that, for the 
most part, the government of the Philippines has been a welcoming partner.364 These 
factors, plus the appeal of the more intense and less constrained wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, have allowed the operations in the Philippines to quietly continue for over a 
decade.365 This characteristic is of some benefit to the U.S. irregular warfare operations 
in the Philippines, for fundamental to the definition of irregular warfare success is the 
idea of a protracted, slow-burning, small-scale conflict. Instead of a single decisive battle, 
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the masters of irregular warfare seek a long struggle aimed at wearing down the 
enemy.366 
C. ORGANIZATION 
1. Anti-Government Forces 
Due to their very nature, the organization of the anti-government groups is non-
standard. Yet throughout the main organizations—the ASG, the MILF, and the RSIM—
there are multiple variations on organization, which span the spectrum from those 
resembling conventional forces, to those with smaller, more secret and cellular structures. 
The MILF has roughly 10,000 members organized throughout the Southern 
Islands. The core leadership of the MILF includes a political central committee, which is 
considered legitimate by the GRP. These leaders control the military organization of the 
MILF, but when MILF commanders’ agendas differ from those of the central committee; 
then these forces are declared rogue or lawless MILF.367 The MILF includes robust 
recruitment and media branches. Outside of the political organization, the MILF includes 
forces that are organized in a military arm, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces 
(BIAF). This military arm includes 14 Guerrilla Base Commands (GBC).368 The GBC 
commanders can then organize the operational elements as necessary. This can resemble 
a conventional force, yet realistically, the troop strength is small, and guerrilla operations 
dominate. In October of 2011, members of the ASG and MILF’s 114th Base Command 
were involved in a battle with AFP Special Operations Forces in the MILF stronghold of 
Al Barka on the Island of Basilan. During this 10-hour long battle, the ASG/MILF forces 
were able to overwhelm the AFP units, virtually annihilating them, killing 19, wounding 
12, and resulting in another six missing in action and two captured.369 As the AFP SOF 
entered into the MILF’s territory, the MILF was able to mobilize a sufficiently sized unit 
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to destroy an AFP unit, which as a SOF unit was comprised of high quality soldiers. This 
is just one example of the larger guerrilla elements that the SPSGs can muster if 
necessary. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a small cellular operational unit conducted 
the ASG/RSIM operation against the MV Super Ferry 14 on 27 February 2004. Just a 
single individual conducted the actual placement of the bomb, a television packed with 
explosives. The result of the operation was 116 dead, 300 injured, and the sinking of the 
ferry.370 
These variations highlight the flexibility, and imaginative thinking necessary to 
conduct operations with limited resources. When the anti-government forces have enough 
force, and have other tactical factors in their advantage, they can openly challenge 
government units. However, the majority of operations are conducted by small, cellular 
units, which can hide, strike quickly, and then fade into the background. 
The structure of the ASG is a fine example of an irregular warfare organization. 
They are structured just enough to function, but not so rigidly that the entire organization 
would fall if it was penetrated. The ASG has been described as a “very loose coalition of 
many groups of radical Muslim terrorist leaders commanding their own loyal followers in 
the Southern Philippines.”371 The ASG, which began with around 1,300 members, has 
dwindled to around 500. It is split into two main sub groups: one on Jolo Island, and one 
on Basilan Island. The organization is said to have had an Islamic Executive Council at 
one time which controlled five functional staffs—including personnel/operations, 
logistics/supply, finance/budget, and liaison/medical. However, the actual operation of 
the organization is less formal than this military staff organization would imply. Instead, 
the ASG has been described as a bandit like organization, one that is obviously willing to 
use terrorism and other violence to advance their political and financial goals.372 Yet, the 
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ASG is able to task organize as appropriate for the various operations they conduct, from 
kidnapping for ransom, to grenade attacks, IED placements and other hit and run guerrilla 
style attacks.  
The RSIM has a structure with a core leader, a central committee, and an 
organization broken into three sub groups for special operations, special actions, and 
security. The RSIM is estimated to have had about 50 members during its peak. These 
members operate in a strict cellular and compartmentalized structure. The use of this style 
of organization made identifying and tracking members extremely difficult.373 
The bottom line is that the anti-government organizations which operate in the 
Southern Philippines, be they Muslim secessionist groups, terror groups, or criminal 
enterprise organizations, all operate for survival and success. They maintain a gang-like 
protective culture, similar to the protections offered by the barangay culture in every 
other period of Filipino irregular warfare. When necessary, these groups can come 
together for a common purpose. More often than not, though, they are isolated and self-
reliant. They are the essence of irregular warfare. 
2. Armed Forces of the Philippines 
During this period, the AFP has been forced to operate in a variety of conflicts 
across the spectrum of warfare. They have worked in areas deemed contested, controlled, 
and uncontrolled. They have faced a variety of threats, mostly irregular, while 
maintaining the ability to respond conventionally to external aggressors. Most 
importantly, the AFP has often had to confront these threats in areas where their own 
population is living and hoping for peace and stability. This has forced the AFP to use 
ingenuity in the use of force. One large area of focus over the last decade has been the 
development and use of Special Operations Forces (SOF).  
The AFP Special Operations Forces are organized by their parent services. Their 
training, management, and funding is also provided by the parent services, while the units 
are deployed and commanded by the AFP geographical unified commands. AFPSOF is 
primarily broken down by service: Army, Navy, and Air Force. Within the Philippine 
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Army, the largest provider of AFPSOF, the forces fall under the command of the 
Philippine Army Special Operations Command (PASOCOM). This command has 
responsibility for the three SOF army units: the Philippine Army Special Forces 
Regiment Airborne (SFRA), the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), and the Light 
Reaction Battalion (LRB). The SFRA is modeled after the U.S. Army Special Forces 
Regiment, the “Green Berets”—small units designed to conduct sensitive missions in 
difficult environments. The SFRA consists of 1,200 personnel in three operational 
battalions. The FSRR is a highly trained and aggressive infantry unit, similar to the U.S. 
army Ranger Regiment. Designed to move fast and fight hard, the FSRR has roughly 
1,800 personnel in three operational battalions. The LRB is a top-tier counter-terrorist 
unit within the AFP. It is small, with approximately 400 personnel broken down into 
three companies. The LRB is composed of personnel trained within the SFRA and FSRR. 
Within the Philippine Navy, there are two SOF units: the Naval Special Warfare Group, 
within the Fleet Forces, and composed of about 400 personnel specializing in SEAL 
operations; and the Force Reconnaissance Battalion (FRB) located under the Philippine 
Marine Corps. The FRB has approximately 500 personnel in three companies, and is 
responsible for special reconnaissance in support of Marine and Navy operations. Within 
the Philippine Air Force, the 710th Special Operations Wing has approximately 2,000 
personnel, responsible for supporting the special operations forces of the other services. 
The final unit of the AFPSOF is the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group 
(AFPJSOG)—a unit comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Forces units. The 
AFPJSOG is responsible for special missions under the direction of the AFP.374 
3. United States 
The Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P), is a temporary 
task force organized to conduct a specific task in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom- Philippines (OEF-P) and the greater U.S. GWOT. The JSOTF-P is a special 
operations specific task force that falls under the command of the Special Operations 
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) and the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Once the 
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JSOTF-P’s mission is deemed complete, it will be disbanded. The JSOTF-P is comprised 
of approximately 600 personnel, from all four services of the United States military. 
Because it is a special operations task force, the bulk of these troops come from the U.S. 
Army Special Forces and the U.S. Navy Special Warfare units. The JSOTF-P operates 
within a Joint Special Operations Area, which includes the Southern Islands of the 
Philippines along with Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The headquarters for the 
JSOTF-P is located at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga, co-located with the AFP 
geographical unified command—the Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM). 
The bulk of the task force is broken down into three subordinate regional task forces, 
responsible for operations in Mindanao, Sulu, and the Archipelago. These task forces 
operate side-by-side with their AFP counterparts deployed in the area.375 
D.  TACTICS / DOCTRINE 
1. Anti-Government Forces 
 The goals of the anti-government organizations in the Southern Philippines are as 
varied as the organizations themselves. The MILF’s political goals are to establish a 
Muslim social order and an Islamic state. A basic tenet of the Islamic radicals, as stated 
by the RSIM, is that the Philippine Islands were originally a Muslim nation, and that the 
colonization by the Christian Spanish pushed out the rightful Muslims. Therefore, they 
believe that the islands should be returned to Muslim control and administered under an 
Islamic government and Sharia Law.376 The objectives of the MILF are Islamic outreach 
and Jihad. Their four-point plan outlines a diplomatic offensive: Islamic community 
action which demonstrates their resolve, peace negotiations for political concessions, and 
military build-up, with military offensive action if peace talks fail.377 The goals of the 
ASG are less defined, and while they are along the same lines as the RSIM and the 
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MILF, they are more often likened to criminal enterprise and financial gain—while 
simultaneously working to discredit the GRP.378 
 The strategies employed by these organizations are remarkably similar. Due to the 
fact that they cannot directly overthrow the GRP, or threaten annihilation of the AFP or 
the GRP, they have instead chosen an irregular campaign strategy. These organizations 
challenge the GRP by attacking them where they are able, in any manner that they can. 
These attacks have two goals: to de-legitimize the GRP within the population and to 
legitimize the Islamic leadership as a credible entity. Because there is a definite safe 
haven in the Southern islands, an area permissible to the Islamic organizations and not 
permissible to the legitimate government of the Philippines, the anti-government 
organizations have a significant area where their message resonates with the population. 
Simultaneously, because this area exists, it is nearly impossible to eradicate these anti-
government forces. The government cannot control the region without massive numbers 
of troops. Therefore, a vacuum of power is produced, which the Islamic organizations fill 
with their own control.  
 The anti-government forces have signaled an understanding of the fact that they 
do not need to win, they simply need not lose. The longer they can stay in the fight, the 
more legitimacy they gain—ultimately the anti-government forces “tread the long path to 
authority and legitimacy.”379 If they can persist long enough, they will be able to gain 
their goals through concession, or build enough strength to offer a legitimate and direct 
challenge to the GRP. 
 The method they use to stay in a protracted fight has two main lines of operation. 
The first is to attack the GRP, and the forces of the GRP, inside the Islamic safe havens 
when the GRP encroaches into an area where the anti-government forces have the upper 
hand, or when targets of opportunity present themselves. The second line of effort is to  
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attack the GRP outside of the Islamic safe havens; this effort is a continuous reminder to 
the population that the GRP is considered illegitimate and that the Islamic movements 
have not gone away.  
 Supporting these two lines of effort is a prime reason why the irregular operations 
conducted by the anti-government forces take the form of either small unit guerrilla 
operations inside safe havens, or terrorist attacks outside of safe havens. The AFP is a 
legitimate and very real threat to these anti-government groups, therefore they need to 
maintain the ability to hide, attack, and then melt away. On their home turf, they can hide 
enough military assets to challenge the AFP units when able. Outside of their safe haven, 
it is much more difficult to hide; in these scenarios the insurgent often chooses to use 
cellular, compartmentalized units to maintain operational security and ensure the success 
of the attacks. 
2. Armed Forces of the Philippines 
In order to understand the AFP’s use of irregular warfare against anti-government forces 
during the war on terror, we must first look at the Philippine national strategy. The 
Philippine Presidential Executive Order Number 21, Series 2001, is the National Internal 
Security Plan (NISP). The NISP is a response to the growing insurgencies in the Southern 
provinces, and looks to address the root causes, and neutralize the insurgents who exploit 
these causes.380 Succinctly, the NISP looks to promote good governance, reduce poverty, 
and resolve the insurgency by applying all four pillars of national power: diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic. The five imperatives of the NISP are: (1) to ensure a 
responsive and effective government, demonstrating that it is a better choice than the 
insurgents’ organizations; (2) to ensure unity of efforts, with the understanding that 
insurgency is a shared concern of the entire bureaucracy—including non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s), people’s organizations (PO’s), and the entire citizenry; (3) to 
maximize the use of intelligence as a responsibility of all government agencies and as a 
critical pre-requisite to government response; (4) to manage violence and maintain law 
and order; and (5) to intensify a public information campaign for a stronger link between 
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the government and the people.381 The operational methodology used in this plan is 
called Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D). The clear and hold stages are the 
responsibility of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP), who must defeat 
insurgents in their own safe havens and maintain a reasonable level of security managed 
by the government, so that the consolidation and development can proceed safely. 
Consolidation and development are the primary responsibility of other national and non-
governmental agencies, who must seek ways to eradicate the root causes of social issues 
and insurgency.382 Because the Philippine Department of National Defense and the AFP 
are the lead agencies for the security aspects of the strategy, they themselves have 
developed an internal strategy for attacking the insurgencies. This is “Oplan Bantay-
Laya” (Defend the Freedom), a plan to defend local communities and protect the 
population.383 Bantay-Laya clearly defines the military role as clearing, holding, and then 
supporting the follow-on consolidation and development. The strategy also focuses 
military operations on the insurgencies, by using a heavy aspect of Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) in coordination with Intelligence and Combat Operations, with a goal 
of neutralizing the anti-government forces.384  
Realistically, what this looks like for the AFP is counterinsurgency operations 
(COIN). The AFP uses larger conventional forces to conduct combat clearing and 
security operations, and the Navy conducts coastal patrolling and interdiction/police 
operations. CMO is used to gain access to communities and build intelligence for other 
operations, and the AFP SOF is used to attack networks, leadership, insurgent cells, 
supply lines, external support, and more. Due to the inherent nature of military forces, 
some are more suited to certain missions than others. A large infantry division is big, 
unwieldy, slow to react, and filled by a majority of lesser trained soldiers led by a few 
better trained officers and NCOs—however, they bring a large presence and an ability to 
control, based upon their size. Special operations forces are generally small, more well-
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trained at all levels, and quick in reaction and skill, but less robust—so therefore, they 
have a smaller “footprint.” Both are best suited for different aspects of COIN: the larger 
units to control large areas and provide persistent presence, while SOFs can be more 
suited to specific missions. Think in terms of a police department: the patrol officers do 
routine work and police the area they are assigned, while the Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) forces respond to situations which need specific skills that the patrol 
officers do not have. In the same way, homicide detectives bring their special skills to 
homicide investigations. Furthermore, the police need a government to give them 
oversight, a justice system, and the authority to conduct their work. None of these groups 
can be successful without the other. In COIN, the same concept applies to the relationship 
of the individual military forces, both with each other and with other government 
agencies—they must all work together. Of course, a well-organized and directed Special 
Operations Force can even have a big impact on a large area, if properly applied. The 
initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom—Afghanistan was a major success for 
USSOF. Large American military units could not be mobilized as rapidly as desired, so 
the SOF was deployed rapidly with the full support of all the governments’ power. The 
impact these forces had was undoubtedly astounding, they rapidly allied themselves with 
friendly Afghan forces and executed a campaign which saw the rapid collapse of the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan. 
The AFP has placed a large emphasis on the development of its different special 
operations forces, as evidenced by their continued existence and funding. Strategically, 
operationally, and tactically, these forces have found themselves routinely involved in the 
war on terror and insurgencies in the Southern Philippines while supporting their 
principle mission in Internal Security Operations (ISO)385. Most of the missions they 
have conducted over the last decade have been of an irregular warfare nature. Lastimado 
and Rojas (both Majors in the AFP Army and Marine Corps respectively), provide a 
succinct description which supports the irregular nature of these forces. 
 “In the present setting, where the Philippine insurgency problem 
has consumed so much of the country’s resources, PASOF, considering its 
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ability to function at many different levels and its flexibility in shaping the 
environment for combat, is one of the significant means of resolving the 
threat posed by insurgencies. The mission of the Special Forces Regiment 
(Airborne) in Internal Security Operations environment is to plan for and 
conduct Direct Action Operations, Special Reconnaissance Operations, 
and Combat Readiness Assessment. It is also responsible for the training 
of maneuver units in support of the AFP’s mission. The First Scout 
Ranger Regiment does its traditional Direct Action and Special 
Reconnaissance operations. Direct Action Operations are normally short-
duration operations with a limited scope. They may require a PASOF team 
to infiltrate a hostile area, attack a target, and conduct a preplanned 
exfiltration, which may include long-term, stay-behind operations. The 
DAO achieves specific, well-defined, time-sensitive results of strategic 
and operational significance. These are often characterized by surgical 
precision, typically leaving smaller “footprints” than conventional 
operations. As a result, they can create greater adverse effects on the 
enemy than a conventional force of similar size. Special Reconnaissance 
Operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by 
PASOF, either unilaterally, or through other AFP units or indigenous 
forces. The objective of SRO is to confirm, refute, or obtain—by visual 
observation or other collection methods—information on the capabilities, 
intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. Reconnaissance 
missions conducted by PASOF normally have objectives that are either 
strategic or operational in nature, although they occur at the tactical level. 
The primary role of the SF in Combat Readiness Assessment and Training 
of maneuver units is to provide training assistance tailored to meet the 
specific requirements of the requesting unit. This tailoring serves to 
improve unit’s readiness for combat, while improving its effectiveness and 
efficiency in all types of operations. SF personnel train individual soldiers 
and units of light infantry battalions to fight in combat. They possess the 
technical expertise and knowledge to enhance the soldier’s individual 
skills and shape the unit’s capabilities, discipline, and morale. The Special 
Forces basic unit is a SF team composed of twelve, highly skilled soldiers 
(one officer and 11 enlisted personnel). It is proficient in performing 
small-scale tactics, training, and in operations that are airborne, 
waterborne and in jungle or mountainous regions. The team is composed 
of personnel who are skilled in five (5) respective fields of specialization, 
including; operations and intelligence, demolition and sabotage, 
communication, weapons, and medical. Furthermore, every member is 
cross trained with other specializations, so as to enhance his skills. Each 
SF trooper has the ability to use Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) to 
influence a target community or individual. The SF Team is a unique, 
unconventional combat organization that can plan and conduct special 
operations across a wide range of military missions. Its tactical actions 
often have effects upon operational or strategic objectives. On the other 
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extreme, the Scout Ranger’s basic unit is the 7-man team that is highly 
proficient in small-unit infantry tactics with the capability to operate 
independently. The team specializes in conducting commando raids, 
snipings, demolitions, reconnaissance missions and other guerrilla warfare 
tactics and techniques. The training of Scout Ranger is designed to 
develop a person’s skill, stamina, and spirit. The Light Reaction 
Battalion’s (LRB) task is to conduct counter-terrorist operations in support 
of the AFP’s missions. The LRB’s capabilities include the ability to 
perform reconnaissance of terrorist incidents and locations, to eliminate 
and/or capture terrorists (and other high value targets), and involvement in 
hostage rescue and personnel recovery operations. The LRB is made up of 
individuals who are highly trained in engaging in close quarter combat and 
sniping operations. Moreover, since it is the only AFP unit that is trained 
and equipped by the U.S. Army Special Forces, it is considered as the 
most capable force for military operations in urbanized terrain 
(MOUT).”386 
 Each aspect of the roles of these forces discussed by Lastimado and Rojas has had 
direct application in the clear hold strategy of the AFP, and the clear hold aspects of the 
NISP. The importance of special operations forces and their influence in the AFP was 
shown, for example, in 2010 when the island of Basilan was officially designated to be 
under the command of a Philippine Special Operations Task Force—Basilan (SOTF-B). 
Unfortunately, this endeavor has faced significant fallout concerning the battle in Al 
Barka on 18 October 2011.387 It is clear that the AFP has a robust irregular warfare 
capacity and capability—and that they have routinely used this option in the war on terror 
and insurgency. 
3. United States 
Since 9/11, the U.S. military has offensively sought opportunities and locations 
where it can engage and destroy Al Qaeda and other Al Qaeda-aligned, trans-national, 
non-state, terrorist organizations. One of the more rapidly and easily identified of these 
locations was in the Southern islands of the Republic of the Philippines.388 There, the 
regional Moro Muslim population had already been fighting for autonomy for over a 
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century. The recent decades of battle against the government of the Philippines led the 
Moros to seek external support by becoming an AQ affiliate—while offering them a 
sanctuary, support, and training location. Unfortunately for U.S. military planners, the 
political environment in the Philippines was one where the nation had struggled for over 
six centuries against external occupiers for autonomy and sovereign control of their 
population and territory. The government of the Philippines had established their 
sovereign right, and the U.S. found itself in a situation where it “cannot simply enter 
sovereign countries unilaterally and conduct kill-or-capture missions.”389 
As the U.S. responded to the events of 9/11,the newly appointed president of the 
Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, visited Washington D.C. in November of 2001. 
Arroyo was having significant problems with Moro insurgents in the South. Of 
importance to the U.S. was the linkage of these groups to the trans-national terrorist 
organizations Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and potentially, Al 
Qaeda. The ASG was responsible for operations that had specifically targeted Western 
and American interests, including the abduction of the Burnhams prior to 9/11.390 In 
response, Arroyo requested and accepted the assistance of the U.S. military to “advise, 
train and assist the AFP in the fight against the ASG.”391 This assistance began with the 
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise Balikatan 02–0,392 a previously 
scheduled element of U.S. Pacific Commands Theatre Security Cooperation Plan 
(TSCP). Though Balikatan 02–01 was directly linked to the Global War on Terror, which 
was already being conducted directly in Afghanistan, it was still legally considered an 
exercise and not a contingency operation.393 Therefore, when the initial conditions for 
U.S. forces were immediately set, they included legal prohibitions, strict operational 
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directives, and host-nation caveats.394 These initial conditions have been held over from 
2002, throughout the still-continuing mission in the Philippines. 
Due to the clear prohibition on foreign militaries conducting combat operations in 
Philippine territory, as well as the extreme sensitivity to Philippine sovereign rights, the 
only method to bring U.S. troops into the Philippines was under the preexisting Visiting 
Forces Agreement (VFA), which allowed U.S. participation in joint exercises. The VFA 
and the exercise-specific Terms of Reference (TOR) laid out strict rules of engagement 
(ROE). The ROE stated that “armed force up to and including deadly force was 
authorized for U.S. troops in self-defense and in defense or protection of U.S. troops, 
U.S. citizens, Philippine Forces, and third-country citizens designated by JTF-510, as 
well as in protection of AFP property and U.S. mission-essential property.”395 U.S. forces 
were not permitted to initiate combat operations, but they could react and defend if 
necessary,396 conduct and assist medical evacuations, and advise and assist AFP combat 
operations down to the battalion level (while not actually participating).397  
COL David Maxwell, a former JSOTF-P Commander, elaborates: “Theater-level 
and national-level U.S. military leaders did not understand, to a certain extent, the SF 
concepts of employment and capabilities in a combat advisory mission during 
unconventional warfare. The combatant commander and the Secretary of Defense 
imposed restrictions on SF soldiers’ ability to efficiently conduct operations to 
accomplish the mission. Specifically, because of force-protection considerations, 
American SF advisers were restricted to operating at battalion level with their AFP 
counterparts and were not allowed to operate at lower tactical echelons required to be 
effective in combat situations, which was a strategic error. The belief that U.S. soldiers 
would be safe at a battalion headquarters implied the existence of front lines and a rear 
area, which is a fundamental misunderstanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorist  
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conditions. To see this clearly, consider that the only U.S. combat casualty in OEF-P 
occurred just outside an AFP division headquarters when a terrorist bomb killed a U.S. 
soldier.”398  
A force cap was also specified in the TOR; this kept the number of U.S. forces 
able to enter the country and participate in the mission under 660, which included 500 
troops at the headquarters and 160 Special Forces advisors at the battalion level.399 This 
number would fluctuate over the decades, but would never exceed the strict caps 
designated by the government of the Philippines (GRP). During large joint exercises, the 
numbers would rise to a few thousand, as visiting U.S. forces would be added to the 
already present JSOTF-P U.S. forces. Additionally, U.S. forces were not permitted to 
build any permanent bases or hard structures. “Special Forces teams live, eat, train, and 
work with their Philippine security-force counterparts, and they have since 2001. In the 
Philippines, the only bases and outposts are Philippine. All U.S. forces are integrated 
with military and police units in tactical outposts at the invitation of the Philippine Armed 
Forces Commanders. All arrangements—living, working, billeting, operational—are 
subject to the consent of Philippine commanders, from the Philippine chief of staff down 
to tactical Philippine infantry battalion commanders.”400  
Furthermore, strict operational mission constraints were placed on the U.S. forces 
and the concepts of operations (CONOPs) were scrutinized to ensure that risk was 
mitigated, force protection considered, and political caveats obeyed. 401 Most 
importantly, because the AFP was the primary counterinsurgent and conducting combat 
operations, it was critical that U.S. forces and the AFP operate within the rule of law, 
obeying the Philippine ROE and respecting the Philippine criminal justice system—to 
include, if necessary, incorporating the national police and obtaining arrest warrants.402 
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Philippine sensitivity to these matters was highlighted in 2003, when the U.S. and PI 
began to prepare for the next annual Balikatan exercise. Balikatan 03–01 would be 
modeled along the lines of the 2002 exercise, only with more troops (around 3,000), and 
a different location, Mindanao and Sulu Islands. The Arroyo government received 
significant criticism for their handling of the lead-up. Some in the Philippine public went 
as far as accusing the president of striking a secret deal with the U.S., which would allow 
the 3,000 exercise participants to conduct combat operations on Jolo Island. Ultimately, 
the Arroyo government came out publically with statements which “insisted that U.S. 
troops would not be allowed to fight in the Philippines, they will not be on combat 
missions, the guidance of the president is very clear, there will be no violation of the 
constitution or any of its laws.”403 Exercise Balikatan 03–01 was executed under the 
same restrictions as the previous operations, with the addition that U.S. forces would not 
accompany AFP units on combat patrols on Jolo Island. 
German military historian Hans Delbruck “suggests that there are two kinds of 
military strategy: the strategy of annihilation, which seeks to overthrow the enemy’s 
military power, and the strategy of attrition, exhaustion, or erosion, which is usually 
employed by a strategist whose means are not great enough to permit pursuit of the direct 
overthrow of the enemy and who therefore resorts to the indirect approach.”404 The 
second strategy of Delbruck is what the United States found itself having to execute in 
OEF-P. Because U.S. forces could not go directly at the enemy or the problem in the 
Southern Philippines, another methodology for operations had to be used; this became 
known as the indirect approach.405 
In 2006, Colonel Greg Wilson wrote an article which describes the JSOTF-P 
approach titled, Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation OEF Philippines and the 
Indirect Approach. In his article, he describes how the JSOTF-P has maintained a focus 
on working side-by-side with the Philippine host nation government to use all elements 
of the country’s national power to set conditions and an environment in the Southern 
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Philippines which will reject insurgents and allow the Philippine government to identify, 
isolate, and ultimately dismantle insurgent and trans-national terrorist organizations.406 
Wilson describes a holistic approach based on the McCormick Diamond model, which 
“establishes a comprehensive framework for interactions between the host-nation 
government, the insurgents, the local populace, and international actors or sponsors.”407 
This method focuses on six fundamentals: 1. Consider popular support as the center of 
gravity, 2. Enhance government legitimacy and control, 3. Focus on people’s needs and 
security, 4. Target insurgent safe havens, infrastructure, and support, 5. Share 
intelligence, and 6. Develop indigenous security forces.408 
Because of the restrictions stated earlier, the JSOTF-P was forced into operating 
in a way that it most likely would not have chosen on its own. Without these restrictions, 
it is entirely possible that the U.S. would have chosen a more unilateral U.S.-style direct 
combat operation. Lieutenant General Fridovich, the current Deputy SOCOM 
Commander, former commander of SOCPAC, and one of the first commanders of the 
mission in the Philippines, describes the indirect course of action. The U.S.  “must blend 
host nation capacity-building and other long-term efforts to address root causes, dissuade 
future terrorists, and reduce recruiting…The indirect approach demands diplomacy and 
respect for political sensitivities. SOCPAC focuses on working in close coordination with 
host nation military and political leadership, law enforcement, and U.S. country teams in 
the region (to include the U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of 
State Public Diplomacy officials). These stakeholders share the responsibility of 
capacity-building and leverage each others’ strengths and synchronize efforts.”409   
This indirect approach is essential to understanding how the U.S. military has 
been influencing the strategy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines over the last ten 
years. The indirect approach uses all assets of U.S. power, including U.S. military 
capacity and capabilities, to discreetly influence host nation operations toward specified 
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goals.410 In the case of the Philippines, these goals, as publically stated, are “to support 
the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight 
against terrorism in the southern Philippines. At the request of the Government of the 
Philippines, JSOTF-P works alongside the AFP to defeat terrorists and create the 
conditions necessary for peace, stability, and prosperity.”411 However, what does this 
truly mean? It means that the U.S. is trying to defeat terrorist networks and organizations, 
deny sanctuary, and eliminate international and domestic support to them—support 
which will allow the organizations to conduct offensive operations against the United 
States. These goals are generally, and ultimately, the goals of any counterinsurgent. This 
is LTC Petit’s premise in Thinking COIN but Practicing FID.412  FID, or Foreign Internal 
Defense, is defined by the United States military as “the participation by civilian and 
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.  
The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation’s (HN’s) internal 
defense and development (IDAD), which can be described as the full range of measures 
taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from the security threats 
described above.”413 Petit is clear when he points out that this is an important distinction 
to understand—that the U.S. goals may be counterinsurgency, but the method and the 
mindset used in the operation must be one of FID. He continues:  
“This distinction is critical for two reasons: (1) The Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines, not the U.S., is directly responsible for 
combating insurgents, terrorists and lawless elements; (2) the U.S. role is 
to support a sovereign nation in both building the capacity of its armed 
and civil-security forces, and applying that capacity against violent 
extremists operating in under governed regions. Tactically, the indirect 
approach requires clear-eyed recognition that U.S. capacity will be applied 
through, and not around, the host nation. This paradigm seems simple, but 
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it runs counter to U.S. military “candoism” and requires a long-term view 
and immense operational patience. The indirect approach does not satisfy 
appetites for quick, measurable results. By building capacity with host 
nation security forces and simultaneously applying population-focused, 
civil-military programs, the indirect approach rarely produces singularly 
spectacular results in tactical engagements. Measures of effectiveness are 
often best assessed over time and anecdotally.”414 
So how is the U.S. military in the Philippines actually able to—while thinking COIN 
and practicing FID—influence the sovereign government of the Philippines and it’s 
military without offending a critical ally in the Pacific? First, the current FID mission in 
the Philippines has drawn on the decades-old foundation of joint security cooperation 
between the United States and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The U.S. and the PI, 
since World War II, have shared in a combined Theatre Security Cooperation Plan. This 
plan includes funding, training exercises, equipment sales, and status of forces 
agreements. There are many other aspects to this program, but the bottom line is that both 
countries are deeply embedded within each other’s national security interests in the 
Pacific.415  
This strong foundation of joint combined cooperation was built on top of one 
hundred years of relationship building, which included the American Colonial period, the 
critical World War II years, and the Cold War years, which together cemented a 
permanent U.S./PI alliance. With this foundation, the U.S. has been able to embed 
military advisers and influences at all level of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. With 
strong these trusting relationships, and this persistent presence and access achieved—the 
U.S. has been able to “implement the “indirect approach” methodology, applying U.S. 
capacity strictly “through or with” the Armed Forces of the Philippines against a common 
enemy and for the population. The indirect approach is both a philosophy and a method 
that is inculcated into all practitioners of military strategy. The heart of the strategy is 
based on building relationships, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security-force 
capabilities, sharing intelligence and information, developing focused civil-military 
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programs, and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance. The indirect 
approach requires the discreet application of U.S. influence and assistance. Leaders 
continually calibrate the political implications of their actions, and quickly implement 
adjustments at the local level.”416  
E. WEAPONS / TECHNOLOGY 
1. Anti-Government Forces 
The anti-government forces operating throughout the Philippine Islands have truly 
operated with an irregular attitude towards weapons and technology. They have sought to 
leverage an advantage using already-existing technologies. These organizations have 
neither the ways nor the means to develop new technologies that can directly challenge 
the GRP or AFP, so they must therefore make do with what is available. This situation 
has produced interesting results in three areas: weapons, explosives, and information 
operations. 
 For weapons, the anti-government forces rely on small arms and light indirect fire 
assets acquired by any means possible. It is estimated that the MILF has roughly 8,000 
firearms, and that the ASG has approximately 400.417 For example, many weapons have 
been acquired from past conflicts, such as WWII, captured from the AFP, and/or 
purchased from external sources throughout the region. In terms of weaponry, there are 
no truly significant aspects of acquisition or operations other than what is normally seen 
during a guerrilla conflict. 
 One area of interest is the significant use of explosives during this conflict. 
Bombs are routinely used to attack the AFP, the GRP, and civilians, both inside and 
outside of the sanctuary areas. Some of the most notable examples are the Super Ferry 14 
bombing and the Rizal Bombings on 30 December 2000—where five simultaneous 
explosions killed 22 and injured over 120 people. The three U.S. casualties killed in 
action by the enemy in the Philippines were all killed by bombs: one was killed by a 
motorcycle-borne suicide bomb, and an improvised explosive device that destroyed their 
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military vehicle killed the other two.418 In 2007, the Human Rights Watch organization 
published a report on the victims of bombings and militant violence within the 
Philippines since 2000.  
“Since January 2000, violent Islamist groups in the Philippines have 
carried out over 40 major bombings against civilians and civilian property, 
mostly in the south of the country. Attacks on Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo, 
and other southern islands have killed nearly 400 civilians and injured 
well over a thousand more. Bombs have been set off in urban centers, 
markets, and stores, airports, on ferryboats and wharfs, and on rural roads 
and highways. They have killed Philippine civilians indiscriminately, 
Christians and Muslims, men and women, parents and children, and left 
behind orphans, widows, and widowers. Hundreds of other victims have 
suffered severe wounds, burns, and lost limbs. In all, bombings against 
civilians in the Philippines have caused over 1,700 casualties in the last 
seven years, more than the number of people killed and injured in 
bombing attacks during the same period in neighboring Indonesia 
(including the 2002 Bali bombings), and considerably more than the 
number of those killed and injured in bombings in Morocco, Spain, 
Turkey, or Britain.”419  
 These numbers show the extensive use of explosive attacks throughout the 
conflict. The fact that the largest number of victims are civilians and not AFP or U.S. 
military, underlines the point that terrorism is one of the most prevalent tactics and lines 
of operation in the strategy of the anti-government forces. 
 A second area that the SPSG and Islamic terrorist organizations have taken 
advantage of is in the realm of information operations. These organizations have taken 
advantage of the World Wide Web to recruit, promote operations, spread propaganda, 
and galvanize the population to support their cause. In using the Internet, these 
organizations have found a medium which is difficult for the government to control, easy 
for the population to access, and easy for the organizations to update without significant 
exposure.420 
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2. Government Forces 
 The AFP and the U.S. military in the Philippines have executed a remarkably low 
campaign budget in the Southern Philippines. It is reported that the U.S. spends $52 
million a year on OEF-P. By contrast, the wars in Iraq cost $100 Billion a year, and in 
Afghanistan $30 Billion.421 In 1989, the U.S. supported the Philippines with over $300 
million dollars in economic, military, and land reform aid, while simultaneously 
beginning the closure of U.S. bases and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippine 
islands. By 1992, all U.S. bases in the Philippines were closed.422 After 9/11, President 
Arroyo “accepted President George W. Bush’s offer of $100 million in military 
assistance (including a C-130 turboprop aircraft and 30,000 M-16 rifles) and $4.6 Billion 
in economic aid. She also stated that she would allow the U.S. military to advise, train, 
and assist the AFP in the fight against the ASG.”423 While this is a large sum of money to 
be used in the war on terror, remarkably little was spent on high-end technology. For the 
most part, the money was spent on supporting the force and keeping operations running. 
For example, in 2003, the U.S. State Department gave the AFP a $25 Million counter-
terrorism grant. This money was spent on building the capacity and capability of the 
Light Reaction Companies, the AFP’s top-tier counter terror unit. “The AFP soldiers 
were outfitted with reinforced vests, weapons, and other gear. The grant also paid for 
ammunition and shooting practice.”424 Despite a high degree of support from the U.S. 
military, in many situations the AFP still has to work with what they have. As reported by 
the author Max Boot, “The Philippine Armed Forces are sorely restricted in their capacity 
for precision bombing. Several Philippine and American soldiers we spoke with 
expressed frustration that the Philippine armed forces lack armed Predator drones, AC-
130 gunships, satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions, and other high-tech U.S. 
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weapons that could more quickly finish off terrorist leaders. But the Philippine 
government isn’t willing to pay for this fancy gear, and the U.S. government hasn’t been 
willing to donate it.”425 
 Outside of the traditional weapons of the AFP (small arms, explosives, indirect 
fire systems including artillery and mortars, armored and unarmored vehicles, and 
aviation attack and support), the AFP has tried new technologies on an old problem. Two 
areas where technology has been leveraged against the problem by the AFP are 
information operations and intelligence gathering.  
The AFP, like its adversaries, has also learned that the Internet and cellular phone 
services are an efficient way of making contact with the population, which is being 
contested for by both the insurgents and the government. For example, the AFP has 
initiated a text messaging campaign that encourages the population to participate in peace 
promotion programs, and to report information on enemies of peace.426 
 The use of aerial surveillance platforms, including the U.S. P3 Orions,427 and 
small Unmanned Arial Vehicles,428 by the AFP to conduct surveillance and 
reconnaissance against insurgents has been documented during the last decade. Though 
this technology may be assisting in gathering intelligence, it certainly has not turned the 
tide in favor of the AFP, nor has it alleviated the need to gather intelligence through 
traditional means, or the need to put boots on the ground to clear, hold, consolidate, and 
develop. 
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F. ANALYSIS / CONCLUSION  
 
Figure 11. GWOT irregular warfare characteristics 
The three major players in the Global War on Terror era in the Philippines have 
all exhibited a high degree of irregular warfare thinking in the implementation of their 
strategies. The Anti-government forces have organized clandestinely, taken advantage of 
safe havens, and utilized near and far attacks in an attempt to discredit the GRP’s 
legitimacy, while simultaneously increasing their own legitimacy. The GRP has built a 
robust special operation capability throughout the entire AFP. These SOF forces have 
been routinely utilized to use their irregular warfare skills to help combat the irregular 
threat in the South. The United States has played the dual roles of player and strong 
influencer of GRP action during the war on terror. After 9/11, U.S. financial support and 
military support to the AFP increased dramatically. The largest example is the JSOTF-P, 
which has been conducting its mission continuously for over a decade. This special 
operations task force is quintessentially irregular, using all facets of non-conventional 
warfare to wage a protracted, slow burning war against terror organizations. The era of 
the war on terror is an excellent example of three different players who all understand 
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irregular warfare in context: they all understand the benefits and limitations of such a 
strategy, and work within these limits to achieve political goals. 
By looking at the organization, the doctrine, and the use of technology, we have 
seen that all of the characteristics of irregular warfare are present in this most recent 
period. Both the anti-government and government forces have used small units in their 
fight, either for survival or tactical necessity. Some large units have been used, creating 
hybrid scenarios; mainly these are by the AFP using larger conventional units to conduct 
counterinsurgency and population resource control operations.  
Tactically, both sides have routinely used irregular warfare. Guerrilla tactics, 
insurgent operations, terrorism, and special operations have played a prominent role in 
the GWOT. These tactics have been used in support of prolonged campaigns that aim to 
wear down the opposition, to attrite them out of the fight. For the AFP, because the 
enemy resides within the population, annihilation is not an option. If lasting peace is ever 
to be had, a willing population must be a part of the solution. For anti-government forces, 
the prolonged conflict and attrition stems from their dominant issue of being under 
resourced, especially when compared to the AFP with their U.S. backing. 
In technological terms, the anti-government forces have—again, due to lack of 
resourcing—resorted to the more traditional guerrilla characteristic of making do with 
what is available. Often they have tried to leverage what is on hand, primarily by using 
whatever means available to make and use bombs for terrorism. On the government side, 
the AFP has benefited from U.S. technological support. Specifically, we have seen how 
the U.S. has supported intelligence with UAVs, and also contributed greatly to the civil 
military operation resourcing throughout the Southern Islands. 
In all, the era is a good example of the Filipino way of war, and it demonstrates a 
continued reliance on irregular warfare well into the 21st century.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“This country has been and is very rich in guerrilla activities.” 
      -Robert T. Yap-Diangco429 
 
The idea of this thesis was to conduct an exploratory study of Filipino military 
history with the purpose of identifying a Filipino Way of War. Beginning in Filipino 
prehistory, and then tracing history through the colonial, Japanese occupation, post -
independence, and global war on terror eras, a common thread has been identified. This is 
that irregular warfare strategy has played a dominant role in Filipino military action. By 
understanding this Filipino method, or way of war, we are then better able to understand 
the nature of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and anti-Philippine Government 
organizations. With a more complete understanding of the background of Filipino 
military operations, it is expected that a better perspective for future operations will be 
gained. Better perspective brings along increased organizational understanding, 
operational efficiency, and a greater potential for mission success. Most importantly 
understanding the inherent tendencies of the organization will allow us to identify 
strengths and weaknesses of possible strategies against threats to the Philippine Nation. 
In order to identify irregular warfare, we have deduced a set of characteristics that 
could be found throughout Filipino warfare history. These characteristics were developed 
by cross comparing the work of Dr. John Arquilla and Russell Weigley on military 
strategy. Weigley’s The American Way of War is important to this study, because it 
outlines the antithesis of irregular warfare. His study of American military strategy sets a 
good definition of total warfare, or warfare with the goal of annihilation. His model says 
that annihilation warfare is the act of applying overwhelming military power directly at 
an enemy, with the goal of totally destroying their ability to make war. Once an enemy is 
annihilated, then political will can be applied without opposition. In application, this type 
of warfare is demonstrated when large militaries use mass formations and firepower 
directly against the enemy. In this warfare, the units of action are armies, divisions, fleets, 
                                                 
429 Yap-Diangco, The Filipino Guerrilla Tradition, vii. 
 150 
air wings, and large weapon systems. These types of forces must be well-resourced, 
operationally and logistically, or they can only have limited hopes for success. This 
becomes another characteristic of conventional warfare: the well-resourced force. A large 
force is expensive, difficult to operate, and difficult to maintain, therefore the desired 
effect for it is a quick and decisive victory. The sooner that the conflict is over, the better 
the result is for the nation that wields these forces. The best example of this is the large 
militaries of World War II. Overwhelming amounts of resources were necessary to 
maintain the martial effort, therefore, the quickest way to victory was much sought after. 
An interesting aspect of conventional warfare is that well-resourced and funded forces 
often look to technological advancement in weapons to gain advantage over other 
conventional militaries.430 
In contrast, because those without the capacity or capability for large-scale 
conventional war more commonly execute irregular warfare, the characteristics are 
markedly different. Units tend to be small for the sake of survival and tactical 
circumstances. Tactics and doctrine for irregular forces take advantage of the small size, 
as well as the nature and purpose of the unit. Generally, these tactics take the form of 
guerrilla, insurgent, or special operations. Because these forces are vulnerable to large 
conventional militaries, due to their size and nature, they must often require longer and 
more protracted conflict. This allows them to gain resources and attack when the 
opportunity is right. Because the irregular force is not able to annihilate a larger, better-
resourced opponent or achieve a quick and decisive victory over them, they must more 
commonly seek to attrite their enemies. They seek to diminish their enemies’ capacity or 
will to fight over time through many small victories. These small victories add up, until 
the larger victory is achieved. These two styles of warfare are shown side-by-side in 
Figure 12.  431 
                                                 
430 Weigley, The American Way of War, xx. 
431 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 6. 
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Figure 12. Comparison of conventional and irregular warfare characteristics 
Terrain or geography and the nature of the threat certainly does play a role in the 
choice of strategy used. This is particularly true throughout the history of Philippine 
warfare, which has taken place in a region classed as very difficult terrain for any military 
operation. Thick jungles, mountainous ranges, and the vast island archipelago consisting 
of over seven thousand islands certainly have had some impact on the military thinking of 
the Filipino warrior. However, these factors, terrain and threat, are not the only factors 
involved in strategy choice. They are combined with the sum of the organizations 
character. In this case, it is over five hundred years of Filipino irregular warfare practice. 
The Filipino warrior does weigh the situation specific factors but he frames them with his 
combined experiences and traditions. An outside example where organizational character 
sways strategy choices in the face of geography and threat is the U.S. war in Vietnam. 
The United States military when faced with an irregular and later hybrid enemy in 
difficult terrain chose strategy based upon their tradition and organizational character. For 
the U.S., this was the use of large conventional forces very well resourced to annihilate 
the enemy. This strategy had been successful in World War I and II and reasonably 
successful in the Korean War. The U.S. military did develop irregular capability and 
capacity during the Vietnam War because of terrain and threat, but it did not become the 
primary American strategy.  
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Another later example of this with the United States is in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan where despite the irregular nature of the conflicts, the U.S. military used 
conventional strategy. Only later in the wars, when conventional strategy was failing, did 
irregular operations become more prevalent. The U.S. military is the most well resourced 
militaries in history, and is able to simultaneously sustain conventional and irregular 
forces in their inventory. This allows the U.S. military to toggle between strategies based 
upon terrain, threat, or circumstance. Even now as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, 
there is a renewed call to return to roots and refocus on classic combat skills, the 
American tradition of high-intensity conventional maneuver warfare. 
Neither terrain, threat, nor traditions are singularly responsible for the Filipino 
irregular way of war. All three must be taken into account holistically to understand the 
nature of the Filipino warrior. Throughout military history, the Filipino warrior has 
fought on the same terrain consistently throughout every conflict. Cultural tradition is 
also generally consistent, slowly evolving over the centuries. The threats have been more 
varied by nature, spanning the warfare spectrum from the highly conventional to the 
highly irregular. Yet despite the differences in threats, irregular warfare has been 
prevalent in every era. 
   
When comparing conventional and irregular warfare an exception can be found. 
This exception is a scenario where a large standing conventional military conducts 
irregular warfare. This is most commonly seen in the form of special operations. When a 
large military uses small units, irregular doctrine, and seeks irregular effects and 
objectives, such as protracted conflicts and attrition, (Figure 12) they are using a hybrid 
strategy.432 According to Dr. John Arquilla, when executing a hybrid strategy, a military 
planner must have “a willingness to recognize both the mixed nature of many military 
campaigns and, frequently, the just-off-stage presence of substantial conventional 
forces.”433 Because there are significant differences in the effects, objectives, and 
methods of these two strategies, it is most important for the military planner and executer 
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to understand which strategy these are using, and when the strategy is hybrid. When it is 
hybrid, there must be recognition of when and how each method is being implemented, 
and for what purpose. 
Throughout the five eras of Filipino warfare addressed in this study, we have 
followed a distinctive trend in Filipino irregular warfare. In each era, the fundamentals of 
Dr. John Arquilla’s definition, and the identified characteristics of irregular warfare, are 
present. This definition, and these characteristics, arise from a military situation where at 
least one of the belligerents is at a distinctive disadvantage—one where they do not 
possess the means or might to directly challenge their rival. Without the ability to directly 
challenge, they must therefore look for an indirect method of challenge. These indirect 
challenges often include the three characteristics, or legs, of irregular warfare: small 
units, guerrilla or special operations tactics, and terrorism.434 This study has distinctly 
traced how irregular warfare has been the dominant form of warfare conducted by the 
Filipino warrior for centuries. This strategy of warfare has always stemmed from a lack 
of resources. Both anti-government and government forces have used irregular warfare 
strategies to make up for a lack of military resources and/or an inability to directly attack 
and annihilate their enemies. Despite the lack of military resources, both sides have 
harnessed what is available in abundance for victory: the Filipino population.  
                                                 
434 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 6. 
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Figure 13. Irregular warfare characteristics through the Filipino warfare eras 
 
When the characteristics are presented, it is seen that all of them are represented, 
in every era, by at least one of the participants. Terrorism is considered an irregular tactic, 
but it is broken out here because of its sensitivity. In the later eras, when the conflicts are 
Filipino versus Filipino, all of the characteristics continue to be seen, at times from both 
sides of the conflict. Importantly, we have seen that the organization and tactics are a 
result of the units being relatively under resourced and needing to conduct a protracted 
and attrition based campaign. Two of Dr. Arquilla’s three legs of the irregular warfare 
triad, small units and irregular tactics, are present through the full range of history—
never all at once, or in every occasion—however, with enough regularity to support our 
conclusion. Terrorism, his third leg, has only become prevalent in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
Through the analysis of organization, doctrine, and use of technology, we have 
identified a growth stream for the method of war. Filipinos have commonly used small 
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units in order to maximize survivability against better-resourced opponents. Hand-in-
hand with small units, Filipinos regularly employed guerrilla and or special operations 
tactics—for example, by hiding among the population or within a safe haven, and then 
striking against the enemy when opportunity presented itself, and finally returning back 
to safety. This tactical pattern is commonly seen in every era.  
The Filipino irregular way of war began with the tribal foundation of the barangay 
battle culture that, by analogy, created a kind of irregular warfare cultural DNA in the 
Filipino makeup. The Spanish and American colonial periods were a sort of adolescent 
time for Filipino irregular warfare, a time when lessons were hard-learned as the Filipino 
warrior tested what irregular warfare could accomplish. The Japanese occupation can be 
likened to a finishing school for Filipino irregular warfare. During the Japanese 
occupation, guerrilla warfare was extensive throughout the Philippine Islands, and 
multiple types of irregular warfare were conducted by many different organizations. This 
was a true coming-of-age period, where a majority of the Filipino population was 
exposed to the method and effectiveness of this style of warfare. Along this same line of 
thought, the post-independence period, which included the second half of the 20th 
century and the beginning of the 21st century, can be thought of as the adult years of 
Filipino irregular warfare. During this time, many different organizations, including the 
Philippine government, used irregular warfare to compete for political goals.  
There is a certain maturity that coincides with the regularity or commonality of 
the use of irregular warfare in the modern Philippines. This comes from the slow growth 
and complete acceptance of this style of warfare by the Filipino culture over the 
centuries. How long will this adulthood last? This is uncertain; we cannot know until it is 
over. What is important is that analysis is conducted and understood—then used to 
increase self-awareness, and adjust operations accordingly. 
Filipino history shows that battle can often be characterized as being between the 
weak and the strong. Due to an inherent lack of resources, the weak have had to resort to 
unconventional methods in confronting the strong, in order to offset their disadvantages, 
and prolong the conflict. When using irregular warfare, the weak are trying to buy time to 
become stronger or achieve parity with their opponents. It is to the advantage of the weak 
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to prolong the conflict, and simultaneously, make the cost higher for the stronger 
opponent. Hence, the strong will always prefer a quick and decisive outcome to the war. 
This history can have practical application to today’s Philippine military 
environment. Contemporary history has shown how the AFP has evolved, particularly in 
terms of organization and tactics/doctrine/strategy, to adapt to the demands of current 
conflicts. More than demonstrating the use of small units and special operations units, the 
AFP has shown that a mix of conventional and unconventional approaches can be used 
successfully to fight a largely unconventional conflict. 
Future threat to the Philippine nation will not necessarily come in the form of an 
irregular conflict. Generally, any military threat will come from either an external or an 
internal source, and will take the form of a conventional threat, an irregular threat, or 
some form of hybrid. 
 
Figure 14. Philippine National Threats 
In Figure 14, we have simplified and categorized the threats in order to 
conceptualize each. According to this categorization, there are four possible threat 
scenarios. Each has its own unique attributes, risk, and potential. An external 
conventional threat is possible because there are South East Asian regional powers that 
have the capacity and capability to produce a military that could invade the Philippines. 
While the likelihood of this is low, it is possible and must be considered. If a large 
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conventional military did invade the Philippines, we considered this the most dangerous 
scenario. This is primarily because the AFP conventional formations are generally quite 
limited, and have a restricted ability to force project outside of the archipelago. An 
internal conventional threat is also possible, but considered the least likely threat. This 
threat would have to come from either a rogue AFP unit or a very well resourced anti-
government force. This is a dangerous scenario but within the capabilities of the AFP to 
respond to. Opposite to conventional threats, irregular threats have a seemingly higher 
likelihood. Considering that, external and internal irregular threats are currently ongoing 
in the Philippines. An external irregular threat has a moderate likelihood because there 
are very few irregular organizations in existence that are also transnational. JI, AQ, and 
the LET are a few examples from recent history. If this threat did exist, it would pose a 
danger to the Philippines, but could be contained. Most likely is an internal irregular 
threat of which there are a number ongoing in the Philippines. This threat also poses the 
most danger, because an irregular threat requires sanctuary among the population and by 
definition, an internal threat means that some form of the population is already willing to 
accept the irregular threat as legitimate and the government as de-legitimate. Meaning the 
threat group already has some portion of the population that will protect and enable them. 
It is important to understand how the AFP is capable of dealing with each of the 
four threats described. Does the Filipino irregular way of war have limitations or 
advantages when confronted with any of these threats? 
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Figure 15. The Filipino way of war against potential national threats 
Against either internal or external irregular threats, the irregular nature of the AFP 
and the Filipino way of war would function well. The AFP would be fully capable of 
combating irregular threats with current organization, tactics, and technology. Certain 
aspects would have to be adjusted for the specifics of the threat, terrain, and environment, 
but the baseline makeup would be sufficient. If necessary, this irregular capability could 
also be combined with AFP conventional capability, national police, and the justice 
system to fully combat the irregular threat. An internal conventional threat likewise could 
also be contained and combated without major adjustments to the current AFP. This is 
assuming that the internal threat would be of sufficiently limited size that the AFP would 
still have the advantage in resources. An external conventional threat is the most 
dangerous; because it offers the scenario that the AFP is least organized to combat. Most 
of the Philippines conventional deterrent relies upon direct support from the United States 
as required by the Mutual Defense Treaty. This offers risk to the AFP because it is 
relying on a third party that, likely would, but hypothetically, may not honor the 
agreement. The AFP could deter with its own irregular SOF forces, but this would require 
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an increase force projection capability. The most likely scenario would be a conflict 
similar to the Japanese occupation of World War II. An initial conventional defense could 
be established, if defeated, then the AFP could continue by waging a guerrilla conflict, 
until enough resources and support could be mustered to directly challenge the enemy. 
One of the more interesting aspects of the Filipino irregular way of war is 
resistance to the American way of war. The United States has certainly imparted a 
significant amount of influence on the AFP over the last century. After the U.S.’s 
successful COIN campaign of 1898–1902, and throughout the American colonial period 
and the post-independence period, the U.S.-directed development of the AFP would be 
along the lines of the conventional American model. 435  The most significant influence 
would come in the structure of the AFP organization, which would be modeled directly 
like the U.S. military. With this type of organization came an implied military strategy: 
conventional warfare. At this stage of military development, there was no reason to 
believe that the American way of war was not the superior way of war. U.S. success in 
World War II had established the dominance of the U.S. in military affairs and solidified 
the importance of annihilation warfare.  
The Philippines was declared a commonwealth by the United States in 1935, but 
true independence would have to wait.436 Post World War II, the Filipino people gained 
their long sought after independence, and with it, a completely new series of internal 
conflicts. While the U.S. had granted autonomous rule, American business and military 
influence was still strong throughout these transition years.437 The United States 
continued to maintain large naval and air bases on the Philippine islands. With the Cold 
War heating up in the Pacific, the United States and the Philippines were committed to an 
alliance to defend each other from any external threat through the Mutual Defense Treaty 
of 1951. In application, the MDT meant that the United States would secure the 
Philippines and respond to any invasion—but in return, the U.S. would use the 
Philippines as a key lager and staging area. The U.S. and the Philippines maintained a 
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robust cooperative alliance during this time, with the Philippine army even contributing 
to the U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam.438 Out of this relationship was the largest period 
of conventional growth for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Resourced, 
trained, and mentored by the United States, the AFP grew their conventional capabilities 
for future Cold War combat. 
The U.S. model is seen primarily in the organization of the conventional and 
special operations units within the AFP. In the Army, for example, which is the oldest 
service in the AFP, standard organizations are the divisions, brigades and battalions. The 
major arms in the service are the infantry, artillery, and armor, supported by the engineers 
and support services. Special operations units of the AFP include the Army’s Scout 
Rangers, Special Forces, and Light Reaction Battalion, along with the Navy’s special 
warfare group (equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs). Their general makeup and purpose 
is modeled directly after the United States military. Despite these organizational 
similarities, irregular warfare has remained highly dominant for two very specific 
reasons. First, despite that, the organization of the AFP was created for conventional 
warfare; it was not resourced properly for success in it by the GRP. Second, the conflicts 
that the AFP was involved in during the second half of the 20th century were internal 
conflicts of an irregular nature, conflicts that dictated a non-conventional or hybrid 
solution instead of an annihilation solution. 
In contemporary times, the Philippine environment would suggest that the threat 
to the nation’s security continues to come from largely internal threats, potentially 
supported by external actors. These internal threats are likely to continue well into the 
immediate future. For as long as socio-economic problems, the so-called root causes, 
remain unresolved, there is always a significant portion of the population that will help 
insurgents thrive. If the Philippines’ 2011Human Development Index (HDI),439 is used 
as a gauge, the percentage of population below the income poverty line is 22.6, and the 
percentage of population vulnerable to poverty is 9.1. These percentages, out of a current 
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long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. 
 161 
projected population of 94.01M,440 as of 2010 census, represent roughly 29.8M. This 
provides some idea of the vast numbers of the population that are deprived, marginalized 
and therefore, vulnerable to ideological/religious motivations to go against the 
government. In other words, resolving the socio-economic root causes of the existing 
insurgency problems remains an enormous challenge, considering the current 
environment. While it is just one among many other factors that relate to an insurgency, 
poverty cannot be easily discounted. This then presents a perpetual problem for the 
Philippines. It further indicates that insurgency will likely be an ongoing problem for the 
Philippine government and the military. 
The problem of insurgency, reckoned from the time of the founding of the 
CPP/NPA and the MILF, has already managed to exist for almost four decades. 
Throughout this period, its cost to the Philippine government and to society cannot be 
overemphasized. In the Mindanao conflict alone, the number of people killed between 
1970 and 1996 is estimated at 100,000.441 Likewise, for the same period, the AFP is said 
to have spent Php73 Billion, or an average of 40% of its annual budget, on the conflict in 
Mindanao.442 In the more recent war with the MILF in 2000, the then National Security 
Adviser Roilo Golez placed the cost at Php 6 Billion, at least.443 Relative to its impact on 
the economy, the Presidential Assistant for Regional Development, Paul Dominguez, told 
a civil-society forum in April 2002 on the cost of the Mindanao conflict that the 
economic cost of the continuing conflict would be at least $2 Billion over the next 10 
years.444 This amount does not include the costs for fighting the communist insurgency 
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and other threat groups, which is also substantial. What is clear is that the funds lost to 
these conflicts could have been used for other Philippine domestic priorities, including 
various development programs. 
Notwithstanding the costs, the ongoing conflict also presents the danger of 
apathy, not only to the Philippine society, but more so to the AFP. The duration of the 
conflict has reached a point where it is generally accepted as a normal function of life in 
the Philippines. Consequently, this presents the risk of losing that sense of urgency 
needed to end the conflict, or to contain it to a level where it no longer poses a challenge 
to Philippine society. Given the other factors required to address the insurgency, the 
holistic government and non-government stakeholders in society must increase their 
contribution to a solution, and not simply rely on a military solution. 
A practical military implication for the AFP is that fact that irregular warfare is 
likely to remain the nature/character of their conflicts. This emphasizes the need for a 
continuing—and more effective—AFP capability to conduct counter-guerrilla operations. 
This need would be best supported by additional training focused on small-unit tactics 
and leadership, and intelligence. An emphasis on civil-military operations and 
psychological operations would also complement combat operations. 
Furthermore, the current talks between the Philippine government and the 
insurgent groups put primacy on the peace process as a solution to end the conflict, as 
embodied in the latest Internal Peace and Security Plan “Bayanihan.”445 While the AFP 
abides with the national policy, it is crucial to recognize that the best way that the 
Philippine government can negotiate for peace is from a position of strength. This means 
that the AFP must be successful in its campaigns against the armed components of the 
various threat groups. The AFP, while supportive of the peace initiatives, cannot afford to 
endure debacles such as the October 2011, Basilan incident where the government forces 
lost 19 soldiers. Such incidents erode the public’s confidence in the AFP, as well as the 
government, while it emboldens armed groups. The AFP must increase its own 
legitimacy while simultaneously de-legitimize the various armed groups. Only then can 
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the threat groups be compelled to seriously participate at the negotiating table and invoke 
peace. In order for the peace process to work, the AFP must demonstrate, unquestionably, 
that it can fight for peace.  
By continuing to understand and develop a capacity for irregular warfare, the AFP 
will be better able to understand their adversaries. Thus, a more holistic 
counterinsurgency strategy can be developed, which focuses on placing responsibility for 
actions, a reliable justice system, rule of law, and reconciliation where appropriate. The 
continued incorporation of irregular warfare into AFP conventional warfare strategy will 
create more opportunity for success by building on organizational and cultural strengths. 
These conflicts should not be viewed as a competition between the organizations of the 
AFP, but a competition against all of the AFP and GRP. A holistic hybrid strategy will 
create successes by building on a predisposition for irregular warfare amongst the 
Filipino warriors. Setbacks must not create an excuse to abandon the strategy, but must 
foster self-reflection, and organizational growth. Had it not been for the Desert One 
Failure, USSOF may not have had the motivation or perspective needed to make changes 
which created, arguably, the finest special operations force in the history of warfare. 
External defense remains a constitutional mandate for the AFP. Threats from 
external aggression, however, continue to be remote. In the event of an external 
aggression, the Philippines can rely on its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United 
States. Notwithstanding, given the state of the AFP’s capability for external defense, the 
shift to guerrilla warfare, after conventional means have failed, will always remain a 
staple in the country’s overall defense plan. The AFP, together with the population, will 
resort to the kind of warfare that has been in existence since its pre-colonial days: 
guerrilla warfare. To this end, history will most likely repeat itself. 
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